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

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Compiled and edited by the Research Division, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, and published by the Public Information Branch
Design Management: Eric Plummer
Production: Don Matheson

*Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History / Lieux historiques canadiens: Cahiers d'archéologie et d'histoire* will be published as papers become available. Manuscripts may be submitted to Chief, Research Division, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H4, Canada.

Articles appearing in this series are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History/
Lieux historiques canadiens: Cahiers d'archéologie et d'histoire – No. 14

National Historic Parks and
Sites Branch
Parks Canada
Indian and Northern Affairs
Ottawa, 1975

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Price Canada: $5.75; Price other countries: $6.90
Catalogue No. R61-2/1-14
INA Publication No. QS-7012-000-BB-A1
Library of Congress Catalogue Card No.: 70-103875
Price subject to change without notice
Information Canada
Ottawa, 1975

Thorn Press Limited
Contract No. 07KX-A0767-5-5824

# The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830

by Robert S. Allen

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## Abstract

Initially formed in 1755 during the last great war for empire between France and England in North America, the Indian Department became the keystone of British policy for the wilderness interior. With the support of the local tribes and working closely with the British army, the department provided invaluable service during the American Revolution, the struggle for the Ohio valley and the War of 1812, and thus helped to preserve British jurisdiction and political institutions over much of British North America from the continuing threat of usurpation by American republicanism.

Submitted for publication, 1973,
by Robert S. Allen,
National Historic Parks and Sites
Branch, Ottawa

## Sommaire

Ce rapport traite principalement de l'établissement, de l'organisation et de l'histoire militaire du ministère britannique des affaires indiennes en Amérique du Nord. Durant les soixante-quinze premières années, l'importance de ce ministère résidait dans le rôle de défenseur des frontières et de gardien de la suprématie britannique qu'il exerçait en cherchant sans arrêt à s'assurer la fidélité des tribus indiennes au gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Durant la guerre de conquête entre la France et l'Angleterre en Amérique du Nord, sir William Johnson, poussé par son ambition personnelle et des intérêts économiques ainsi que par son attachment à la nation iroquoise, réussit à remporter de grandes victoires sur les Français et leurs alliés indiens. Sir William connut son plus grand succès diplomatique dans le domaine des affaires indiennes lorsqu'il accepta les propositions de paix de Pontiac en 1766 et qu'il changea officiellement la frontière indienne occidentale selon les clauses du traité de Fort Stanwix en 1768. Sa mort, survenue en 1774 à Johnson Hall, marqua la fin d'une époque pour le ministère.

Au moment de la Révolution américaine, le rôle militaire du ministère s'accrut. Celui-ci se chargea alors d'obtenir l'appui des tribus indiennes pour défendre la frontière. A cette occasion, les tribus servirent à sauvegarder la position stratégique des postes de l'ouest et à retarder la poussée américaine vers cette direction.

Durant les années qui suivirent immédiatement la guerre de la Révolution, les Indiens furent complètement perdus, face aux revendications territoriales et aux prétendus droits de conquête des Américains, d'une part, et devant les affirmations répétées et les promesses d'appui et de protection des Britanniques, d'autre part. Aux prises avec ce dilemme, la tribu algonquine tenta de regrouper les Indiens en un mouvement commun afin de s'opposer plus efficacement aux ambitions territoriales des Américains. Suite à cette initiative, un combat ardu s'engagea pour la possession de la vallée de l'Ohio et, malgré la défaite indienne et l'anéantissement de leurs revendications sur cette vallée, cette bataille permit de confirmer et de délimiter les institutions monarchiques de la Grande-Bretagne dans le Haut-Canada et d'empêcher le républicanisme américain d'envahir cette région.

Lorsque les Britanniques abandonnèrent les postes de l'ouest en 1796, le rôle du ministère perdit de l'importance, l'aide militaire des Indiens n'étant plus requise. La sérénité qui régna durant ces années de paix fut troublée par des accusations portées contre divers agents des affaires indiennes à propos de détournements de fonds et de mercantilisme exercés lors de la distributions des approvisionnements aux tribus.

Ces activités répréhensibles cessèrent devant la menace d'une nouvelle guerre avec les Etats-Unis. Les vieux rites de courtisanerie reprirent et les représentants britanniques des affaires indiennes cherchèrent à s'assurer le concours des chefs influents des conseils. Avant l'été 1812, grâce à une action remarquable de la part du personnel mi-

nistériel, les Anglais et les Indiens remportèrent des victoires rapides et décisives sur les forces américaines, de calibre supérieur mais insuffisamment préparées.

La guerre de 1812 se termina par le *status quo ante bellum* et, même si les institutions britanniques furent préservées dans le Haut-Canada, les nantissements indiens furent sacrifiés à la politique internationale. Les tribus, qui avaient perdu à tout jamais leurs terres ancestrales et ne pouvaient plus servir d'alliés militaires, durent accepter le nouveau système paternaliste des réserves. C'est ainsi que s'éteignit, vers 1830, l'influence du ministère britannique des affaires indiennes et ce fut la fin de son rôle militaire. Le ministère releva alors un nouveau défi, celui d'administrer les réserves indiennes par l'intermédiaire d'une direction de la fonction publique.

## The Regime of Sir William Johnson (1755-74)

### *Prologue*

Throughout the long wars for empire between France and England in North America, the allegiance of the Eastern Woodland tribes was of paramount importance to the success of both powers. An Iroquois alliance was particularly sought because of their political and military strength, and their strategic central location.[1] The Iroquois were kept outside the French fur-trading network, and as a result the confederacy was in constant conflict with the Huron and Neutral who controlled the trade from the north and west. Algonkian-speaking tribes also prevented the Iroquois from usurping the trade along the Ottawa River; and to the east, the Mohican controlled the Hudson River uplands. When their own hunting grounds became denuded of beaver by about 1640, the Iroquois were forced to turn increasingly to the Europeans for subsistence and the acquisition of trade goods, which rapidly became a necessary adjunct of their culture, both for trading purposes and for survival. As a result of the growing necessity for economic dependence, the formal inauguration of a British-Iroquois alliance resulted at Albany in 1664. The agreement was not an innovation in the relations between Iroquois and Europeans, but was merely a continuation of the policy of giving Albany merchants control of Indian affairs and trade, a legacy which was inherited from the Dutch who had made an informal agreement with the Mohawks in the 1640s.[2] The importance of this alliance was that it formed a barrier of frontier defence and as Thomas Dongan, governor of the royal colony of New York, later observed, the Iroquois "are a bulwark between us and the French and all other Indians."[3] Although French-Iroquois relations were in a condition of alternate peace and war during the 17th century as both sought to control the fur trade with the western Indians, the British succeeded in maintaining a peaceful cordiality with the Iroquois confederacy. Thus the Iroquois assisted in asserting the eventual trading supremacy of the British over the French, as well as providing a convenient first line of defence for the westward-expanding frontier settlements of the colonies of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia against possible attacks from the French and those western Indian tribes in alliance with them.

For nearly 100 years the major diplomatic tactics used by both the French and the British in attempting to achieve an Iroquois alliance involved religion and trade. Missionaries were as much political propagandists as spiritual mentors, and religion became an important tool in serving the ambitions of the imperial rivals in the New World.[4] But, as Peter Wraxall, secretary of Indian affairs under Sir William Johnson, clearly pointed out on behalf of the British, "Trade was the foundation of their Alliance or Connexions with us, it is the chief Cement w$^{ch}$ binds us together. And this should undoubtedly be the first Principle of our whole System of Indian Politics."[5] Thus for the British, supremacy in the Indian trade became the keystone to any preservation of a balance against the French. A tem-

1 A general map of the middle British colonies in America about 1755. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*


A General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America
LAKE ONTARIO
LAKE ERIE
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN
NEW ENGLAND
NEW HAMPSHIRE
OHIO
A Sketch of the remaining Part of Ohio R.

porary setback occurred, however, in 1701 when the Iroquois, following King William's War and a series of French raids into their country, decided to adopt a policy of neutrality and made treaties of peace and friendship with both the French and the British.

This Iroquois diplomacy was shattered in the 1740s during King George's War (1745-48) when British traders took advantage of the supremacy of the Royal Navy, which kept supplies and trade goods from reaching New France, and usurped the French role in the fur trade in the Ohio valley. The Mingo, Delaware, Wyandot, Miami and other tribes which had previously bartered with the French now turned to the British trader and his cheaper and more abundant wares. Following the Logstown conference with the once pro-British Algonkian tribes, the British were permitted to build trading posts on the Miami, Sandusky and Cuyahoga rivers, and by 1748-49, were dominant in the Ohio fur trade.[6] But almost immediately the Algonkian tribes of the region became alarmed, then hostile at the aggressive nature of the British traders, and especially at the Ohio Company of Virginia, which was granted 200,000 acres of land west of the Allegheny Mountains by George II for the purpose of engaging in trade and land development. British expansion and settlement meant the loss of Indian land and culture, and the tribes began to seek a renewal of their friendship and alliance with the French, whose settlements in the west included only those lands immediate to their trading posts. As early as 1749 George Croghan, trader and agent for Sir William Johnson, commented that "the Indians Dos nott Like to hear of their Lands being Setled over Allegany Mountain."[7]

The British push into the Ohio valley jeopardized French expansion westward and threatened their supply line to the upper Mississippi valley and the Louisiana colony, and encouraged by the Algonkian tribes, the French redoubled their efforts to regain territorial jurisdiction over these vast wilderness lands. As a first gesture in this reaffirmation of sovereignty, Governor Roland-Michel Barrin, Marquis de La Galissonnière, despatched Captain Céloron de Blainville in the summer of 1749 to the Ohio to assert French rights. With 200 regulars and Canadian militia and a band of Indians, all in 23 birchbark canoes, Céloron descended upon the Ohio country with flags flying, drums beating and the resounding salute of musketry. Lead plates were buried throughout the disputed region proclaiming the Ohio lands for Louis XV of France "by force of arms and by treaties, notably by those of Ryswick (1697), Utrecht (1713), and Aix-la-Chapelle (1748)."[8] Tribes trading with the British were admonished to cease and warned that those who persisted in the practice would suffer grave consequences.

French determination to regain control of the Ohio valley culminated in the destruction of the greatest Indian town in the Ohio country, Pickawillany, the centre of British trade and influence. For more than two years following Céloron's tour, the French had attempted unsuccessfully to incite the neighbouring tribes to attack the powerful Miami town. The downfall of this trading centre was imperative for the French if they were to regain the strategic Ohio lands and recover the allegiance of the tribes in the region. Finally, in 1752, Charles-Michel Langlade, a young French fur trader from Michilimackinac possessing strong influence among the tribes of the upper lakes, persuaded 250 Ojibway and Ottawa to organize an expedition to the Ohio. Eager for adventure and plunder, the group stealthily approached Pickawillany on the morning of 21 June. Indian girls working in the cornfields shrieked the alarm, but the surprise was sudden and complete. Most of the men were away on the summer hunt and the few that remained, including a number of women and children, were quickly butchered. Three British traders who were in the town surrendered, but the attackers stabbed one to death as a grim warning. The pro-British Miami chief, La Demoiselle (known also as "Old Briton") was "boiled and ate" as a final symbolic act of defiance.[9]

The sacking of Pickawillany temporarily signaled the end of the British trade in the Ohio. The allegiance of the local tribes, including the Miami, had now reverted to the French, and British traders scurried back to the safety of Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York. By the winter of 1752-53, Governor Barrin's plan for a line of strategic forts and Indian loyalty was achieved. Although Céloron's expedition and the capture of Pickawillany had secured the Ohio for the French, these events were not sufficient to deter the stubborn aggressiveness of the British traders and the Ohio Company of Virginia, 2 Distribution of Indian tribes in the Old Northwest, about 1775.



which continued a declared policy of westward expansion through trade and settlement.

The French attempted to discourage British expansion by constructing Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, the entrance through which the British traders gained access to the Ohio country. Irked by this action, the Ohio Company sent a contingent of troops under George Washington to reconnoitre. The Virginian mismanaged the assignment and engaged in a skirmish in which a young French nobleman, Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville, was killed. After this unfortunate affair, Washington and his group hastily retreated to the Great Meadows where he built an entrenched camp called, appropriately, Fort Necessity. A French relief force led by a grief-stricken and vengeful brother of De Villiers forced Washington to surrender on 3 July 1754. The exchange of shots in the Ohio wilderness was sufficient to terminate the short-lived Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The temporary respite in French-British hostilities had ended, and in America war was renewed.

The defeat of George Washington at Fort Necessity coupled with the memories of Céloron's visit and the massacre at Pickawillany inspired the pro-French Indians to engage in intensive and continuous raids against the British settlements along the northern frontier. Anxious to solve the problems of defence and security against these attacks, the colonies agreed to meet in a general council at Albany, the centre of British trade interests. One of the many matters discussed was that of framing a frontier policy.

The Albany congress of 1754 condemned the private purchase of Indian lands as a principal cause of uneasiness and discontent among the tribes. The need for centralized control of western lands had long been apparent and the congress appealed to the king to create a colonial union to manage Indian trade, war and treaties, buy and settle Indian lands and temporarily govern such settlements which would ultimately become new colonies. In addition, the congress stated that an endeavour should be made to regain the friendship of those tribes which had recently defected to the French; that forts should be built in the Indian country for their protection, to facilitate trade and to bring them under closer supervision. A suggestion was made to control expansion and limit existing colonies. The latter suggestion foreshadowed the Proclamation of 1763 and the British policy of establishing an Indian barrier state as a form of frontier defence.[10] Finally, and of vital significance, the congress recommended that those Indians in alliance with or friendly to the British should be kept constantly under the wise direction of an appointed superintendent of Indian affairs.

In London, the news of the Anglo-French hostilities at the Great Meadows prompted the expedition of Major General Edward Braddock with two regiments to Virginia with orders to drive the French from the Ohio country. Before proceeding to disaster at the battle of the Monongahela in the summer of 1755, Braddock, as commander of the British forces in America, followed the recommendations proposed at the now defunct Albany congress and appointed William Johnson superintendent of Indian affairs for the Northern Department.[11] The superintendent was to possess full authority and responsibility for all Indian relations in the principal theatre of war on the borders of New England, New York and Pennsylvania. This, according to Johnson, included not only the tribes of the Six Nation confederacy, but those of the entire Ohio valley as well.

### *The Regime of Sir William Johnson*

The selection of William Johnson as superintendent was not surprising. He was born of good family in Ireland in 1715, being the nephew of Admiral Sir Peter Warren, the commander of the British and colonial naval forces at Louisbourg in 1745. Johnson came to America in 1738 for the purpose of attending to his uncle's estate at Warrenbush in the Mohawk valley of upper New York. The young Irishman immediately initiated a lucrative trading business with the Indians, and within the year he crossed the Mohawk River to occupy a great tract of land which he had purchased. Here he built his first home, Mount Johnson, which was before long to be succeeded by the progressively more impressive establishments of Fort Johnson and finally Johnson Hall.

Although Johnson pursued the Indian trade and land acquisition with great vigour and diligence, his exploits were not confined to commerce and real estate. Toward the end of his first year on the Mohawk in 1739, he purchased a 16-year-old German indentured servant girl

3 Sir William Johnson in council with the Iroquois at Johnson Hall, Mohawk valley, upper New York. Painting by E. L. Henry. *(Original owned by Mr. John B. Knox, Knox Gelatine, Inc., Johnstown, N.Y.)*

named Catherine Weissenberg. She was his housekeeper at Mount Johnson, and by her he sired three children, two daughters and a son, John, who was the heir to his estates and the future superintendent general of Indian affairs. While at home Johnson seemed content with Catherine, more commonly known as "Catty," and there is some evidence that he married her on her deathbed in 1745.[12] Yet in the same year as the birth of Catty's first child, an unknown Iroquois girl bore him a son, the first of a very long succession of mixed-blood offspring. Most of them were the products of temporary relationships and the children remained members of the families of their Indian mothers, but nine of them, resulting from more enduring attachments, were named in his will and to each of these he left money, farms, livestock and other property.

Assisted by several agreeable women, many of whom possessed political influence in council, Johnson enjoyed a long and profitable relationship with the Mohawk and other tribes of the confederacy. His native geniality, robust temperament and earthy sense of humour combined with his fair dealing in trade made Johnson a favourite with the Iroquois, who gave him the sonorous and appropriate name of *Warraghiyagey*, "he who does much business."[13] He wrapped himself in their ceremonial regalia, stamped through their dances, squatted by their fires, sat with respectful patience through their lengthy councils, kept his home continually open to them and showered them with gifts. When Catty died, he chose Iroquois women to take her place, first Caroline, the niece of the great Mohawk sachem Hendrick, and then in 1753, Molly Brant, the sister of the soon-famous Mohawk orator, statesman and military leader, Joseph Brant. For 21 years Molly, often called "the brown Lady Johnson," was recognized as his official consort. She bore him eight children and was the honoured hostess presiding at a table at which the guests often included noted Indian dignitaries, governors, generals and peers of the realm.

The success with which Johnson developed his trading and social contacts with the Iroquois, which had already made his private fortune, was now about to make his public reputation. Owing to his great influence among the Iroquois during King George's War, Johnson was appointed "Colonel of the Forces to be raised from the Six Nations."[14] However, as a result of Céloron's expedition, the burning of Pickawillany and the defeats of the British at Fort Necessity and the Monongahela, Johnson was required to exert every ounce of influence to maintain Iroquois neutrality at least.

Soon after his appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs, Johnson was commissioned a major general. In September of 1755, with an army of some 300 totally undisciplined Mohawk and Oneida warriors and about 300 equally unreliable New England provincials, Johnson fought a battle at Lake George against Baron Dieskau, the commander of a French force recently arrived from France. Dieskau's mixed troops of French and Indians initiated the action by surprising and mauling the vanguard of Johnson's army. The old and very corpulent Mohawk, Hendrick, had his horse shot from under him and was bayoneted while frantically trying to rise. Johnson positioned the remainder of his army behind a makeshift breastwork of logs and boats, and with this protection was able to inflict severe casualties on Dieskau's attacking force.[15] In 1756, in appreciation of his victory, the king made Johnson a baronet and appointed him "Sole Agent & Superintendent of the Affairs of the Northern Indians and their Allies."

As superintendent of Indian affairs, Sir William continued incessantly to court the allegiance of the Indians, and in 1757, during a series of lengthy councils, he managed to bind the Iroquois firmly to the British cause in the war with France in North America. Their spokesmen declared that they had "not forgot the old agreement with our Brethren the English, but are determined to hold fast the Covenant Chain . . . and we shall from this day forward consider the English and ourselves as one body, one head and one mind."[16] As well as securing the allegiance of the Iroquois, Johnson instructed his agent, George Croghan, to negotiate the Treaty of Easton in 1758 by which Pennsylvania agreed to surrender its title to Indian lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. This treaty temporarily pacified the Algonkian tribes of the Ohio valley, and the loss of their support "knocked the French in ye Heade."[17]

The results of the recent British successes prompted and encouraged the operation against the French at Fort Niagara. The capture of this magnificent fortress was vital to the British war effort as it would curtail the French western fur trade and finalize the indecision of their already wavering Indian allies. By the summer of 1759, Johnson had coaxed 900 Iroquois, including many pro-French Seneca who lived near the post at Niagara and traded with the French, to accompany him on the British expedition. This was a clear indication that Johnson's long struggle against French agents for Iroquois allegiance, made difficult by their clan disunity and neutrality, had been won.

The British, under Brigadier General John Prideaux, laid siege to Fort Niagara, but a shell from a coehorn burst prematurely and killed the British officer. The command fell to Johnson. The siege continued as Royal Engineers constructed lines of trenches and batteries of artillery. Captain Francois Pouchot, the French commandant at Niagara, was reasonably confident. French reinforcements from the Illinois, Detroit and the western posts, including western Indians under the command of two excellent woodsmen, Aubry and Ligneris, were advancing to the relief of the fort; but the fate of Niagara was to be decided not on the siege.

Within two miles of Niagara, the French relief force was surprised and attacked by the British and Iroquois at La Belle Famille on 25 July. The French were flanked by John Butler, an assistant to Johnson, and routed. Aubry, Ligneris and other French officers made desperate efforts to retrieve the day, but nearly all of them were killed or captured. Johnson informed Jeffery Amherst, commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, of the battle and noted that "I cannot ascertain the Number of the Kill'd, they are so dispersed among the Woods, But their Loss is Great."[18] Pouchot had no choice but to surrender, and by the terms of the capitulation the French garrison was allowed to march out with flags flying, a tribute to their courageous conduct. They eventually returned safely to France, in spite of Iroquois protests.

The capture of Fort Niagara and Wolfe's triumph over Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham in September sealed the fate of France and her hopes for empire in North America. For Johnson personally, the victory at Niagara was the culmination of 21 years of literally uninterrupted lesser successes. The Iroquois were now firmly attached to the British and Johnson, as superintendent of Indian affairs, spoke for England in matters concerning native policy.

The great war for empire had raised England to the summit of imperial power and bestowed on her such remarkable territorial acquisitions as Canada, the Mississippi and Ohio valley regions and the Floridas, but in North America the Seven Years' War had illustrated with almost disastrous results the shortcomings of England's colonial policy of "salutary neglect."[19] Before the conflict the colonial governments had been responsible for their own defence and their relationships with the Indians. Throughout the war, the various colonial assemblies were reluctant to make adequate provisions for the defence of the frontier and even failed to cooperate one with another or with the British garrisons. For years New England suffered from Abenaki and French raids, but received little assistance or encouragement from neighbouring New York. The Mohawk valley, a prime frontier target for French and Indian attacks, resisted reasonably well during the Seven Years' War mainly because of the influence and organizing skill of Sir William Johnson and the pro-British Iroquois, especially the Mohawk. In Pennsylvania the pacifistic Quakers, who possessed political and financial control of that colonial assembly, steadfastly refused to expend monies on frontier defence. British administrators, both those stationed in the colonies and at Whitehall, appreciated the deficiencies of this traditional system and realized that the acquisition of new and vast frontier lands necessitated alteration of colonial defence policy in North America.

After the defeat and expulsion of the French in the Ohio valley, for example, the tribes there were left at the mercy of American expansion. As settlers and traders pushed into the region, the Indians became fearful that their way of life was to be destroyed forever. Concerned about this rampant encroachment on tribal lands, Henry Bouquet, the commandant at Fort Pitt, interpreted the Treaty of Easton as equally binding on Maryland and Virginia, whose lands adjoined the hunting grounds of the Ohio Indians. He therefore issued a proclamation (October 1761) which forbade any hunting or settlement west of the Alleghenies unless licensed by provincial governors or the commander-in-chief. Bouquet enforced the edict by driving away and burning the cabins of "vagabonds" making settlements in the area.[20] Further pledges were

4 The Old Northwest, 1740-83.



made to the Indians by Johnson at Detroit in 1761, and George Croghan at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1762. But the policy of regulating the Indian trade and white settlement, so effectively initiated at Albany and continued at Easton, had failed miserably by 1763.

The British interest in safeguarding Indian lands as exemplified by the Treaty of Easton was devised under the shadow of war, but never heartily approved of by any colonial assembly. Inspired by the news of a victorious peace with France, settlers and traders, eager for the acquisition of new lands or fortune, poured into the Indian country where they used "Every Low Trick and Artifice to Overreach and cheat those unguarded ignorant People."[21] Sir William Johnson both sensed and feared growing tribal discontent, and in a letter to Amherst urged a policy of "Steady, Uniform, and friendly Conduct towards them," in order to keep the "Indians from forming An attachment to His Majesty's Interest."[22] Amherst, however, never saw a need for large expenditures on Indian affairs and his control over the purse of the Indian Department made Johnson's task of conciliating the tribes most difficult. In addition, and contrary to the sound advice of Sir William Johnson, Amherst, as commander-in-chief in North America and thus possessing full control over the Indian Department which was considered a branch of the military, decided to discontinue the expensive annual dole to the tribes, thereby adding to native discontent. This new program of rigid economy was the result of the financial strain placed upon the imperial war chest during the Seven Years' War by constantly presenting the Iroquois and their allies gifts in order to "Brighten the chain of friendship."[23]

Indian hostility became increasingly overt, and at Michilimackinac, soon after the British takeover, fur trader Alexander Henry was told,

*Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you have not yet conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods, and mountains, were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with them to none. Your nation supposes that we, like the white people, cannot live without bread – and pork – and beef! But you ought to know, that He, the Great Spirit and Master of Life, had provided food for us, in these spacious lakes, and on these woody mountains.*[24]

Indian opposition and bitterness toward British rule was further accentuated at the Detroit council in September of 1761 when Johnson committed a diplomatic blunder. The superintendent arrived at Detroit with a host of Mohawk dignitaries and friends who patronized the other tribes insufferably during a long council. Then Sir William Johnson arose and informed the gathering that he regarded the Wyandot as the leaders of the incipient western confederacy – at this time a collection of Algonkian tribes, most of which had been allies of the French.[25] This speech angered the influential Ottawa confederacy (Ottawa, Potawatomi and Ojibway) and further aggravated the Indians. Johnson's comments, the fear of the irretrievable loss of their lands, their anger at British austerity measures aimed partly at them, and misinformation that the French king was returning to help them combined to goad the Indians under the leadership of the Ottawa chief, Pontiac, into open rebellion against the British in May of 1763.[26]

Although Johnson had repeatedly sent letters and warnings to Amherst and the Board of Trade in London regarding tribal unrest, the rapid fall of the British frontier posts at Venango, Le Boeuf, Presque Isle, Miami, Sandusky, St. Joseph, Ouiatenon and Michilimackinac in May and June of 1763 surprised the superintendent and the British military. Only Detroit and Fort Pitt withstood the Indian attacks. Even the Seneca, the western door of the pro-British Iroquois, took part in the blood-letting as they massacred the garrison at Venango and ambushed a supply column at Devil's Hole near Niagara Falls.[27]

The inability of the various colonial assemblies to agree upon any joint system of defence, combined with the Indian uprising under Pontiac and further complicated by the potential danger from the Spanish and French settements in the Floridas and Louisiana, made all the more obvious the need for a plan of frontier defence utilizing British imperial forces under a central command.[28] The British government responded with a royal proclamation prepared by the Board of Trade and Plantations in October of 1763. The proclamation established all lands west of the Alleghenies as an Indian reserve.

*It is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest . . . that the . . . Indians . . . should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of*

Sir William Johnson (1715-74). An oil by Edward L. Mooney from an original by Thomas McIlworth. *(New-York Historical Society).*



*such Parts . . . not having been ceded to or purchased by Us.*[29]

Although grants of land in the reserve were forbidden without the express permission of the crown, three new colonies were declared open to settlement in the hope of satisfying land-hungry migrants – East Florida, West Florida and a greatly diminished Province of Quebec. Also, the fur trade was regulated by allowing only licensed traders into the frontier regions west of the proclamation line.[30] The measure was adopted merely as a temporary expedient in the hope of bringing some form of imperial control to the prevailing turmoil in the wilderness.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1763, Sir William Johnson held a number of councils at which he urged the Indians to be calm. At Johnson Hall in September, the superintendent successfully persuaded the Iroquois, minus the Seneca, to unite with the British. Peace emissaries travelled to the distant Indian towns to stress the firm and mutual attachment of the British and Iroquois.[31] The horrible thought of a British-Iroquois force marching against the western tribes the following spring induced a cessation of hostilities. Johnson, sensing a desire for peace, arranged a large council at Niagara in July of 1764, at which he was prepared to discuss a resumption of trade and a redress of native grievances. More than 2,000 warriors congregated at the Niagara council. If peace was restored, the superintendent guaranteed the renewal of the trade upon which the tribes were economically dependent. Johnson's efforts were entirely successful and the tribes agreed to terms. Even the Seneca signed a formal peace treaty on 18 July.[32] As a crowning touch to mark the end of this most difficult period of Indian relations, Johnson hosted Pontiac at the Oswego council in July of 1766. The Ottawa chief, after receiving a bountiful distribution of presents, shook hands with Johnson and announced his submission to the British.[33] Upon the termination of tribal hostilities, Johnson turned immediately to the more enduring problem of the management and regulation of trade and Indian affairs.

Early in 1764, Sir William Johnson drafted a series of "observations" to the Lord Commissioners of Trade and Plantations in England. The Indian problem, argued the superintendent, was caused by two factors: land encroachments and trade relations. Johnson had negotiated large and personally profitable land deals with the Iroquois, so not surprisingly he largely neglected any discussion of the failure of the Proclamation of 1763 and land infringements. Instead he devoted most of his paper to devising a solution to trade and political relations with the Indians on the western frontier. Johnson proposed that a much stronger Indian Department should be created, independent of military controls; that with appointed deputies, assistants and agents, the superintendent should receive full authority over all aspects of Indian affairs. Trade should be regulated and confined to specific frontier posts, and although traders were to be permitted to go into the interior to conduct their business at the designated posts, they were not to trade at the various Indian villages. In addition, only those under licence and bond could trade, and the trading of alcohol was strictly forbidden. Finally the superintendent and his assistants should act as justices of the peace at these posts.[34]

The Board of Trade appeared to act favourably toward Johnson's scheme, and on 10 July 1764 proposed a plan for the "Future Management of Indian Affairs in America." In London George Croghan, lobbying for Johnson, was ecstatic over the response and noted that

> *The sole management of Indian Affairs and the Regulation of Indian Trade is invested in the Superintendent and his Agents independent of the Officers Commanding at any of the posts which I make no doubt will be no small mortification to some people.*[35]

Croghan's comment foreshadowed a recurring and plaguing problem between the military and the Indian Department regarding the nature of the control exercised over the tribes by the Indian Department.

Since 1756 the Indian Department had functioned under the control of the commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America. Relations between the department and the British military had become extremely sensitive under Amherst who continually interfered with or ignored the policy suggestions of Johnson. With the appointment of Thomas Gage in 1763, however, and his initial *laissez faire* approach, friction and misunderstanding between the two groups lessened and Johnson was able, for a time, to administer his department unhindered.

Johnson's proposals of 1764 possessed weaknesses, however, and early hopes for the passage of the plan proved premature. The granting of licences to traders was marked by illegalities, favouritism and interprovincial jealousies. Although Johnson sought to confine the trade of the Northern Department to specific posts in accordance with the plan's provisions, both British and French traders violated the post restrictions and the wholesale evasion of "Johnson's Regulations" soon became common. The Indians clearly preferred to trade in the woods or at their villages rather than make long and tiresome trips to the various designated posts. In addition to these difficulties the crown was suspicious of granting excessive powers to colonial officials for the management of the West. A final blow to the ambitions of Johnson's scheme was the inability of the depleted British treasury to finance a plan of such magnitude, and the refusal of the American colonies to pay taxes and thus help defray the expenses of maintaining the military garrisons. In spite of the lack of support Johnson stubbornly attempted to implement this more extensive system for the management of Indian affairs. He appointed agents and commissaries for Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, de Chartres and Michilimackinac to supervise the trade which was restricted to these several posts.[36] Nonetheless by 1766-67, the scarcity of funds and lack of cooperation, in which even post commanders and Johnson's agents violated the directives, rendered the plan inoperative. Immense quantities of beaver pelts were being brought in from various villages, Alexander Henry and his partner, Cadotte, bringing in 1,500 pounds alone; and in 1767 over 100 canoes came to Michilimackinac from the Northwest laden with illegal "Johnson Regulation" beaver pelts.[37]

Not only had Johnson's plan for Indian affairs and the regulation of trade failed, but of greater importance, he complained,

*The thirst after Indian lands is become almost universal, the people who generally want them are either ignorant of, or remote from the consequences of disobliging the Indians, many make a traffic of lands, and few or none will be at any pains or expence to get them settled, consequently, they cannot be loosers by an Indian war, and abandon their country, they have their desire tho' at the expence of the lives of such ignorant settlers as may be upon it.*[38]

In addition to the growing dangers of Indian unrest on the frontier, Johnson was forced to intervene in a clash and scandal between the military commandant at Michilimackinac, Major Robert Rogers, and members of the Indian Department over authority, trade and distribution of presents to the upper lakes tribes. With some difficulty Johnson managed to appease the military and Rogers was quietly removed from his post, but only after receiving an attractive and encouraging commission to seek the Northwest Passage.

Colonial opposition to the Sugar Act (1764) and the Stamp Act (1765) which the Americans regarded as "repugnant to our Rights and Privileges as Freemen and British subjects," affected appreciably the imperial policy for the interior.[39] What had originated as measures to help lessen the cost of regulating trade and land settlement had developed into a constitutional issue which involved the affirmation of the legislative supremacy of Parliament over the colonial assemblies. With the steady deterioration of Anglo-American relations, British troops were gradually drained from the wilderness posts to maintain order in the urban seaboard centres.

After a careful study of the frontier problem, Lord Shelburne, recently appointed Secretary of State and concerned with colonial affairs, proposed a plan which represented a departure from previous policy. Shelburne based his premise on the fact that with the withdrawal of British troops from the interior, it was impossible to prevent American westward expansion.[40] In addition, the cost of the military establishment in the West involved maintenance of the forts and transfer of troops and provisions, as well as the administrative expenses of the Indian Department and the distribution of presents. Consequently, as a means of lessening these burdens on the British treasury, Shelburne urged the restoration of Indian affairs to the various provinces, and controlled settlement of the interior with the financial provision of quit-rents to solve the problem of expense.[41]

Lord Shelburne's suggestions were referred to his successor Lord Hillsborough, the first Secretary of State for American Affairs. Working closely with the Board of Trade and Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief of his majesty's forces in America, Hillsborough's thinking was dominated by three considerations: the reduction of expenses in North America; the maintenance of a proper political relationship between the colonies and Great Britain, and the convenient distribution of the military forces. Thus, the resultant plan of 1768 represented a precipitate retreat from previous imperial policy with regard to the Indians. The British army was withdrawn from posts in the wilderness except for those at Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, and the authority to manage Indian affairs was restored to the colonies. This decision was prompted by the government's primary desire to reduce American expenses.[42] Frontier defence had involved an extra expenditure of £300,000. This amount had been considered practicable provided the colonies could be encouraged to pay as much as a third of the amount. But when they continued to balk at paying, it was decided to deny them the defence upon which they appeared to set so little value. A secondary purpose was to gather regular forces in seaboard centres of population where their presence might discourage the growing American inclination to engage in seditious assemblies and riots. A third factor was the belief of the British government that if the colonies were exposed to a general Indian war with which they themselves must deal, this would restore that sense of dependence on England which had passed with the defeat of the French.

Throughout the period of colonial supervision (1768-74), the frontier became increasingly chaotic as a result of the irregular practices and enroachments on western lands by the traders, settlers and speculators. The futility of attempting to stem the tide of westward expansion resulted in a general plan for the formal relocation of the westward limits of the Proclamation of 1763. The extension of the Indian boundary line was a victory for a number of influential land speculators and colonial government officials who envisioned huge personal financial profits and new empires in the vast and largely unknown interior. The first major revision of the boundary was negotiated with the Iroquois by Sir William Johnson at Fort Stanwix in the autumn of 1768. In an effort to salvage some remnants of their traditional homelands from land-hungry settlers and speculators, the confederacy surrendered to the crown title to all their lands south of the Ohio River which "they no longer needed for hunting."[43]

By the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, Great Britain made a definite pledge that the Ohio River should be the frontier boundary forever. This promise gave the Indian tribes a sense of security against future aggressions, and for that reason won their neutrality. In the generation of Indian conflict that followed, tribal spokesmen never ceased to remind the British and Americans of the solem pledge made by George III at Fort Stanwix. The boundary, agreed upon in 1768 and reconfirmed by American commissioners at the Treaty of Pittsburgh in 1775, was to become the major bone of contention in Indian affairs and was not finally abandoned by the tribes of the Ohio valley and Great Lakes region until the Treaty of Greenville in 1795.[44]

The results of 1768 were unquestionably momentous for both the Iroquois and Algonkian tribes. The Iroquois received a royal payment of £10,000, as well as 20 *batteaux* laden with presents and food; and although westward migration had been temporarily diverted from their New York homelands along the Finger Lakes, the negotiations with the Iroquois had opened to settlement the lands of Kentucky and large areas in western Pennsylvania and West Virginia. This isolated the Shawnee who, in their traditional Kentucky hunting grounds, suddenly found themselves facing a horde of eager white migrants. Because they were considered wards of the Iroquois, the Shawnee had received no payment for the 1768 cession. Thus in anger and bitterness, the frustrated Shawnee joined the Algonkian confederacy centred in the Ohio valley and disassociated themselves from their supposed benefactors, the Six Nations. Unfortunately for the Shawnee and contrary to the advice of John Stuart, superintendent of Indian affairs for the Southern Department, the Cherokee adopted a policy similar to that of the Iroquois and attempted to deflect white expansion from their southern homelands by ceding territory to the north. As a result, by the 1770s migrants from north and south began to flood into the middle or Kentucky lands of the Shawnee, who were literally sacrificed to white greed by the Iroquois and Cherokee.

Disturbed about the growing unrest on the frontier which was created by the inroads of the settlers and traders, Sir William Johnson held a number of lengthy Indian councils between 1770 and 1773. His power, however, particularly among the Algonkian tribes whose lands were threatened, had been considerably reduced as a result of the plan of 1768 and his part in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, and all attempts to secure a promise of peace, especially with the now surly and resentful Shawnee, failed.[45] "As far as I can understand these Affairs," Gage wrote to Hillsborough, "the Cession [of 1768] is the Cause of all the Commotions that have lately happened among the Indians." The secretary replied that he could *only lament that a Measure of the Utility of which such great expectations was held out, and which has been adopted at so great an Expence, should have so entirely failed in it's Object, as to have produced the very Evils to which it was proposed as a Remedy.*[46]
Hillsborough justifiably complained that the cession had been "so managed" by Johnson, but what followed added to the danger of his misjudgements. After a great purchase, prudence would have counseled slow settlement, but the cession of 1768 was followed at once by plans for immediate settlement on a grand scale and Johnson, as always, was at the centre of the new plans. Hillsborough originally hoped for their success but ultimately opposed them.

As American migrants – among them Daniel Boone – poured into Kentucky, the Shawnee became increasingly defiant. Thomas Gage, who as commander-in-chief was most anxious not to employ British military forces in an Indian war on the frontier, wished these American groups would "Let the Savages enjoy their Desarts in quiet."[47] His position was incompatible, however, with the insatiable frontier spirit –

"a peculiar democratic levelling influence likely to be arrogant, daring, dangerous and uncontrollable."[48] Insult was added when migrants from Virginia told a number of Shawnee chiefs, now living in temporary villages along the Scioto north of the Ohio, that soon these lands would also be surveyed and settled. In September of 1773 a delegation of Shawnee, now supported by Wyandot, Delaware and some Seneca, told Johnson that if any whites crossed the Ohio there would be "evil consequences."[49] Indeed, further encroachments by whites provoked scattered raids in retaliation.

The lack of a consistent and unified British plan for the tribes in conjunction with bitter intercolonial land rivalry and Indian discontent rendered the situation on the frontier hopeless. The regulation of trade and land settlement virtually ceased, and the frontier gradually dissolved into anarchy. In consequence, a proclamation was issued on 10 March 1774 under order from the crown which reinstated in the king's name the pertinent portions of the Proclamation of 1763, prohibiting settlement and land grants in the West and reaffirming the reservation north of the Ohio River. It also declared that all land purchases from the Indians since 1763 without royal licence would be considered "void and fraudulent."[50]

The proclamation was a preliminary to the Quebec Act of 24 June 1774 in which Great Britain annexed the entire region north of the Ohio River to the Province of Quebec. Besides the military officers and members of the Indian Department on the frontier, four new civil governments were to be created in the region of Detroit, Michilimackinac, Vincennes and Kaskaskia, with a lieutenant governor for each. Thus the Northwest was to be preserved as an Indian state and a fur-trade empire. This proclamation also resolved the problem of the French Canadian settlements in the Illinois country, giving them the same politico-constitutional privileges and rights as the French in Canada.[51]

Until the outbreak of the American Revolution, however, white migration westward continued unchecked. The Proclamation of 1763 was ignored; the barrier of 1768 had been washed away by the rushing tide of settlers, and the Quebec Act was despised by Americans and labelled as "intolerable." In Kentucky the mutual acrimony between the Indians and the American migrants was accentuated by the brutal slaying by Americans of an unsuspecting and peaceful Shawnee family which included a pregnant woman. By June, increasing Indian retaliatory raids induced the governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, to call out the militia and declare a state of war. The Shawnee were immediately joined by the Delaware, Wyandot and Seneca. Although the war in Kentucky was to terminate quickly with the result that the Shawnee finally recognized the Fort Stanwix cession, Johnson was fearful that the remainder of the Six Nations might join in the hostilities. Therefore in an attempt to soothe and arrest the Iroquois desire for war, the superintendent assembled a large council at Johnson Hall in July of 1774. After a long, four-hour outburst of rhetoric in which he pleaded for Iroquois neutrality, Sir William Johnson collapsed and died.[52]

The news of the death of *Warraghiyagey* resounded throughout the Indian world and was marked by wailing and rituals of lament. In many respects his regime was remarkable. As first superintendent of Indian affairs he had succeeded in developing and maintaining an organization which was capable of influencing and manipulating the tribes to suit the interests of the British crown. At the same time Johnson amassed a personal fortune in land speculation. Iroquois affection for the man and their influence over the other tribes coupled with Johnson's calculated and skillful diplomacy in bargaining for Indian cessions were responsible for his incredible acquisition of wealth. By using the Six Nations as a fulcrum, Johnson's power and prestige were enhanced and by scattering agents throughout the various Indian towns and thus maintaining direct contact with the pulse of native feeling, he achieved a tightly knit system for the management of Indian affairs.

At the time of Johnson's death British economic measures had reduced expenses for the Northern Department to £5,000 per year, and this included the usual high costs of the annual distribution of presents to the Indians. As a result, the tribes were in an unhappy mood with respect to their economic position. Flagrant encroachments on their land by American migrants followed by Dunmore's War only aggravated their bitterness. The situation was further complicated by the dissatisfaction of the Algonkian-speaking western tribes which were angry at the Six Nation Iroquois for hoarding the Fort Stanwix presents. In response to these problems the western tribes decided to rid themselves of the shackles imposed by their Iroquois patrons and to form their own confederacy. Any type of tribal disunity, however, was catastrophic to Indian hopes of continuing a traditional existence of hunting and fishing, and the formation of this second confederacy was to initiate 20 years of disharmony among the native peoples which were to conclude with their destruction. The events of 1775 were to delay the difficulties of Indian factionalism, however, and Johnson's department was soon to face the test of war and the grave responsibility of encouraging and assisting the tribes in the cause of the king.

## The Indian Department and the Frontier in the American Revolution (1775-84)

## I

The outbreak of hostilities at Lexington in 1775 created a new set of problems for the British Indian Department. Its role was no longer one of controlling and appeasing discontented tribes: now the department was instructed to conduct a planned and careful crusade to win the allegiance of the Indians to the royal interest. As has been noted, between 1763 and 1775, the British government attempted to discourage westward migration, but in the colonies "it was the passion of every Man to be a Landholder, and the People had a Natural Disposition to rove in Search of good Lands, however distant."[1] The limitless stretches of unoccupied western territory inhabited by only a few roving Indians had created an opportunity for quick acquisition of land by immigrants. With imperial troops concentrated initially along the eastern seaboard, Americans in considerable numbers pursued their wishes unhindered by the irritating restraints of British colonial policy.

A summary and explanation of the philosophy of these frontier people in 1775 was provided by the governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, who had failed to enforce British regulations.

*The established Authority of any government in America, and the policy of Government at home, are both insufficient to restrain the Americans; and that they do and will remove as their avidity and restlessness incite them. They acquire no attachment to Place: But . . . for ever imagine the Lands further off, are Still better than those upon which they are already Settled . . . Proclamations have been published from time to time to restrain them . . . . But . . . they do not conceive that* [the British] *Government has any right to forbid their taking possession of a Vast tract of Country, either uninhabited, or which Serves only as a Shelter to a few Scattered Tribes of Indians. Nor can they be easily brought to entertain any belief of the permanent obligation of Treaties made with those People, whom they consider, as little removed from the brute Creation.*[2]

Thus the American Revolution became in the West, as had other white confrontations there, an Indian war.

In 1775 both the British and the Americans endeavoured to secure Indian assistance. In Boston, General Gage urged such a policy; and Colonel Guy Johnson, nephew and son-in-law of Sir William and the newly appointed British Indian Department superintendent, perceived that other colonies were about to follow the example of Massachusetts, and found that various measures were being taken by "New England Missionaries and others to alienate the affections of the Indians and Spirit them up to bad purposes."[3] Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, reacted quickly. Writing to Johnson he advised that *The Time might possibly come when the King, relying upon the Attachment of his faithful allies, the Six Nations of Indians, might be under the necessity of Calling upon them for their Aid and Assistance in the present State of America . . . . His Majesty has received* [intelligence]

6 Colonel Guy Johnson (ca. 1730-88), superintendent general of Indian affairs, 1775-82. Painting by Benjamin West. *(Andrew W. Mellon Collection, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.)*

*of the Rebels having excited the Indians to take a part, and of their having actually engaged a body of them – in Arms to support their Rebellion, justifies the Resolution His Majesty has taken of requiring the Assistance of his faithful adherents the Six Nations.*[4]

Although both the British and the Americans had begun to recruit Indian allies, most of the tribes gravitated toward Great Britain rather than the colonies. The king, as represented by the British Indian Department, had a history of just dealings with the natives. Gage astutely observed that "the Indians well know that in all their landed disputes the crown has always been their friend."[5] Indeed, the main duty of the British Indian agent had been to protect the various tribes from acts of aggression or depredation by the American settlers.[6] Therefore in the autumn of 1775, realizing the futility of attempting to gain Indian aid, the Americans adopted a policy of seeking their neutrality. At Fort Pitt a treaty of peace was negotiated with the Six Nations, Delaware and Shawnee.[7] The commissioners gave assurances that Americans would not settle north of the Ohio River, and Congress voted its consent. Virginia passed a law forbidding settlement beyond the river and for a while the natives seemed content with the arrangement. But the promises of white non-expansion were not fulfilled, and the British soon gained the active support of most of the tribes.

The value of the alliance with the Indians was soon appreciated by the British when, in early September, 1775, an American expedition of 1,000 soldiers landed in a swamp

7 Daniel Claus (1727-87), superintendent of Indian affairs for Canada, 1760-75. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

about a mile below the British fort of Saint-Jean on Lake Champlain. The southwest curtain of the fort was not completed and the much smaller force under Major Charles Preston could not have withstood a strong assault. As the Americans pressed through the woods sensing an easy victory before falling on an ill-prepared Montreal, about 100 Caughnawaga surprised them and forced them to retire. The Indian attack not only delayed the American advance on Saint-Jean but, more importantly, on Montreal for over two weeks, a respite which gave the British time to attend to the defence of the fort (which eventually fell) as well as the rest of the province. In large measure, the Indian victory in the woods near Saint-Jean, by delaying the American advance on Montreal and Quebec, contributed to the complete defeat of the Americans before the prepared British defences at Sault-au-Matelot and Près-de-Ville on the last day of 1775.[8]

For the British Indian Department, collecting, organizing, feeding and keeping their native allies in a happy and warlike mood was tedious and continuous work. At Fort Ontario, Guy Johnson "assembled 1458 Indians and adjusted matters with them in such a manner that they agreed to defend the communications, and assist His Majesty's troops in their operations."[9] The Indians were to be used principally as raiders, their favourite targets being the fertile western valleys which supplied the continental army with grain; thus the tribes were employed in making "a diversion and exciting an alarm on the frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia."[10] At the three major Indian Department western posts the tribes rallied to the British standard. At Niagara John Butler, a veteran of the William Johnson regime, met with the Six Nation Indians who expressed their satisfaction at having an opportunity to show their friendship; Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton reported that he could muster 1,000 Indians at Detroit in three weeks; and at Michilimackinac, Arent De Peyster, soon to be commandant at Detroit, assured Carleton of the support of the upper lakes tribes and noted with pleasure that the Sauk and Fox had recently arrived to declare their loyalty to the British.[11]

By the summer of 1777, Congress was frustrated in its attempt to draw the Six Nations to conferences at Fort Pitt and Albany. By refusing the American overtures the Indians had shown a deep "resolution and determination to continue firm in their fidelity" to the British crown.[12] Indeed, at the Oswego council, the Iroquois officially announced their intention of fighting the Americans. Later in the year during the Fort Stanwix campaign, Indian loyalty was again tested severely, and their contribution and fighting skills at the battle of Oriskany enabled the British to check the American relief force under General Herkimer. Although Mary Jemison, a white woman living among the Seneca along the Genesee, noted that "our town exhibited a scene of real sorrow and distress, when our warriors returned and recounted their misfortunes,"[13] the Iroquois nonetheless were determined to resist the Americans. For the Indians, the Revolution appeared to be an opportunity to

8 Colonel John Campbell (ca. 1740-1804) replaced Daniel Claus through political appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs of Canada in 1775, although Claus retained the affection and loyalty of the Indians. The date of the painting is about 1785. *(Château de Ramesay, Montreal.)*

protect their land from the advance of white settlement.

The difficult task of the Indian Department in maintaining and encouraging tribal allegiance to the British was made easier following the escape of three Loyalist sympathizers from Pittsburgh in the spring of 1778 – Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty. These three able and experienced men had lived among the Indians for many years, and they had considerable influence with the various tribes of the Northwest. McKee was appointed a captain, and Girty an interpreter, and although Elliott was initially mistrusted by Henry Hamilton at Detroit, he, too, soon became a prominent figure in the department. In later years the direction and decision-making of the Indian Department was to a large extent shouldered by these individuals but particularly by McKee and Elliott.

In the summer of 1778, the Iroquois, supported by the newly formed corps of Butler's Rangers, raided and burned several American frontier settlements including the prosperous communities of Wyoming Valley and Cherry Valley in New York. "It is in the highest degree distressing," wrote General Washington, "to have our frontier so continually harrassed by this collection of Banditti under Brant and Butler."[14] But the frontier people of America, "a wild ungovernable race, little less savage than their tawny neighbours," possessed a dogged determination and bitter hatred of the Indian and refused to be intimidated or pushed out of their settlements.[15] The persistence of these back settlers was to be rewarded.

Washington authorized a relief expedition to the frontier under Major General John Sullivan in 1779. The campaign was aimed at the Iroquois towns along the Finger Lakes. It was hoped that by defeating the Indians the valuable western grain supplies would be secured for the continental army. The effort was a success,[16] but Sullivan failed to capture Fort Niagara, the major British supply base in the region. The Indians and Butler's Rangers had managed to maintain this military installation, and although the Indian towns and crops were destroyed, the Iroquois still remained intact as a viable fighting force. Gratefully, Frederick Haldimand, governor of Quebec, acknowledged that "the fidelity of these Indians has alone preserved the Upper Country."[17] Native resilience was clearly evidenced during the following year when, campaigning under Sir John Johnson, they "took 14 rebel officers and 316 men, and destroyed 714 houses and granaries full of grain, 6 small forts and several mills, which afforded the rebels the most convenient supplies."[18]

By 1781, the Indians, weakly supported by the Indian Department and the British garrisons at the western posts, were firm in their determination to preserve their territory. "We mean to defend ourselves to the last man, before we give up our Lands and we will spare none, if they [Americans] begin with us."[19] The military successes of Joseph Brant over George Rogers Clark along the Ohio River in the autumn of 1781 gave the Indians a feeling of victory and optimism. But the continual exchange of atrocities on the frontier fanned the deep-seated bitterness and contempt.

Persistent raids from the American settlements in Kentucky plagued the tribes of the Ohio valley. One such raid was to make 1782 the bloodiest year of the Revolution in the West. In March a contingent under Colonel David Williamson butchered 90 innocent and pacifistic Moravian Indians at Gnadenhutten.[20] The heartless murder of these Christian Indians was even more unforgivable because they were Delaware, and in 1778 Congress had negotiated a treaty of "perpetual peace and friendship" with them.[21] The Indians never forgot the cold-blooded barbarity of Gnadenhutten and aroused to a fierce retaliation, the tribesmen hunted Americans and tortured those they caught with brutal delight.

A second American expedition under Colonel William Crawford crossed the Ohio River in June and followed Williamson's route. The Indians, eager for revenge, surprised the American force at Sandusky and routed it, but not before killing 100: Indian losses were 4.[22] Unfortunately Crawford was captured by Delaware warriors under Captain Pipe, and suffered the worst agonies that the Indian mind could conceive. Simon Girty witnessed the grisly affair in Pipe's village but dared not intervene. The news of the death of Crawford prompted the publication of Hugh H. Brackenridge's *Indian Atrocities* (1782) in which the author, by referring to the Indians as "the animals, Vulgarly Called Indians," exemplified the American attitude toward the Indian during the American Revolution and the later struggle for the Ohio valley.[23] Haldimand was shocked by the Indian conduct, but the exasperation of the Indians for the cruelties practised on them by the rebels in the upper country made the natives lose all restraint.[24]

Another Indian victory took place in August at Blue Licks. Two hundred mounted men from Kentucky, among them such notables as John Todd and Daniel Boone, were totally defeated by Wyandot and upper lakes Indians.[25]

With the American Revolution nearing its completion, the Indians in 1782 had won two successive and decisive battles against the Americans at Sandusky and Blue Licks. These victories seemingly assured the preservation of Indian security in the Ohio valley. But in Europe, Britain was terminating a costly and unpopular war, and the boundary provisions of the Treaty of Paris gave to the United States this entire region which the Indians had just successfully defended. The tribes had no intention of giving up their traditional hunting grounds to their enemies, the Americans. A new phase in the struggle for possesion of the Ohio valley was to open.

## II

The proposals of peace reached Frederick Haldimand, governor of Quebec, in September 1782. The news caused a general alarm and discontent among the tribes who feared the loss of their lands and American retaliation. Throughout the war the Indians were most attached and serviceable to the royal cause, and suffered greatly "by the shameful encroachments of the Virginians upon their valuable Hunting Grounds."[26] Prior to 1775, the tribes were settled in ease and affluence, but only because the British exercised great pains and bestowed immense capital to effect that settlement. Consequently the rumour of an Anglo-American peace and possible loss of their lands to the Americans shocked and angered the natives. Haldimand wrote,

> *The Indians are Thunderstruck at the appearance of an Accommodation So far short of their expectations from the Language that had been held out to them, and Dread the idea of being Forsaken by us, and becoming a Sacrifice to a Vengeance which has already in many Instances been raked upon them.*[27]

What was really behind Haldimand's concern was his realization that if the British wished to secure the safety of the upper Province of Quebec, the affections of the Indians must be preserved. Therefore, the governor instructed Sir John Johnson, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (1782-1828), to devote a great portion of his time to the cultivation of "the Private Friendship and confidence of the Chiefs of greatest note."[28] Public councils would be held with the greatest decorum, formality and military pomp.[29] The British in North America as represented by Governor Haldimand, as early as February, 1783, had no intention of deserting the tribes because it would mean (*a*) the probable restriction of the expansion of British imperial suzerainty; (*b*) an added impetus to the westward rush of American settlers which would certainly result in a flood of republican tendencies in the sparsely settled upper Province of Quebec which had had no time, as yet, to establish firm British monarchical institutions; (*c*) the loss of the fur trade, and (*d*) the destruction of the Indians.

Nevertheless, as a result of the peace negotiations, Haldimand advised Colonel Arent De Peyster, commandant at Detroit, to inform the Indians that England would no longer assist them or "approve of their carrying war into the Enemy's country," but every possible aid would be given to "secure and defend their own against every Incursion of the Enemy."[30] After the cessation of British offensive operations, American parties continued to raid across the Ohio River, and one of these contingents massacred a band of Shawnee at Standing Stone village. Haldimand insisted, however, that members of the British Indian Department should discourage the Indians from seeking further revenge. Policy became a matter of watching for any extension of the American frontier and trying to assist the Indians in securing the upper country.[31]

The first "official news" of the peace treaty—although only a printed copy of the preliminaries—reached Haldimand on 26 April 1783 via New York. The settlement of the international boundary, by which England surrendered to the new republic great tracts of land including the entire Ohio valley, placed the governor in a serious dilemma. He immediately sent despatches to Brigadier General Allan Maclean, commandant at Fort Niagara, and to the officers in charge of the other western posts, giving them the details of the treaty and advising them to avoid publishing the terms for fear of the Indian reaction.[32]

9 Colonel John Butler (1725-96) held various appointments in the British Indian Department and commanded the Loyalist corps of Butler's Rangers during the American Revolution (1777-84). *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

In spite of the endeavours of the British officials at the posts, the news of the treaty spread rapidly throughout the western country and the Indians by "entire villages" came clamouring to the British seeking explanations and begging for supplies.[33] The state of Indian feelings was reported in detail by an alarmed but sympathetic Maclean at Niagara.

> *The Indians from the surmises they have heard of the Boundaries, look upon our conduct to them as treacherous and cruel; they told me they never could believe that our King could pretend to cede to America what was not his own to give . . . . That they were the faithful Allies of the King of England, but not his subjects . . . they would defend their own Just Rights or perish in the attempt to the last man, they were but a handfull of small People, but they would die like men, which they thought preferable to misery and distress if deprived of their Hunting Grounds.*[34]

The British garrison commanders did their utmost to prove to their former allies that England had not forsaken them, and as well pleaded with the Indians to end further atrocities on the frontier and to adjust their differences with the Americans. But there was a general fear that the Indians, embittered by the treaty, would retaliate by attacking the western posts. The horrible memories of the Pontiac Rebellion just 20 years earlier kept the commanders alert and cautious.[35] Haldimand instructed Sir John Johnson to detain Joseph Brant at Montreal to prevent him from inciting the Indians to acts of violence against the Americans and British alike, and to inform the Indian leader that lands for his Mohawks would be provided in Canada.[36]

In a further effort to placate the Indian fear that the British were abandoning them, Johnson attended a number of councils in the summer of 1783. At Detroit on 28 June, the superintendent told the chiefs that the terms of the peace which had made them uneasy on account of the boundary line did not mean to deprive the tribes of an extent of country of which the right of soil belonged exclusively to them.[37] The difficulty of pacifying the Indians was complicated by the summer peace mission of Major Ephraim Douglas who was despatched by the Continental Congress to Detroit and Niagara for the purpose of reconciling the tribes to the treaty.[38] The American party arrived at Detroit during the Johnson conference, but fearing that the life of Douglas was threatened and not wishing any outside interference which might alienate the tribes from their fidelity to the crown, the British refused his plea to speak to the Indians.[39]

At Niagara Maclean was incensed at the American for sending messages and private emissaries among "our Indians."

> *They are not only our allies, but . . . part of our Family; and the Americans might as well . . . attempt to seduce our children & servants from their duty and allegiance, as to convene and assemble all the Indian Nations, without first communicating their intentions to His Majesty's representative in Canada . . . if any such person . . . comes to assemble the Six Nations I shall certainly bring him in here & keep him till I send for Instructions to General Haldimand.*[40]

Thus Douglas received the same answer at Niagara and was unable to assemble the Indians for a council.[41] Johnson, however, distributed several barrels of rum and succeeded in mollifying the irate Six Nations. His speech to the Indian conference at Niagara sidestepped the real issues of the boundary line and British military assistance to the Indians. But, as at Detroit, there was an impression that England was prepared to guarantee to the Indians the Fort Stanwix line of 1768.[42]

In August, 1783, Washington directed Major General Baron von Steuben to arrange with Haldimand the method by which the British wished to give up the western posts upon the signing of the final peace treaty.[43] Haldimand, however, refused to discuss arrangements for the evacuation of the posts with Von Steuben or to allow him to make a tour of the Indian country. His excuse to the American representative was that he had received no instructions from the British crown. Writing to Lord North, Secretary of State of the Home Department, Haldimand expressed his real motives.

> *The longer the evacuation is delayed, the more time is given to our fur traders to remove their merchandise, and the greater opportunity is given to the officers under my command to reconcile the Indians to a measure for which they entertain the greatest abhorrence.*[44]

The news of the Treaty of Paris, signed 13 September 1783, placed the governor in a most precarious position. By the terms of the treaty the British had totally abandoned their Indian allies. This was a crushing blow for the preservation of tribal lands in the Ohio valley.[45] Indian resentment was at a high pitch on the frontier. In spite of the constant efforts of British officers and Indian agents to establish amicable relations between Americans and Indians, outrages continued. But on 27 November 1783, Haldimand devised a binding policy for the frontier which was to continue until the defeat of the tribes a decade later. The governor explained his policy to Lord North.

> *The Indians know that no infringements of the Treaty in 1768 can be binding upon them without their express concurrence and consent. In case things should proceed to extremities, the event no doubt will be the destruction of the Indians, but during the contest not only the Americans but perhaps many of His Majesty's subjects will be exposed to great distresses. To prevent such a disastrous event as an Indian war . . . cannot be prevented so effectually as by allowing the posts in the upper country to remain as they are for some time . . . the intermediate country the limits assigned to Canada by the provisional treaty of 1782 and those established northwest of the River Ohio in the year 1768 should be considered entirely as belonging to the Indians.*[46]

This was the crucial proposal to retain the posts indefinitely and preserve the Ohio valley as an Indian buffer state, not because of the fur trade but to maintain British imperial and territorial jurisdiction in the Northwest to allow the firm establishment of settlement and British political institutions to develop in the upper province, and to save human lives.

## III

The traditional argument of many American historians is that Britain continued to hold the posts for the sake of preserving the British fur-trade monopoly. Yet the Northwest fur trade yielded an annual revenue of only £200,000, of which two-thirds came from the American side of the line.[47] From the British standpoint, the financial loss would be minimal as it did not matter whether the furs were gathered by British or American traders because the pelts would still find their way to London, the great world marketplace for the trade. Thus British manufacturers would still profit, and the only sufferers would be the British traders in Canada. But again, the loss to the traders in Canada would not be drastic because the larger portion of the furs gathered in the American territory would pass through Montreal, which possessed natural advantages over American ports in the east because of its easy access by lake and river. The total cost of retaining the posts, by contrast, was estimated at £800,000 per year.[48] From a purely financial or economic standpoint it was in the interest of Britain to deliver the posts to the Americans as soon as possible, if the fur trade alone were taken into account; therefore, one must seek other reasons for Britain's violation of the treaty.

The retention of the posts was owed primarily to a British blunder and secondarily to an American weakness.[49] The blunder was the utter neglect of the Indians in the peace negotiations with the United States. Amid the distractions of a falling empire, the British forgot the Indian completely, one of the most striking oversights in the whole history of British imperial policy. When news of the proposed boundary provisions of the treaty reached British North America in April, 1783, the violent reaction of the merchants, army officers and especially the Indians caused a reappraisal of western policy in Whitehall.

Although committed to the treaty, the British devised a new policy based on two objectives. One was to persuade the Indians that their interest lay in coming to terms with the Americans. The second objective was to restore the shattered confidence of the Indians in the British. Herein lay the dilemma of British policy, since to achieve one goal was to destroy the other.

The British violation of the treaty passed through several stages. Originally the retention of the posts was intended to be temporary and to cover the liquidation of British fur-trading interests south of the boundary line; then it was to prevent another Pontiac revolt which would have taken the lives of many British, Americans and Indians; and finally, a ready excuse was found to postpone the evacuation indefinitely when, in violation of articles of the treaty, Americans failed to pay their debts to British creditors and confiscated Loyalist properties.[50]

As well, the weakness of the central government of the new republic was a vital stimulant for the British retention of the western posts. Working under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had neither the financial means nor the authority to stop the migration of American backwoodsmen or to de-

10 Finger lakes district of upper New York showing the general area of Sullivan's campaign, 1779. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*


LAKE ONTARIO
Part of Lake Erie
SENECAS
ONONDAGAS
Oneida L.
THE SIX NATIONS
Ohio or Allegany River
Pennsylvania
Albany
Part of Connecticut
EXPLANATION
Indian Villages
Chief Towns or Large Villages
Indian Paths
The Boundary Settled with the Indians in 1768 is described by a —— Line
To His Excellency WILLIAM TRYON Esq.r Captain General & Governor in Chief of the Province of NEW-YORK &c &c This Map of the Country of the VI. Nations Proper, with Part of the Adjacent Colonies Is humbly inscribed by his Excellency's Most Obedient humble Servant Guy Johnson 1771.

vise a uniform land and Indian policy. The backwoodsmen, the natural enemies of the Indian, encroached on Indian lands and atrocities were exchanged. The British, by retaining the posts, aided the Loyalists trekking to the upper Province of Quebec, renewed the allegiance of the Indians, checked American westward expansion and, contrary to the boundary terms of the Treaty of Paris, maintained territory in the new republic.

During the summer and autumn of 1783, the Indians, actively encouraged and supported by British officials, attempted to form an Indian confederacy composed of Algonkian tribes and the Iroquois to oppose the territorial demands of the United States. In September, delegates from 35 tribes assembled at Sandusky to consider the common Indian danger and to plan a united defence.[51] The leading Indian spokesman was Joseph Brant, who had distinguished himself as a Loyalist during the American Revolution. In his speech, Brant proclaimed the basic Indian right to survive as a people. Thus, he continued, a satisfactory peace settlement could only be realized by a general agreement between Congress, represented by all the American states, and the Indian confederation, represented by all the tribes.[52] Although the need for a confederation was universally acclaimed, no definite steps were taken at this time.

The British dignitaries present were Sir John Johnson and Alexander McKee. The latter was not only an officer in the Indian Department but had family connections with the Shawnee which gave him great influence among the tribes. It was their task at the conference to soothe Indian resentment, stave off a general Indian war in which both England and the United States might become involved, and yet to maintain tribal allegiance to the British in order to secure an Indian barrier between the American settlements in the west and the struggling upper Province of Quebec.

At the council, Sir John delivered his "Tomahawk Speech" in which he assured the Indians that the peace treaty had in no sense extinguished their title to the lands northwest of the Ohio River. Johnson reminded the Indians that by the Proclamation of 1763, all land west of the mountains had been reserved for them. At the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, the line had been adjusted with formal Indian consent to make the Ohio River a permanent eastern boundary for Indian lands. Finally, the line had been restated at a general conference wth American representatives at Pittsburgh in 1775. Thus the superintendent general of Indian Affairs told the council that they should put the tomahawk aside, but to keep it in sight in case the Americans attempted to molest them.[53] Johnson then informed the council that the British were most concerned with the fate of the Indians, and that the king would lend at least moral support to the tribes if the Americans infringed on their lands.

Johnson's speech achieved a remarkable success with the tribes. *The meeting with the nations at Sandusky has been of singular service in removing their uneasiness, and in preventing them from drawing mischief on themselves by continuing hostilities on the frontiers of the United States. The Indians' well grounded suspicions of the designs of the Americans against their country, is confirmed by the movements of the intending settlers.*[54]

In the spring of the following year, Haldimand received a despatch from Lord Sydney, Secretary of State of the Home Department between the years 1783 and 1789, complimenting the governor on his conduct in retaining the western posts which "will have a good effect on the Indians."[55] Sydney noted that "the interests of the people of America dictate that they should treat the Indians with kindness, but if America does not, the tribes may find refuge in His Majesty's dominions."[56] Haldimand quickly accepted the advice of the secretary of state and in order to repay the Six Nations for their services in the king's cause, purchased for them a "fertile and happy retreat" on the Grand River as a substitute for the homelands they had lost in New York State.[57] The governor hoped that "The Settlement will not only be a frontier to our Settlements in that quarter, but may be conducive to securing the Furr Trade to this Province."[58]

But increasing numbers of American migrants coming to Detroit and other western settlements through the Indian country kept the tribes in a state of alarm: "Their Savage Blood is not yet perfectly Cool."[59] Joseph Brant, realizing that a satisfactory peace could only be attained by a general agreement between the Indian confederacy and Congress, managed to reassemble the tribes at Niagara in late August, 1784. The Indian leaders, however, soon became impatient when the American commissioners with whom they were to treat were delayed by various preliminaries. Therefore the Algonkian tribes drifted home to attend to their winter hunting and left the Six Nations waiting for the congressional representatives.[60]

By November there were more than 2,000 Indians lounging around the western posts depending on the British for presents, food and clothing. Yet it was the firm determination of the tribes to "uphold their rights which cannot but be approved of by every honest man, and their united action may secure from the Americans the justice they have a right to."[61] If a rupture was to be averted on the frontier, the region between the Great Lakes and the Ohio River had to be preserved as a national home for the Indian. But by the winter of 1784, that dream was impossible unless Britain was prepared to assist the tribes actively in their struggle for national survival.

## Indian Confederacy: The Search (1784-93)

### I

After the American Revolution, the Indians learned that they had no right to exist independently or to live where they pleased. By fighting with the British between 1775 and 1783, the tribes, according to the official American view and the Treaty of Paris, had forfeited title to their lands. Thus Indian land was to be considered as conquered and surrendered territory. The ignorance and frustration of the Indians was constant. To them, the entire peace treaty of 1783 was incomprehensible. The tribes had won two glorious victories at Sandusky and Blue Licks in 1782 and had never been overrun by the Americans. They knew themselves therefore to be unconquered.[1] Also the British in the Northwest had not been overrun or conquered. How, then, reasoned the Indians, could the British cede the land of the Ohio region (which the tribes regarded as their own) to the Americans? Yet the tribes learned that the United States had been given, by international treaty, all the land up to the middle of the Great Lakes.[2]

The British, through the speeches of Sir John Johnson and other members of the Indian Department, denied that they had forfeited Indian lands by the terms of the 1783 treaty. What had been transferred to the United States, they stated, was the exclusive right to buy Indian lands within the American international boundary, but not the ownership of these lands which had been guaranteed to the Indians by several prior treaties, particularly the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768.[3]

On 15 October 1783, the Confederation of the United States inaugurated an Indian policy based on the report of James Duane, chairman of the committee on Indian affairs. The ordinance repudiated the Ohio River boundary and demanded that the tribes of the Northwest withdraw west and north beyond the Miami and Maumee rivers.[4] The Indians were told that the land on which they now lived had been ceded by Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris. Consequently, the Indians were a subdued people and subject to the wishes of the United States.[5] Thus treaties could be negotiated and the tribes would have to vacate certain lands for settlement. In attempting to establish peace with the Indians of the Northwest, Congress wished to begin the process of acquiring the lands between the Ohio and the Mississippi.[6]

At the Treaty of Fort Stanwix on 22 October 1784, the appointed American commissioners, Oliver Wolcott, Richard Butler and Arthur Lee, managed to assemble the influential Six Nations and negotiate a settlement. The Iroquois leaders protested to the representatives of the United States that a definitive treaty could not be concluded without the presence of the Algonkians – Ottawa, Ojibway, Potawatomi, Delaware, Shawnee and Wabash confederates.[7] This protest was an effort to maintain Indian unity against American territorial ambitions as encouraged by Joseph Brant and members of the British Indian Department at Sandusky in 1783.

The commissioners, however, sternly reminded the Indians that they were a subdued people and that the king of England had ceded to the United States all the Indian land as far as the Great Lakes, and by right of conquest, the Americans could "claim the whole."[8] The Iroquois leaders debated the alternatives, but Cornplanter, a noted Seneca chief, argued that an accommodation must be made with the Americans if peace was to be preserved, and his rhetoric influenced the rest. So having been abandoned by the British, now the Ohio valley Algonkian Indians were sold out by their old rivals, the Six Nations.

By the terms of the treaty, the Six Nations surrendered to the United States their ancient territorial claims to much of the land lying west and north of the Ohio River.[9] This provision was contrary to the prior treaties, proclamations and acts of 1758, 1763, 1768, 1774 and 1775. But of equal importance to the Americans was the knowledge that it freed the western tribes from Iroquois domination.[10] The western tribes, by right of conquest, were subject peoples of the Iroquois. However, when the Iroquois divested their claim to the Ohio country in 1784, the tribes in that region were considered free and independent and could be dealt with accordingly by the Americans. The policy of Congress was to terminate land claims tribe by tribe, and thus disassociate itself from the traditional policy of Sir William Johnson, who worked through the Six Nations to obtain concessions from the Algonkian tribes. With the 1784 treaty successfully completed, the congressional representatives looked forward to negotiating with the western tribes without Iroquois interference, a policy maxim reminiscent of the old official British colonial policy of "divide and rule."

At Fort McIntosh on 21 January 1785, only a few minor chiefs from the more pacifistic factions of the Wyandot, Delaware, Ojibway and Ottawa assembled to hear the Americans. George Rogers Clark, backwoodsman and hero of Vincennes, had replaced Wolcott, but the speech read to the western Indians was the same as that of Fort Stanwix. After token objection, the chiefs of the tribes represented acknowledged the protection of the United States and signed away lands north of the Ohio River.[11]

At the Sandusky conference in 1783 the tribes had pledged that no agreement would be made with the United States except through the Indian confederation as a whole; but at Stanwix and McIntosh, the various tribal land cessions resulted in the dissolution, for the moment, of the united Indian front.

The removal of tribal land claims by the treaties of 1784 and 1785 only complicated the Indian policy of the United States in the Northwest. Native restlessness and discontent became apparent. The 1784 Iroquois cession angered the Wyandot, Delaware and other native bands which argued that the Six Nations had no right to cede the Ohio valley hunting grounds inhabited by Algonkian tribes. Also, the 1785 treaty was considered invalid by the Ohio valley tribes because the militant Shawnee, one of the most influential tribes of the region, had refused to attend the council.

Yet even before the treaties were ratified, American backwoodsmen swarmed into the Ohio River area – "so fine a country my eyes never beheld"[12] – and upon Indian lands not yet ceded. The attempts by congressional forces to drive these settlers out of the contested region were futile. The "white banditti" were well organized, numerous, and firm in the belief of the right of expansion into vacant forest lands.[13]

The Indians, however, in spite of their land cessions in the recent treaties, were prepared to contest the advance of the backwoodsmen. Captain Johnny, a Shawnee chief, told the Americans at a council at Wakitunikee that

> *you are drawing close to us, and so near our bedsides, that we can almost hear the noise of your axes felling our Trees and settling our Country . . . the Boundary is the Ohio River, . . . but it is too clear to us your design is to take our Country from us . . .* [we are] *determined to act as one man in Defence of it. Therefore be strong and keep your people within Bounds, or we shall take up a Rod and whip them back to your side of the Ohio.*[14]

The resolution of the Indians to defend their country was no veiled threat. Settlers floating down the Ohio River in flatboats were repeatedly attacked by various bands of irascible natives.[15] Tribal spokesmen explained to British agents that they had never asked for peace; indeed, they thought the Americans desired it, and listened to them only because the Indians were so advised by their father, the British king. The tribes "had no idea that the Americans looked on them as conquered people 'till so informed by the commissioners.'"[16]

The general dissatisfaction of the Indians prompted Joseph Brant to visit the country of the upper lakes in the summer of 1785 and hold council with the nations. At the assembly, the Six Nations implored the Algonkian tribes to join them in defending their country against the attacks of the United States and they repudiated the action taken by their representatives at Fort Stanwix. Although the tribes declared their firm attachment to the king, British Indian Department agents present nonetheless advised them not to act precipitately, but to state to Congress their position and claims.[17]

Like Pontiac 20 years earlier, Brant was concerned about native survival, and it was the Mohawk leader's hope that he could combine all the tribes of the Northwest into a single grand confederacy.[18] Only through solid Indian unity could effective resistance be made against American westward expansion. But he knew that what was required to gain Indian acquiescence was a more solid assurance of British support. Therefore, in order to ascertain exactly what position his majesty's government would take if serious difficulties developed between his people and the Americans, Joseph Brant journeyed to England during the winter of 1785-86.

The arrival of the "noble American savage" in England on 12 December 1785 caused a sensation in British society.[19] Although Brant enjoyed the pageantry and pleasures of London social life, he was preoccupied with the problems of the native people in America. In a lengthy introduction to Lord Sydney Secretary of State of the Home Department between 1783 and 1789, Joseph reminded the minister of the faithful and valuable role the Six Nations played in the late American war. The Indians, he continued, were astonished that the British had forgotten them at the peace treaty of 1783, and the Americans were violating the British-Indian pact of 1768. Therefore, Brant urged, would the king support the Indians in a war with the United States?[20]

Sydney's reply, three months later, was a paragon of British diplomatic protocol. Certainly the king had the welfare of the Indians at heart but

> *His Majesty recommends to his Indian allies to continue united in their councils, and that their measures may be conducted with temper and moderation; from which, added to a peaceful demeanor on their part, they must experience many essential benefits, and be most likely to secure to themselves, the possession of those rights and privileges which their ancestors have heretofore enjoyed.*[21]

The language was nebulous enough to imply that Britain would assist the Indians in a future emergency, but it provided Brant with little immediate encouragement for a British-Indian alliance against America.

However, in a secret despatch, Sydney instructed Lieutenant Governor Henry Hope of Quebec to avoid assisting the tribes openly, but to maintain a friendly relationship with them since "the very peace and prosperity of the province depends on it."[22]

> *It is utterly impracticable for his Majesty's Ministers to prescribe any direct line for your Conduct should matters be driven to the extremity, and much will depend upon your judgment and discretion in the management of a Business so delicate and interesting.*[23]

Unquestionably British native policy for America in 1786 was vague. Nonetheless it did possess the soundness of flexibility and allowed the local officials in the field to use their own discretion according to the exigency of the circumstance. Whitehall could then repudiate any such decision if the action proved harmful to the delicate balance of Anglo-American diplomatic relations.

Brant returned to the forests of North America in the summer of 1786 to find the native problem acute. During his absence in England the American commissioners Clark and Butler had summoned the peace faction of the Shawnee to a council at the mouth of the Great Miami River. In return for a promise of peace, the Shawnee delegates acknowledged that the United States was "the sole and absolute sovereign of all territory ceded by Great Britain in the 1783 treaty."[24] In addition the chiefs signed away Shawnee claims to territory east of the Miami River.[25]

The treaties of 1784, 1785 and 1786, based solely on the idea of conquest, had coerced the Indians into relinquishing all their lands along the northwest frontier to the United States. Congress was suspicious of the British activities with the Indians and followed a policy of counteracting the king's influence among them by attempting to reduce the tribes to the status of dependent wards. By 1786, however, the northwest tribes were disgusted with the

11 Field dress (private), Loyalist corps, Butler's Rangers; watercolour by Charles M. Lefferts. *(New-York Historical Society.)*

whole Indian policy of the United States and repudiated all the treaties made with the congressional representatives since the close of the American Revolution.[26] The Shawnee were particularly incensed against the influx of the backwoodsmen, and raids commenced along the Ohio River.[27] Congress, having embarked prematurely on a policy of aggression, was financially powerless to combat Indian resistance.

In an effort to bring some security to the helpless frontier, two expeditions under George Rogers Clark and Benjamin Logan were organized by Kentucky, independent of central authority. Clark's action against the Miami of the Upper Wabash River failed miserably owing to desertion and lack of supplies, and he was forced to retreat to Vincennes.[28] Colonel Benjamin Logan, however, surprised the Shawnee and on 6 October 1786 burned their two principal towns of Maycockey and Wakitunikee (where Captain Johnny had made his defiant speech in 1785).

> *Maycockey town raised the "Yanky" colours but to no purpose, as the army destroyed the town, proceeded to Wakitunikee and destroyed it and burned the houses of Alexander McKee and Blue Jacket.*[29]

## II

The violence on the frontier alarmed Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, the new governor of Quebec. As a representative of the British crown, he quickly conveyed the message to the Indians that the king was at peace with the world and was neither prepared nor wished for war. The Indians, Dorchester urged, must endeavour to secure a solid peace with the Americans. In a despatch to Sir John Johnson, Superintendent General of Indian affairs, the governor cautioned that "All promises (to the Tribes) not intended to be fulfilled must be avoided."[30]

In a letter to Lord Sydney a few days later, Dorchester elaborated on the reason for his concern.

> *The Americans have made an inroad on the Shawanese country west of the Ohio, burned some of their villages and carried off some women and children as prisoners. The town where the Indian Congress was to assemble was also laid in ashes. The alarm* [is] *increased by the report that parties are moving up the Rivers which fall into the Ohio River from the North and leads to Detroit.*[31]

The governor realized that a prolonged war between the Indians and Americans was a distinct possibility. Therefore, it was in the national interest of British North America to maintain at any cost the allegiance of the tribes of the Northwest, for upon them rested the retention of the western posts – Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac – and indeed the defence and survival of the upper Province of Quebec. To achieve this loyalty, the British government spent over £20,000 per year between 1784 and 1788 on Indian presents.[32] The tribes were provided with ammunition, muskets, axes, knives, clothing and medals of King George III.[33] Lord Sydney even suggested that it might be advisable to give the Indians ammunition with which to defend themselves against the Americans.[34]

As a gesture of unity and to discuss their mutual problems, the tribes of the Northwest and the Six Nations gathered for a lengthy council near the mouth of the Detroit River in December of 1786. Joseph Brant opened the conference with a speech pleading for Indian unity. The tribes responded by unanimously and formally denouncing the treaties of 1784, 1785 and 1786. The Indians justified this action by blaming the Americans who, they contended, held councils wherever they chose without regard to the tribes and made separate treaties instead of having a general conference with all the nations.[35]

After this lengthy discussion the council, known now as the "United Indian Nations," drafted an address to Congress. The message began with a declaration of surprise that the tribes were not included in the peace treaty of 1783. The king had advised them to remain quiet, observed the Indians, but unfortunately "mischief and confusion" had occurred. Nonetheless, the Indians urged a meeting in the spring to negotiate a treaty of friendship and understanding with the Americans. Meanwhile, suggested the council, Americans should stop encroaching on tribal lands across the Ohio River.[36]

The British, as represented by their Indian Department agents at the councils, had succeeded in obtaining a loose alliance of the Northwest tribes. This was a damaging blow to the early Indian policy of the United States which had planned a programme of divide and rule. However, Indian unity was shaky at best. At the Detroit council there was friction over the concession of lands north of the Ohio by the Treaty of Fort McIntosh. The Wyandot and Delaware who lived nearest the Ohio, and who would bear the brunt of an American attack, were prepared to compromise. But the Shawnee and other western Indians were determined to stand firm on the 1768 line as the limit of white expansion.[37]

During the long, complicated Indian-American debate over recognition of aboriginal rights, the British maintained a position of remarkable consistency. In the spring of 1787, Major Robert Matthews, military secretary to the governor, made an official tour of inspection of the western posts for the purpose of making a special report for the information of the secretary of state of the Home Department. During the course of his travels, Matthews wrote Joseph Brant and gave him a summation of the official British policy toward the tribes of the Northwest.

> [The king] *cannot begin a war with the Americans, because some of their people encroach and make depredations upon parts of the Indian country; but they must see it is his Lordship's intention to defend the posts . . . . On the other hand, if the Indians think it more for their interest that the Americans should have possession of the posts, and be established in their country, they ought to declare it, that the English need no longer be put to the vast and unnecessary expense and inconvenience of keeping posts, the chief object of which is to protect their Indian allies, and the loyalists who have suffered with them.*[38]

The tone of the letter was such that the Indians were to believe that if the posts were surrendered to their inveterate foes, the Americans, the traditional life style of the tribes would be doomed. Sydney, writing to Lord Dorchester, echoed the theme by arguing that the conduct of the Americans had justified the retention of the western posts. The British treatment of the Indians, continued Sydney, has always been liberal and "considering that the security of the Province may depend on their loyalty, supplies may be augmented rather than leave them discontented."[39] Whitehall was anxious to continue using the natives as pawns in their dealings with the Americans, and thus retain British commercial and imperial interests in the Northwest. Yet, because of tribal resistance and British policy for the frontier, the United States in the summer of 1787 initiated a policy of appeasement of the Indian tribes and the public lands of the Ohio valley.

## III

The first governor of the American territory northwest of the Ohio River was Arthur St. Clair, a veteran officer of the American Revolution, whose appointment became effective on 22 October 1787. The governor was instructed to negotiate a treaty of peace with the Indian tribes and "to conciliate the white people inhabiting the frontiers towards them."[40] But there was to be no departure from the former treaties of 1784, 1785 and 1786, unless a more favourable boundary could be obtained for the United States. "You will not neglect any opportunity that may offer of extinguishing the Indian rights to the westward as far as the river Mississippi."[41]

St. Clair was a man of limited military and administrative capacity, but he did realize that if the uneasiness among the tribes of the Northwest could not be removed, a general war would ensue. In a letter to Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, the worried governor observed:

*Whether that uneasiness can be removed I own, I think doubtful, for though we hear much of the Injuries and depredations that are committed by the Indians upon the Whites, there is too much reason to believe that at least equal if not greater Injuries are done to the Indians by the frontier settlers of which we hear little.*[42]

In spite of the apparent danger, St. Clair arranged an Indian council, but he regretted that the finances of the United States would not permit a more liberal appropriation of money, particularly since the tribes were receiving large amounts of presents and other inducements from the British.[43] Congress had voted a total of $34,000 of which $20,000 was to be applied toward the extinguishment of Indian claims to lands already ceded to the United States, and for purchasing other lands beyond the limits fixed by prior treaties. Nonetheless, after a final meeting with Knox, the governor departed for the "Territory Northwest of the River Ohio."

When St. Clair finally reached the Ohio on 9 July 1788, the frontier was in a chaotic state. One observer noted that the emigration to Kentucky and Ohio, termed the western territory, "exceeded the bounds of credibility." Enterprising New England people in particular, checked in their commercial pursuits at home, turned to the tempting, though remote, country and were not deterred by the danger or difficulty in finding a means of subsistence. In addition, "the present feeble Congress has little authority over any part of the western country, and it is doubtful whether the new one may possess the power sufficient for the purpose."[44]

Depredations on the frontier became more bold and alarming than ever. American backwoodsmen butchered a band of migrant Cherokee on the Scioto; and on 13 July an Ottawa raiding party attacked and plundered the American supply column carrying the Indian presents for St. Clair's upcoming council.[45] During this summer of violence one young man, Thomas Ridout, the future surveyor-general of Upper Canada, was captured on the Ohio by a group of Shawnee. Although suffering considerable hardship while living in the Indian towns, Ridout observed, upon being paroled at Detroit, that "it is almost needless to say to those who are acquainted with the causes of disturbance between the Americans and natives, that the former are in general the aggressors, but in this war they are so in a more unjust degree than usual."[46]

While atrocities were being exchanged on the frontier, St. Clair waited patiently at Fort Harmar for the Indians to arrive. The tribes had assembled at the Maumee in October, 1788, to discuss the feasibility of treating with St. Clair. Some of the more remote western bands saw no need for another treaty: their towns were too far removed to feel the pressure of American expansion. Joseph Brant persisted, however, and counseled a policy of moderation, suggesting that the Muskingum-Venango line would provide a reasonable compromise to the Ohio River boundary. The tribes were badly divided over this proposal, and the Shawnee and Miami finally left the meeting in anger. Indian unity, the keystone to successful native resistance against the Americans, was again rent. The other tribes agreed to attend the St. Clair meeting, but Brant, his dream of a united Indian nation apparently shattered, refused to be a part of the separate tribal negotiations with the governor.[47]

In January, 1789, a number of native bands, with the notable exception of Brant's Mohawks and the militant Shawnee and Miami, gathered at Fort Harmar on the Ohio River near Marietta. Initially the tribal delegates pressed for the retention of the Ohio line, but St. Clair refused. After considerable bickering the Indian leaders reluctantly agreed to negotiate two separate and dictated treaties. On 9 January 1789, the Six Nations, led by their pro-American Seneca orator Cornplanter, accepted the terms of St. Clair which reaffirmed the boundary provisions established by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784. But the Americans made a notable concession in that they paid the Iroquois $3,000 for the land ceded. Although the governor did not fully concede the Indian right to the land of the Northwest, he did comply with the principle of purchase.[48] A second treaty was arranged with the Algonkian Indians on the same day. Again the tribal leaders renewed the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Fort McIntosh. For this concession the Indians received $6,000 in presents and goods.[49]

The treaties of Fort Harmar opened up the great part of the Ohio valley to American occupation. St. Clair regarded the negotiations as a great victory; but the treaties had stained the honour of the native leaders and by the time they reached their wilderness towns, their mood had grown to a seething desire for revenge. The irony of the situation was that the United States, moving rapidly in 1789 toward a policy of peace and absorption, was forced to wage a desperate five-year Indian war for which the new republic had neither the means nor the desire.

## IV

Notwithstanding the treaties of Fort Harmar concluded by Governor St. Clair with the Iroquois and several of the Algonkian tribes, the tranquility of the frontier settlements, now extending 400 miles along the Ohio, had not been secured. The Shawnee, Miami and Wabash tribes, who had refused to attend the Fort Harmar negotiations, were determined to prevent all American settlements northwest of the Ohio River; the Indians were despatching war pipes, and a deputation was sent to Detroit to announce war and to demand ammunition.[50] Joseph Brant, still vainly attempting to gain positive assurance of British support in an Indian-American war, desired to know if the western posts were to be kept or handed over to the "Yankees" who were "Taking advantage all the time and the English appear to be getting tired of them."[51]

The continual ravaging of white settlements in Kentucky and along the Ohio prompted a concerned George Washington to call out the militia of Virginia and Pennsylvania for the protection of the frontiers against the incursions of the hostile tribes. The president cautioned St. Clair that war with the Indians ought to be avoided "by all means consistent with the security of the frontier inhabitants, and the security of the troops, and the national dignity."[52] But if the Indians persisted, a campaign would be necessary.

Dorchester, who was concerned for the safety of the upper Province of Quebec, was naturally suspicious of the movements of the United States in raising troops. The governor feared that the purpose of the American force was to subdue the Indians and then to attack the frontier posts.[53] But St. Clair, under instructions from Washington, lessened British anxiety by informing the commander at Detroit that the American expedition was designed solely for the purpose of "humbling and chastising some of the savage tribes whose depredations are becoming intolerable, and whose cruelties of late become an outrage."[54]

The commander of the American expeditionary force was Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, the senior active military officer of the United States in the Ohio Territory. His army began to muster at Fort Washington (Cincinnati) in September, 1790, but supplies were low and the militia quotas of Kentucky and Pennsylvania were incomplete.[55] In spite of these vexing problems Harmar marched for the Indian country in early October. The point of attack was a group of Miami towns clustered about the portage between the Maumee, St. Joseph and Wabash rivers. Harmar's advance met little opposition, for the Indians burned their houses and cornfields and retreated ahead of him.

Five of the largest Miami towns had been burned and 20,000 bushels of corn destroyed, but barely a shot had been exchanged. Harmar was satisfied; he had successfully completed his mission of destroying the Indian settlements. Colonel John Harden, however, was disappointed at the lack of action and received permission to make a reconnaissance in force in the hopes of forcing an engagement with the natives. In two separate battles on 20 and 23 October 1790, Harden was attacked and his troops badly mauled by Shawnee, Miami and Potawatomi under the Miami leader Little Turtle. In the first action the Americans suffered 300 killed, and in the second confrontation the Indians drove the Americans into a swamp and killed 200 more, all, according to Elliott, with spear and tomahawk. The number of Indians killed was only 25. American prisoners professed that Detroit was the intended object in the spring.[56] After these engagements, General Harmar returned to Fort Washington and St. Clair reported with incredible optimism that "General Harmar has made a very successful campaign," but Washington was disgusted with Harmar's results and wrote privately to the Secretary of War; "I expected little from the moment I heard he was a drunkard."[57]

When the news of the disastrous campaign of General Harmar reached

12 Joseph Brant (1742-1807), the warrior. Painted by George Romney. Inscribed lower right, Thayeadanegea. *(National Gallery of Canada.)*

Congress, that body immediately voted to augment the size of the permanent military establishment. Major General Arthur St. Clair was appointed commander-in-chief as well as governor. The concluding remarks on the Harmar campaign were presented to Congress in a report by Henry Knox who commented caustically that the army, at a cost of $320,000 had burned some grain, destroyed a few bark huts and suffered over 200 killed, while Indian losses were less than 100.[58]

In November Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, a principal warrior of the Shawnee, travelled to Detroit to ask the British for clothing and food for the distressed Indian families who had lost everything during their flight from Harmar. These two chiefs stated that war resulted because of American encroachments on lands beyond the Ohio, and the tribes were bound to defend their traditional hunting territories. The land, they claimed, had always belonged to the Indians, and by former treaties the Ohio was always considered the boundary line; this was rigidly adhered to by the tribes.[59]

Emboldened by their success, the Indians made more frequent their depredations, and the conditions on the frontier were now more deplorable than before the American expedition. In January of 1791, native bands destroyed the New England settlement of Big Bottom near Marietta, and an attack was launched against Dunlop's Station near Cincinnati. Several communities were entirely disrupted as murder, torture and captivity became common.[60]

In the spring a number of tribes gathered at the Miami with the intention of achieving an acceptable decision which would facilitate a favourable termination of their troubles with the United States; but Indian optimism, owing to their late victory, war preparations and continual hostilities on both sides had widened the breach and peaceful negotiations for the moment were not feasible.[61] Grenville at the Home Department was alarmed at the reports of Indian outrages and urged Dorchester to effect a reconciliation of differences and establish an atmosphere of peace in the western country. Dorchester was in fact pursuing a policy which suited exactly the desires of the British Home Department. In February of 1791 the governor told Sir John Johnson that he would feel great satisfaction in being instrumental in putting an end to the hostilities between the United States and western Indians. He instructed Johnson to "learn the nature and extent of the specific terms on which the Confederated Indian Nations would be disposed to establish a great tranquillity and friendship with the United States."[62] The idea of open British interference in an Indian-American war was clearly not sanctioned.

## V

In 1791, the United States, despite overburdening financial difficulties, was determined to conduct a second punitive expedition against the Indians in an effort to bring peace and security to the Northwest frontier. In April, St. Clair, after consultations with Washington and Knox, returned to the Ohio country to undertake the organization of his campaign. At Pittsburgh, the governor invited Iroquois bands to join his force against the Algonkian tribes.[63] Ironically Congress, at the same time, had directed Colonel John Procter of the American Indian Department to engage the assistance of Cornplanter and other chiefs of the Six Nations in peacefully settling the disputes between the Americans and the hostile Ohio Indians.[64] Owing to the influence, however, of Joseph Brant, Alexander McKee and other members of the British Indian Department, the Iroquois were persuaded to reject the American proposals. In addition, Procter, who had hoped to meet with the natives at Sandusky, was denied permission to proceed westward by Colonel Gordon, the British commander at Fort Niagara. Gordon was angry because the different American commissioners had avoided applying for British aid, preferring instead to impress the Indians with their own importance. The commander was convinced that if the Americans had applied to the British government to bring about a peace on equitable terms, "the results would have been accomplished long ago."[65] The American peace mission was thus abruptly terminated, and Procter returned to St. Clair's base at Fort Washington.

Throughout the summer and autumn, military preparations and active hostilities were carried on by the Indians and Americans. The Shawnee and Miami in particular were most hostile, raiding the back settlements and attacking flatboats along the Ohio River.[66] Toward the end of May an American army of 700 under the command of Brigadier General Charles Scott marched against the Upper Wabash tribes and destroyed a few towns belonging to the nonbelligerent Wea and Piankashaw. The militia killed a number of old men, women and children left behind, and to the apparent horror of Alexander McKee, the Americans skinned a chief whom they had killed.[67] In July, Brigadier General James Wilkinson led an expedition of 500 Kentucky militia against several more distant Wabash towns. This force met no opposition, but succeeded in burning some villages and killing a few natives.[68] These raids only heightened Indian-American contempt and bitterness, and the desire for retaliation was mutual.

Indian councils were held in early July at the foot of the Miami rapids.[69] The chiefs were determined to form a confederacy of all the tribes to defend their country to the last and the boundary they contended for was the Ohio River. At the same time, St. Clair was grappling with the difficulties of raising troops in the frontier. His force was ill-equipped and untrained; the lash was applied liberally, desertion common, murder not unknown, and the problem of logistics ever plaguing.[70] Yet in spite of these mounting perplexities St. Clair marched for the Indian country in September. His force constructed two posts called Fort Hamilton and Fort Jefferson in mid-October in order to protect the lines of communication.

The Indians, commanded by Little Turtle, had been supplied from the British stores at Detroit. To further bolster native confidence, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty and other notables of the British Indian Department

13 Sir Frederick Haldimand (1718-91), governor general of Canada. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

were present to act as advisers. Girty noted that "the Indians were never in better heart and are determined to drive the Americans to the Ohio and to starve their posts."[71] St. Clair, suffering from a severe case of gout, advanced cautiously through the wilderness, heeding the words of Washington, "beware of surprise."

At sunrise on 4 November 1791, the Indians assaulted the American camp. The militia panicked almost immediately, but the regulars held their ranks and managed to check the ferocity of the native thrust; however, the death of Richard Butler, the second in command, disheartened the Americans who began to give way and finally fell into utter confusion.[72] The fugitives, throwing away arms and equipment, continued their flight for 30 miles until they reached Fort Jefferson. The battle was one of the most severe ever fought between Indians and Americans. Casualty figures have been hotly debated: Americans losses range from 500 to 1,500; native losses from 50 to 150. But unquestionably, the affair was the greatest Indian victory since the Braddock disaster of 1755. In an anonymous letter from Niagara, the details and implications of the battle were clearly outlined.

*The American Army of which no doubt you have this summer heard, had advanc'd on the third of this month to within Forty Miles of the Miamis Towns, they were there encountered by near Two thousand Indians, who on that day took from them the greatest part of their Horses & Cattle – On the 4th, at Sun rise they attack'd their Camp, but were twice repuls'd, irritated beyond measure, they retir'd to a little distance, where separating into their different tribes and each conducted by their own Leaders, they returned like Furies to the assault & almost instantly got possession of near half the Camp – they found in it a row of Flour Bags, & bags of Stores, which serv'd them as a Breast work, from behind which they kept up a constant & heavy fire, the Americans charg'd them several times with Fixed Bayonets, but were as often repuls'd – at length General Butler, second in Command, being kill'd, the Americans fell into confusion & were driven from their Cannon, round which a Hundred of their bravest Men fell, the Rout now became universal, & in the utmost disorder, the Indians follow'd for Six Miles, & many fell Victims to their Fury, in the Camp they found 5 pieces Brass Cannon, 3 of 6 & 2 of 4 pounds, 1 4½ Mortar & 2 paturaros, all Brass & mounted for field Service, with these they took all the Arms, Ammunition, Provisions, Cloathing, entrenching Tools, and Stores of every kind, the Americans had in their Camp for the purpose of erecting Forts, & remaining the ensuing Winter in the Indian Country, besides the Commanding Officer, the Adjt. Genl. & Surgeon Genl., Twelve hundred are said to have Fallen in the Assaults & pursuits – you however know the Indians, most probably this Number is exaggerated we do not hear of one prisoner – about 50 of the Indians are said to be killed & wounded, the Numbers at first were American Regulars 1500, Militia 800, in all 2300 – of Indians nearly 2,000. Two Forts they had erected on their Rout nam'd Hamil-*

*ton & Jefferson, are said to be surrounded by the Indians, they contain 100 Men each with but little provisions; the truth of this information may be depended on, Simon Girty, if not in the action, was within view of it. He had join'd Coll. McGee at the foot of the Rapids brought the American Orderly Books & all their papers – Butler's Scalp was brought in, & is sent they say to Joseph Brant with a severe Sarcasm for his not being there – He is at the grand River with the Six Nations – Cowan in the Felicity was dispatch'd with the interesting intelligence. I saw him yesterday at Fort Erie – He left your Brother well on the 14th who had sometime before hurt his arm and was not yet able to write, an Express is now getting ready for Quebec, finding an opportunity I send this by New York. Humanity shudders at the number of poor wretches who have fallen in this Business, but as they were clearly the agressors, they merit less pity, the horrible Cruelties that may probably now fall on the defenceless Frontiers of the Western American Settlements, is infinitely more dreadful & claims from every person who can feel as a man, every preventative that can be devis'd; I have this morning wrote to our Friend Mr. Askin strongly pressing him to join the Trade in inspiring the Indians with moderation. The Americans must be severely hurt at this Blow, however willing to resent it, they will find great difficulty in raising another Army for this Service. They would probably listen to any Reasonable Terms of accommodation, if they saw a prospect of its being establish'd on solid Grounds, perhaps this can only be affected by the influence of the British Government & Trade with the Indians – The Terms the Indians ask'd were, that the Ohio shou'd be establish'd as the Boundary to the American Settlements, & that they shou'd enjoy unmolested their hunting Grounds, to the West & North of that River, some of the Branches of the Ohio to the Southward of this come within a few Miles of the Genesea River, which runs into Lake Ontario Sixty Miles East from the Fort of Niagara – If these two Rivers by the interposition of Government cou'd be fix'd as the Boundaries between the Americans and Indians, & between them & us, we shou'd secure our Posts, the Trade, & the Tranquility of the Country; you will know that the present lines must furnish a source of constant Contention & dispute – The others now propos'd being on Streams not navigable, will be free from this, the Indians not having as yet sold their Country between this & the Genesea nor does any of the American Settlements extend to the West of that River, but they very soon will – I wish our Peacemakers of 83 had but known a little more of this Country. I wish our present Ministry were informed of the actual situation – perhaps this is the important moment in which the unfortunate terms of that Peace may be alter'd – Perhaps this moment may never return –*

A month after the battle Alexander McKee wrote his superior, Sir John Johnson, giving him details of the St. Clair campaign. The agent noted that a minor chief, Quania, and ten men were the only Six Nation Indians who took part in the fight.[73] Joseph Brant, to the derision of the western tribes, did not participate. The Mohawk leader was convinced that a compromise boundary line was the only solution to an Indian-American peace, and war would only hasten the death of native life and culture in the Ohio valley. The opinion of this influential Iroquois was to have a profound effect on the future status and negotiations of the Indian confederacy.

Along with the Indian warriors who participated in the battle against St. Clair was a considerable number of Canadians and mixed bloods. Traveller Isaac Weld commented that *A great many young Canadians, and in particular many that were born of Indian women, fought on the side of the Indians in this action, a circumstance which confirmed the people of the States in the opinion they had previously formed, that the Indians were encouraged and abetted in their attacks upon them by the British. I can safely affirm, however, from having conversed with many of these young men who fought against St. Clair, that it was with the utmost secrecy they left their homes to join the Indians, fearful lest the government should censure their conduct.*[74]

The struggle for the Ohio valley was an Indian-American confrontation. Many mixed bloods and refugee Americans, particularly those who became members of the British Indian Department, actively encouraged tribal resistance to American expansion. These men lived among the native people, spoke their language, married their women, fathered their children and attended their councils; thus they maintained a considerable influence in policy-making. Vitally significant also, they possessed the *sine qua non* for an Indian war: the power to imply, promise, even hope for British assistance.

Yet Whitehall, as represented by the new secretary of state of the Home Department, Henry Dundas, was officially maintaining a policy of the strictest neutrality. Dundas ordered Dorchester to

> *show every consistent mark of attention, in regard to the Indian Nations who have showed proofs of attachments to the British Interests* [but] *. . . every means which prudence can suggest should be taken for healing the differences which at present exist* [between the Indians and Americans] *, and for effecting, if possible, a speedy termination of the war. The chief object is to obtain for the Indians the peaceful possession of their hunting grounds.*[75]

The Indians, revelling in the glory of a second successive victory, ravaged the defenceless northwest frontier in the winter and spring of 1792. Although the Indian war had been provoked by reciprocal depredations, Congress conceded that the whites were more probably the aggressors, as they frequently made encroachments on tribal lands. Indeed after the St. Clair battle, the Indians could have swept clean the country before them as far as Pittsburgh, for there was not a sufficient force to check their advance.[76] But the Indians were concerned solely with the defence and preservation of their natural way of life within the confines of the land bordered by the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, as agreed to by the Treaty of 1768.

Washington was most distressed at the inability of the army to remove the Indian menace, but Congress was more accurate in assessing the problem.

> *It is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within our territory.*[77]

Undoubtedly the tribes would not be able to effectively continue their operations against the Americans if the United States had the western posts. The British gave the Indians supplies, clothing, food, arms, ammunition and most of all, encouragement to persevere in their efforts to maintain their Ohio valley homelands. Nonetheless, in spite of British assistance in the Indian cause, it was "not the inclination or interest of the United States to enter into a contest with Great Britain."[78]

## VI

The twin Indian victories in 1790 and 1791 presented Whitehall with the opportunity to formulate a scheme for a native barrier state. The plan as described to George Hammond, the first minister to the United States, was to suggest British mediation between the Americans and the Indians to create a separate country for the tribes, independent from Great Britain and the United States; the boundary would be formed by the Great Lakes and the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.[79] Lord Dorchester, on leave in England, fully supported the proposal.

> *If the area northwest of the Ohio between the Mississippi and the Lakes shall be secured exclusively to*

14 Sir John Johnson (1742-1830), superintendent general of Indian affairs, 1782-1828. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

*the Indians, and remain neutral ground in respect to Great Britain and the United States, peace between them and the Indians will be restored immediately, and established upon a solid foundation.*[80]

The creation of an Indian buffer state was designed to protect Upper Canada from the territorial ambitions of the American republic, preserve the hunting grounds for the Indians who had been under British protection and, of secondary importance, enable Canadian fur traders to continue operating in the region south of the Great Lakes from which they might otherwise be excluded.[81] The price Britain would have to pay was the surrender of the western posts. Nonetheless Hammond, as instructed, merely suggested to Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State for the United States, the feasibility of establishing a national home for the Indians in the Ohio valley. But the Americans firmly rejected this offer and demanded that the British evacuate the western posts "with all convenient speed," as stipulated in the 1783 treaty.[82]

The arrival of John Graves Simcoe as the first lieutenant governor of Upper Canada in the summer of 1792 further strained Anglo-American diplomatic relations. Simcoe had absorbed a violent antipathy to everything American in the course of his active military career with the Queen's Rangers during the Revolutionary War. He had accepted the Canadian post in the hope of being instrumental in the "Reunion of the Empire," and openly confessed that there was "no person who thinks less of the Talents or Integrity of General Washington than I do."[83] The biggest fear of the lieutenant governor was that the Indians, if left to make their own peace with the republic, would then fall like a scourge upon a defenceless Upper Canada. What inspired Simcoe, however, was the hope of strengthening and extending British influence in the interior of the continent.[84] His position was precarious because the official policy of Whitehall, like that of the United States, was to maintain an atmosphere of peace and cordiality between the two countries.

While Great Britain and the United States debated over the possible solutions to the native problems, Joseph Brant and a number of Iroquois were becoming increasingly disenchanted with British promises and the war against the Americans. Henry Knox had made peace overtures to the Six Nations and Brant was tempted to negotiate. The Mohawk leader wrote McKee that the British government gave only evasive answers.

*If Great Britain wishes us to defend our Country, why not tell us so in plain language . . . . There is now a field open for our accommodation with the Americans . . . make them explain themselves on this subject, which I have never as yet, been able to prevail upon them to do.*[85]

Discouraged by the vacillation of British native policy and realizing that the Indian victories had provided the tribes with a degree of bargaining power, Brant became convinced that the time was opportune to attempt a restoration of peace with the Americans through negotiations. To ensure that at least a part of the Ohio valley could be preserved for Indian use, Brant was prepared to accept a compromise boundary line. Many chiefs of the Six Nations supported the Mohawk's convictions, and with this idea firmly established in their minds, the Iroquois accepted an invitation to attend a large Indian conference in the summer of 1792.

The council at the Glaize, a tributary of the Miami River, was called by the various tribal leaders to ascertain what military and political strategy the Indians could agree upon in event of another confrontation with the Americans. Alexander McKee, representing British interests, was present at the assembly. Simcoe advised the agent that he should encourage the Indians "to solicit the King's good offices;" but fully aware of the pacific policy of Whitehall toward the United States, the governor warned McKee that

*This solicitation should be the result of their own Spontaneous Reflections.* [We] *must assure our neutrality which we gave Congress; there should appear on our part nothing like Collusion or any active Interference to inspire them* [the Indians] *with such a sentiment.*[86]

The proceedings commenced on 30 September 1792. The delegated speaker for the Algonkian tribes was Painted Pole, a Delaware, who directed his speech toward the Six Nations, accusing them of scheming with the Americans. Cowkiller, a noted Seneca orator, spoke for the shocked Iroquois delegation. "You have talked to us a little too roughly, you have thrown us on our backs."[87] The Iroquois consulted in private for about an hour and then returned to the council. Surprisingly, the chiefs

15 The Ohio country, 1783-96.



of the Six Nations reconciled their differences with the Algonkian tribes and agreed that instead of a third successive campaign, they would meet with the Americans at Sandusky the following spring. The Six Nations were given the honour of carrying the word of peace to the commissioners of the United States. However, the harsh exchange of words and divided opinion had left a mutual feeling of suspicion and doubt between the Algonkian tribes and Six Nations. Although both groups had fully consented to the Ohio River as the only negotiable boundary, the Iroquois, particularly the Seneca, were greatly exposed to American settlement and military strength: thus this important faction of the Six Nations was in a state of vacillation as to whether the Ohio should be the boundary or whether, for their security, a suitable compromise should not be obtained if the Americans pressed for such.

Joseph Brant, suffering apparently from a "fit of sickness" did not reach the Glaize until the end of October. The influence of the Mohawk leader was important to the cohesive power of the Indian confederacy. Those chiefs who were still present hastily assembled a rump council for the dignitary. Brant was relentless in his theme of Indian unity as the only method of safeguarding native culture in the Ohio valley. Those chiefs present acknowledged his wisdom and assured their esteemed visitor that tribal unity would be preserved.[88]

Representatives of the Six Nations travelled to Buffalo Creek in November to meet the American commissioners and deliver the announcement devised by the Indian confederacy at the Glaize conference.[89] Although the Americans accepted the Sandusky peace proposal, a deadly triangle had been formed. The Algonkian tribes led by the Shawnee, Miami and Delaware were adamant in their determination to defend the Ohio River boundary line. This group expected British aid in time of crisis, and with two victories to their credit assumed an air of genuine confidence. The Iroquois, who had adhered to the Ohio line in council, were impressed with the rhetoric of Brant on unity, but like Brant and in spite of the promises to the contrary, they were prepared to accept the compromise Muskingum-Venango line. The Americans, who were eager to grasp at any straw that might result in peace, had agreed to the Sandusky conference, but the commissioners were not content with the Ohio boundary and hoped that a combination of presents and verbal persuasion would induce the natives to accept a new line. The only alternative for the tribal confederacy was the renewal of war and the possibility of Indian collapse. The keystone to a successful Indian resistance to American expansion was active British assistance. If Britain would not aid the tribes, Indian supremacy in the Ohio valley was doomed.

## Indian Confederacy: The Collapse (1793-96)

### I

In the spring of 1793 the Algonkian Indians invited the Six Nations to a new general council at the Miami Rapids, "before we go to meet the Commissioners of the United States at Sandusky, that we may be well prepared and all of one mind to speak to them."[1] Brant and the other chiefs of the Iroquois were ready to subscribe to any attempt at strengthening the Indian confederacy, and readily assented. The Mohawk leader had met with Simcoe before proceeding to the Miami, to discuss the British position and Indian strategy. The results of the conference encouraged Simcoe, who wrote to Alured Clarke, the acting governor of British North America during the absence of Lord Dorchester who was on leave in England,

> *I am not without hopes that the proceedings of the Confederacy will be so managed as to assure to the Indians the greatest part of that Territory which His Majesty's Ministers seemed desirous should intervene between Canada and the United States. Brant considers it absolutely necessary for the Indian security.*[2]

British policy originating from Whitehall was increasingly based on the desire to maintain an Indian barrier state in order to prevent the Americans from expanding into the province of Upper Canada and taking over the western posts. The continued allegiance of the tribes was vital if Britain wished to maintain domination of the Ohio valley. In the hope of stiffening the stand of the Indians on the subject of the boundary, Clarke sent Simcoe maps used by Sir William Johnson in 1768 which clearly showed the Ohio River as the permanent boundary line in the Ohio valley. The governor thought that these maps would be of great use to the Indians in council with the Americans at Sandusky.[3] The maps were a source of delight to Brant, who was determined to protect the traditional Indian life-style against white encroachments by any method short of war, by which means he was now convinced the Indians could not win.

While the tribes were assembling at the Miami to plan their strategy, the American commissioners, Benjamin Lincoln, Timothy Pickering and Beverly Randolph, arrived at Niagara on 17 May 1793, before proceeding, hopefully, to the Indian council at Sandusky.[4] At Navy Hall, Simcoe detained the commissioners for about six weeks, offering the excuse that the Indians were not nearly prepared to meet them in council. During the lull the Americans amused themselves by sightseeing, visiting Niagara Falls, attending the king's birthday on 4 June, and grumbling about the delay. In late June, Simcoe instructed John Butler and Alexander McKee to attend the upcoming meeting between the Americans and the Indians at Sandusky. The agents were instructed to merely explain to the Indians the nature and tendency of the American offers, but to avoid acting as mediators.[5]

It was not until early July that the Indian confederacy finally came to a general conclusion. McKee wrote Simcoe that "The Indians have made a resolution not to make peace on any other terms" except the Ohio, and the Sandusky conference would be useless unless the Ohio line was acceded to by the delegates of the United States. If the proposals were not agreed to, "it may irritate and inflame some of the Nations to violence – which neither advice nor the fear of consequences will be able to restrain."[6] With the tribes apparently, but only apparently, in agreement over the Ohio line, a deputation of about 50 chiefs, including Brant, Cowkiller and Cornplanter, travelled from the Miami to see the peace commissioners. The Indian leaders found the Americans at Fort Erie, where they had been detained by contrary winds. A council was arranged to take place at Niagara, where it was hoped that the two groups could clarify their positions.[7] The meeting took place in the Free Mason's Hall on 7 July with Joseph Brant speaking for the tribal delegates. Benjamin Lincoln assured the Indians that his group had full authority to negotiate a boundary, but Brant, acting as translator, did not make it clear to the Americans that the confederacy was determined on the Ohio River. Indeed, Simcoe noted that Brant "seemed inclined to give up some cultivated settlements north of the Ohio."[8] Although the Iroquois had agreed with the Algonkian tribes for the Ohio, they led the Americans to believe at the Niagara council that the confederacy would accept a compromise line.[9] The keystone for a successful boundary agreement with the Americans was Indian unity, and this Iroquois betrayal was to be a crushing blow to the Algonkian tribes of the Ohio valley.

The Indian deputation returned to the Miami where Brant tried to persuade the confederacy to agree to an alternate line. But his efforts were useless in opposition to the shocked and disgusted militant Algonkian leaders such as Blue Jacket, Captain Johnny and Little Turtle. In addition to the belligerent Algonkian tribes, the Creek and the Cherokee delegates who had lately arrived from the south urged no compromise, particularly after the Shawnee informed their southern brethren that the British government would supply arms and ammunition to the tribes. Alexander McKee supported this assertion. As a result the Indians became hopelessly divided over what proposals should be made to the Americans, and in frustration the confederation sent a message to the commissioners demanding the acceptance of the Ohio River boundary as prerequisite for the Sandusky conference.[10]

Lincoln, Pickering and Randolph reached the mouth of the Detroit River on 21 July and disembarked on the Canadian side, where they were hospitably entertained at the spacious home of Matthew Elliott of the British Indian Department. After receiving the message from the confederacy and carefully considering their reply, the commissioners explained to the tribes at length that the Ohio boundary was impossible, and both sides must make concessions. However, the Americans were prepared to pay large sums of money or goods for any Indian lands ceded. As a crowning inducement for peace, the commissioners admitted that the Indians owned their lands and that the United States had not acquired ownership of the Ohio valley by the 1783 treaty with Britain.

*We now concede this great point; We by the express authority of the President of the United States, acknowledge the property or right of soil, of the great Country above described, to be in the Indian Nations so long as they desire, to occupy the same. We only claim . . . the right to pre-emption, or the right of purchasing of the Indian Nations disposed to sell their lands, to the exclusion of all other White People whatever.*[11]

After ten years of hardship, bitterness and war, the United States had reverted to the British position that what had been transferred was not the title to Indian territory but merely the exclusive right to acquire land from the tribes by solemn treaty with them. If the Americans had conceded to this principle in 1783, a bloody decade of Indian war in the Ohio valley might have been avoided.

The American reply was not satisfactory to the tribes who were consistent in their desire to maintain the Ohio boundary. In addition, the idea of a cash payment for their land was antipathetic to the Indian mind. Tribal chiefs explained to the American commissioners that

*Money, to us, is of no value, & to most of us unknown, and as no consideration whatever can induce us to sell the lands on which we get sustenance for our women and children; we hope we may be allowed to point out a mode by which your settlers may be easily removed, and peace thereby obtained. We want Peace; Restore to us our Country and we shall be Enemies no longer.*[12]

The American peace party, although impressed with the dignity of the Indian plea, realized that further negotiations, including the proposed Sandusky conference, would be futile. Regretting that an accommodation could not be effected, the commissioners sailed for home to report to Washington.

The failure of the Sandusky conference was the death knell of the Indian struggle in the Ohio valley. The inability of the confederacy to remain united was directly responsible for the military defeat of the Indians a year later. Joseph Brant had gambled to effect a boundary compromise between the United States and the Indians, but had lost. The 1768 maps forwarded by Simcoe had hardened the Algonkian tribes to the Ohio line. Also, the Shawnee encouraged the other nations by boasting that "in defending their Country . . . their Father the English would assist them and Pointed to Col. McKee."[13] Their assertion was not refuted.

Brant, returning home to the Grand River, was forced to realize that his long struggle to promote Indian unity as the sole hope of prolonging traditional native existence against white progress had been fatally confounded. In a bitter letter to his friend Joseph Chew, assistant secretary to the British Indian Department, the Mohawk leader commented that there would be no peace because the Shawnee, Delaware and Miami "carried everything their own way," and were "too much under the influence of some white people who advised them to adhere to the old boundary line of 1768."[14] Indeed, the following spring Brant accused

16 John Graves Simcoe (1752-1806), lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, 1792-96. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*



cKee of deliberately stalling the ocedure and claimed that "It ppears to me that it never was the ntention that a meeting should take lace between the American Com- nissioners and us."[15]

In a lengthy despatch to Simcoe, lexander McKee defended his con- uct by explaining that he had tried o accomplish peace, but the Algon- kian tribes persisted in demanding the Ohio as the boundary, and the Iroquois dissented; the tribes were unanimous on every other point. Also, the acknowledgement by the United States that the Indians possessed the right to the land had convinced a number of influential chiefs of the fallacies long propagated, that Great Britain had given away Indian country at the treaty of 1783. In concluding, McKee insisted that he had used no influence to prevent peace, which would have afforded him gratification, but he expected to be blamed.[16]

Simcoe, whose anti-American prejudices were notorious, exonerated McKee. But that did nothing to save the Indians. The lieutenant governor informed George Hammond in Philadelphia that the Six Nations had disrupted the Sandusky con- ference, and that the Algonkian tribes regarded Brant as a traitor and would not comply with any council held under the Mohawk's auspices. The thought of the horrors of another war listressed Simcoe, and he feared hat if the western posts were evac- ated and the British deserted the ribes, the Indians would "in an nstant destroy the settlements and nassacre the unfortunate Inhabitants f Upper Canada."[17] Simcoe's alarm was increased when Lord Dorchester, who had just returned from England, informed him that in case of a war with the United States, Upper Canada would have to be abandoned.[18] With this bleak prospect facing the lieutenant governor, the allegiance of the Indians to the British became of paramount importance. Seemingly, the security and preservation of the Province of Upper Canada was dependent on the fighting qualities of the tribes of the Ohio valley.

The schism between the Algonkian and Iroquois appeared irretrievable, particularly after Brant led a delegation of Six Nations to Buffalo Creek in October and offered General Israel Chapin, Indian superintendent for the United States, the compromise Muskingum line. If accepted, this boundary would relinquish lands north of the Ohio River which the Americans had already settled and improved.[19] The peace proposal was relayed to Congress for consideration, while Brant and his followers waited patiently at the council site. The action of the Iroquois prompted the Ottawa, Ojibway, and Potawatomi to withdraw from the Indian confederacy. These three tribes from the upper lakes had formed the nucleus of Pontiac's alliance in 1763. They were experienced warriors and possessed an influential voice in the decisions of the tribal councils, and their decision to withdraw at this time caused total disunity among the remaining Indian leaders.

The dramatic events of the preceding summer did not deter Whitehall from attempting to maintain "a friendly and conciliatory disposition, consistent with the preservation of the western posts" in regard to Anglo-American relations.[20] Henry Dundas reminded Lord Dorchester that the king's dominions in North America required peace, and the interests of the United States required it more; but if an unpopular war was to erupt between the Indians and Americans, it would give His Majesty's government the opportunity to restore peace to the advantage of British interests.[21] Lord Dorchester interpreted the despatch as a desire on the part of the Home Department to maintain an Indian buffer state and to continue the allegiance of the tribes to the British. In a letter to Simcoe, the secretary of state at the Home Department wrote:

*Should the event of the present Campaign prove unsuccessful to the American Army under General Wayne I cannot but still hope that the States will open their eyes to the Advantages of a Final Treaty upon the principles you are already acquainted with. – The Muskingum Boundary, – or any other which will leave a sufficient Interval between His Majesty's Provinces and the American States, is the greatest object to aim at.*[22]

Therefore, in an effort to revive the crumbling native Confederacy, the governor told an Indian delegation that "I shall not be surprised if we are at war with them [the United States] in the course of the present year; . . . I believe our Patience is almost exhausted."[23] To support his prediction Lord Dorchester ordered Simcoe to send troops to occupy a position at the rapids of the Maumee with a garrison from Detroit. By April, the British had built Fort Miami in the Indian country.[24] This bold decision was a clear act of agression within the territory accorded to the United States by the Treaty of 1783.

The Indians were ecstatic over the prospect of an Anglo-American war. The Dorchester speech, the building of Fort Miami, the encouraging speeches of McKee, Elliott and Girty and the provisioning of the tribes by the British Indian Department heartened the native leaders greatly.[25] They were convinced of the authenticity of the assurances of British aid. The Shawnee reported to Major William Campbell, commandant at Fort Miami, the strength of the American army, announced their intention and determination to drive the Americans out of the Ohio country and appealed to the British for supplies and muskets. Alexander McKee was notably enthusiastic and told Joseph Chew that "the face of the Indian Affairs in this Country . . . seems considerably altered for the better . . . . a very extensive union of the Indian nations will be the immediate consequence."[26] By May, 1794, the British and Indian forces were organized and prepared to meet the expected invasion of Major General "Mad Anthony" Wayne.

## II

The third American military expedition had left Fort Washington (Cincinnati) in October, 1793, after the failure of the Sandusky peace conference. Shortly after the march commenced, a band of Indians attacked the American supply columns near Fort Jefferson, routed the escort and captured a large quantity of supplies and equipment.[27] Wayne immediately ordered a halt after this initial setback, and sent his army into winter quarters around an entrenched camp called Fort Greenville. The traditional problems of discipline and logistics threatened the very existence of the American force, and Wayne was further hampered by the jealousy and scheming of his second in command, James Wilkinson.[28] In the spring of 1794, after a winter of arduous drilling and physical hardships, Wayne's "Legionnaires" as they were now called, advanced to the site of St. Clair's old battlefield and constructed another defensive work which was called Fort Recovery.[29]

Throughout the winter and spring of 1794, the American public became increasingly aroused against the British and Indians on the Ohio frontier. General Wayne referred to Alexander McKee as "the British Indian agent and principal stimulant of the war now existing," and offered $300 for his scalp.[30] The *Centinel of the NorthWest*, Ohio's oldest newspaper, theorized that "the peace and security of the frontier is more properly to be obtained by contending with the British, rather than by a fruitless and dishonorable warfare with its instruments, the savages."[31] When Indian raids and murders continued, the same western newspaper provided the backwoodsmen with an encouraging inducement for retaliation:

> *That for every scalp, having the right ear appendant, for the first ten Indians who shall be killed within the time and limits aforesaid* [April-December, 1794], *by those who are subscribers, to the said articles, shall whenever collected, be paid the sum of $136.*[32]

By June the tension of the frontier, fanned by months of winter idleness in which smoldering bitterness and mutual acrimony had been allowed to build to fanatical proportions, suddenly burst into open conflict. The Indians under Little Turtle, chafing at the delays and in anticipation of an American advance, attacked Wayne's supply columns near Fort Recovery.[33] The convoy of 300 pack horses, guarded by Major William MacMahon and 90 men, was badly mauled. Elated by their success, which occurred on the site of the St. Clair defeat nearly three years before, the Indians continued the pursuit and recklessly charged the fort. The defenders, well protected behind the wooden picketing, inflicted severe casualties on the exposed attackers. The fighting lasted two days, after which the Indians gathered their dead and withdrew to their villages along the Miami.

The setback so discouraged some of the lake Indians that they decided to leave the Miami villages and return home to their distant towns north and west of Lakes Huron and Superior. The hope that the Six Nations would again join the confederacy was thwarted owing to the lengthy proceedings at Buffalo Creek. In addition, Brant was angry because Americans had begun to settle along the south shore of Lake Erie at Presque Isle, and the attention of the Iroquois was directed against General Chapin and the Pennsylvania land claim and not against the army of General Wayne to the west.[34]

The initial Indian enthusiasm for war in the summer of 1794 had been dampened by the affair at Fort Recovery. Again, and when desper-

Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester (1724-1808), governor in chief, then governor of Canada (1786-96). *(Public Archives of Canada.)*



ately required, tribal unity had disintegrated. The defection of the lake Indians and the concern of the Six Nations for lands to the east left the confederacy frustrated and depressed. Little Turtle went to the British at Detroit for encouragement, and Lieutenant Colonel R. G. England, "talked him over for two or three days, and dismissed him seemingly contented."[35]

Not content with the report of Little Turtle, a Wyandot delegation travelled to Detroit to hear assurances that British aid would be provided. Colonel England told the Indians that the tribes would not be deprived of the promised aid, and that he was awaiting the king's orders. In the meantime, the Detroit commander recommended that the chiefs return to McKee at the Miami Rapids for presents and more encouragement.[36] The apparent proof of British sincerity was witnessed by the Indians on 9 August, when 50 men of the 24th Regiment were despatched from Detroit to reinforce Fort Miami.[37] Also, between 7 April and 16 August 1794, the Royal Ordnance Department at Detroit shipped 1,398 pounds of gunpowder to Fort Miami. The Indians knew of the shipments and naturally assumed that it was for their use when needed.[38]

While the Indians were listening to British promises, the American army, 2,500 strong, began its advance, leaving Greenville on 28 July. At the Glaize, in the heart of Indian country, Wayne built another defensive work called Fort Defiance. After burning a number of Indian towns and destroying several cornfields, Wayne sent a curt message to the tribes: "Be no longer deceived or led astray by the false promises and language of the bad White Men at the foot of the Rapids, they have neither the power nor inclination to protect you."[39] This gesture at psychology failed to make an impression on the Indian mind, and in full confidence of British support, Little Turtle led the tribes against the American army.

General Wayne had positioned his force along an elevated ridge parallel to the Miami River only five miles from the British fort. For the protection of the baggage and supplies the Americans constructed a fortification of earth and logs, which was appropriately named Fort Deposit. The army remained quietly on this site for two days. During this agonizing lull the Indians established themselves behind a thick wood, rendered almost inaccessible by a dense growth of underbrush and fallen timber through which had grown a new forest.

On the morning of 20 August 1794, the American army advanced, but was immediately attacked by the left centre of the Indian line which extended for more than 1,200 yards. The undisciplined militia, conforming to tradition, soon fled in confusion and a rapid pursuit took place for about a mile, until the Indians discovered a strong double line of American regulars advancing steadily toward them with arms trailed. At the same critical moment in which the Indian centre recoiled, Wayne sent the Kentucky cavalry of Brigadier General Charles Scott in a slashing counterattack against the native right flank. The Ottawa and Wyandot bore the brunt of this mounted charge, but after maintaining the action for nearly an hour, in which a number of principal chiefs were killed, they disengaged themselves and withdrew into the dense forest. The Indian centre had taken advantageous cover behind the fallen timbers, but the "Legion" infantry, using the bayonet effectively, prodded their adversaries from the underbrush and forced the whole native line to retire at an increasingly rapid rate toward the British fort.[40]

The losses sustained by the two opposing forces are shrouded in contradictions. McKee, whose opinion is least reliable, states that "the Indians lost in the whole but 19 men among whom are to be much lamented 8 Principal Chiefs of the Wyondots . . . the Americans lost between 3 and 400 Killed and Wounded."[41] The *Upper Canada Gazette* reported Indian losses as 15 killed, mostly chiefs, but "according to the Indians their losses are greater and will be felt by them for some time, . . . Wayne suffered 230 killed, and 139 wounded."[42] The Americans admitted to 33 killed and 100 wounded of whom 11 died from their wounds.[43] However George Huffnogle, a deserter from the United States army, stated that Wayne "concealed as much as possible the number of Americans killed and wounded, but . . . was inclined to think there were upwards of 200 or 300 killed and wounded."[44] In the final analysis Isaac Weld offered the most pungent observation.

> *Between thirty and forty Indians, who had been shot or bayoneted as they attempted to run from one tree to another, were found dead on the field by the American army. It is supposed that many more were killed, but the fact of the matter could never be ascertained by them: a profound silence was observed on the subject by the Indians, so that I never could learn accurately how many of them had fallen; . . . suffice it to say, that the engagement soon induced the Indians to sue for a peace.*[45]

The comments of this British traveller provided a suitable epitaph to the battle, for the engagement and the aftermath convinced the tribes that their war with the Americans was futile.

After the battle the American army devastated the cornfields and villages of the Indians and destroyed the storehouses of various British traders, including the headquarters of Alexander McKee. Wayne reported "the woods were strewed for considerable distance with the dead bodies of Indians and their white auxiliaries, the latter armed with British muskets and Bayonets."[46] Indeed, a company of white volunteers from Detroit commanded by Captain William Caldwell, and armed with British muskets and bayonets were in the action of 20 August 1794. Caldwell, an ex-captain and veteran of the esteemed Butler's Rangers during the Revolutionary War, had an excellent record. His military career included participation in the victories at Wyoming, Cherry Valley, German Flats, Sandusky and Blue Licks, and his sympathy for the Indians and his anti-Americanism were notorious.

In bitterness and defeat, McKee fired a farewell verbal volley at an enemy he had despised and fought against with a burning rancour for nearly 20 years in the king's service.

> *The American Army have left Evident marks of their boasted Humanity behind them, besides scalping & mutilating the Indians who were killed in action, they have opened the peaceful graves in different parts of the Country, Exposed the Bones of the consumed & consuming Bodies, and horrid to relate have with unparralelled barbarity driven stakes through them and left them objects calling for more than human vengeance.*[47]

Major William Campbell, the British commandant at Fort Miami, had heard the sound of firing on the morning of 20 August, and when Indians began to appear at the post, he reported "at last it became so serious that I thought it high time to stand to our Arms, fill up all gaps in our Abatis and shut out all communication from the Fort, by fixing our Chevaux de Frise."[48] The Indians instantly understood the meaning of this symbolic act of British isolation. In spite of a decade of promises and encouragement, the Dorchester speech, the building and reinforcing of Fort Miami, the tons of supplies and powder sent from Detroit and the continual assurances of aid, the British in the moment of crisis were abandoning the tribes. Although Campbell had wisely adhered to the official policy maintained for years at Whitehall and had refused to openly assist the natives in their war with the United States, the decision of the British commander in addition to Wayne's victory destroyed the British-Indian alliance and ended forever the struggle for the Ohio valley.

7 Joseph Brant, the statesman. A painting by W. V. M. Berczy. *(National Gallery of Canada.)*

## III

Although the battle of Fallen Timbers ended the Indian-American war for the Ohio valley, Wayne's presence in front of Fort Miami only antagonized and weakened the already shaky foundations of Anglo-American cordiality. The legionnaires attempted to incite the British garrison by feeding their horses on McKee's Island within sight of the fort and showing themselves in small bodies, beating their drums and sounding their horns.[49] In a hasty despatch to Detroit, Major Campbell could not conceal his excitement.

> *We have not seen or heard a word about a Savage all day – It has been a matter of great comfort to me, that the Battle of Yesterday terminated without bringing me into a scrape, but surely my situation is a very extraordinary one, hundreds of the American Cavalry are constantly skirting the wood all around us, and at this Moment, A number of their Officers are looking at us from the Point of Colonel McKee's Island.*[50]

Neither commander wished to initiate a war between their respective countries. Wayne was instructed to subdue the Indians only, and Campbell was merely to encourage and maintain, if possible, tribal allegiance to the British. Thus in an effort to relieve the tension, Campbell decided to commence an exchange of dialogue with the American commander. Why, asked a curious Campbell, were the Americans within pistol range of Fort Miami? Because, replied Wayne, the United States had just won a glorious victory over the Indians and the fort, which was not there before the Indian-American war, had delayed Wayne's pursuit. Campbell's next retort was curt and to the point: if the Americans press the fort, hostilities will commence. The renewal of an Anglo-American war, an Indian dream for more than a decade, seemed probable. Wayne, however, exercising a degree of caution not in keeping with his boisterous temperament, stated that there would be no war, but urged that the British withdraw to the 1783 boundary. The communication ended with Campbell suggesting that the question of the western posts should be left to the ambassadors of the two countries.[51] After the termination of the correspondence with the British commander at Fort Miami, Wayne, who was short of supplies, marched back up the Maumee and built a temporary post called Fort Wayne. Leaving Major Hamtranck in charge, the rest of the American force returned to Greenville to establish winter quarters and await the expected arrival of tribal peace delegations.

British-Indian friendship had dampened considerably by the end of August, 1974. Lieutenant Colonel England at Detroit could not understand the unexpected American withdrawal, particularly as Detroit, indeed Upper Canada, was defenceless and the "Indians . . . have forfeited every pretension to a Warlike or Gallant Character. They behaved excessive ill in the Action at the Falls and afterwards fled in every direction."[52] Wayne took advantage of the Anglo-Indian schism by sending an address to the Algonkian tribes, reminding the natives that the British "had neither the power nor the inclination to protect you, you have severely experienced the truth of that assertion," and inviting the chiefs to a peace council.[53]

The tribes were disillusioned and depressed by the events of the summer of 1794. Confused and perplexed, the Indian leaders gratefully accepted an invitation by Simcoe and Joseph Brant to assemble at the Wyandot village near Detroit (the site of the 1786 conference) on 10 October. At the conference, Lieutenant Governor Simcoe advised the tribes not to listen to any terms of pacification which did not secure to the natives their long-contested Ohio boundary. In addition, the governor urged a cessation of hostilities until the following spring, at which time the British would assist the Indians in the restoration of tribal lands.[54] Brant's counsel was to the same effect, and he advised the chiefs to amuse the Americans with a prospect of peace until the spring, when the Indians might be able to fall upon and vanquish the settlers unexpectedly. But, in spite of the bravado and the endeavours to keep the tribes optimistic and united, the Mohawk leader was disheartened

> *and even says that had the Indians been left to themselves they would have concluded an Equitable and Honourable peace in June 1793 or been strong enough to have over Powered the Forces sent against them, as they would then all have been of one mind and united, but that People interfering caused a Division amongst them which he feared will finally Terminate in the loss of their Country.*[55]

The melancholy of Brant seemed justified, for in November the Iroquois, who had been embroiled in and claims with Pennsylvania, nally signed a treaty of perpetual peace and friendship with the United States, thus relinquishing Indian claims to Presque Isle.[56] The defection of the Iroquois from the Indian confederacy in 1793, the defeat at Fallen Timbers and withholding of promised British military assistance followed by the November treaty left the remaining Algonkian tribes in a mood of hopeless despair and the news from Europe only added to their feeling of gloom.

The eventual solution to the problem of ultimate control in the wilderness of the Ohio valley was to an appreciable degree decided in Europe. The French Revolution and the outbreak of war with republican France forced Britain to turn away temporarily from the question and nature of colonial responsibility. Therefore, the peace mission of John Jay from America was timely and thankfully received by a Britain concerned predominantly with politico-constitutional problems and national defence. Although Anglo-American commercial differences were of marginal interest to the struggle for the Ohio valley, the desire of the United States to acquire the western posts was the cornerstone of Jay's instructions. Both countries, represented by Lord Grenville of the Foreign Office and John Jay, were sincerely working in 1794 to establish a cordial peace and lasting friendship between Great Britain and the United States.[57] The proceedings were conducted in a spirit of mutual amicability; but the pangs of conscience tugged at Grenville, and the British minister attempted to reserve a right to mediate for the Indians so the tribes would not regard themselves as abandoned by the British as in 1783. The politically influential Lord Hawkesbury, president of the Board of Trade and Plantations, commented to Grenville:

*I never saw this point in so serious a light, till I had read one of the Papers you sent me. The Indians will charge us with Treachery. They may massacre all the English now settled among them, and the war which they now wage against the Americans may be turned into an Indian war against us.*[58]

Here is convincing proof that the British retained the western posts because they feared Indian retaliation as much as American expansion. Although the idea of British mediation and an Indian buffer state was not acceptable to Jay, a compromise solution was devised whereby the British, apparently now satisfied, agreed to evacuate the western posts by June, 1796, on the condition that British subjects, American citizens and Indians could freely pass back and forth across the border.[59] Thus, a treaty of peace and amity was signed between Great Britain and the United States, and the British could evacuate the western posts, no doubt happy to be relieved of the responsibility and cost of maintaining order in the wilderness.

Lord Dorchester and Governor Simcoe were instructed by the Duke of Portland, secretary of state for the Home Department between the years 1794 and 1801, "to use their utmost exertions to satisfy the Indians that provision is made for their commercial well being."[60] British officials attempted to explain to the Indians that Jay's Treaty would mean a greater freedom of trade and would improve the life-style of the natives.[61] But the Algonkian Indians sensed the lack of conviction in the speeches of Brant, Simcoe, McKee, Girty and Elliot, and regarded them as "false people." The tribes remained sullen and blamed the British for a second betrayal.

Some of the tribes sent deputations to Wayne at Greenville, where the American commander urged other chiefs to come forward and negotiate "a General Treaty for the Purpose of removing all causes of Controversy and establishing a permanent Peace between the United States of America and the Indians North West of the Ohio."[62] Wayne's suggestion was acceptable to most of the tribal leaders, who realized that the only alternative was a continuation of the war; but after the Fallen Timber-Fort Miami fiasco the Indians did not entertain that thought with relish. Even the militant Shawnee leader Blue Jacket decided to sue for peace, and his example was followed by a very respectable number of other chiefs.[63] A council with Wayne was arranged and the tribes agreed to meet and sign a peace treaty in the late summer of 1795. Joseph Brant clearly explained the reason for the mass defection of the Indians from the British.

*There is certainly a treaty between Great Britain and the Yankies that the Back Posts are to be put in possession of the Yankies in June, 1796.*

*If there is a treaty between Great Britain and the Yankies I hope our Father the King will not forget the Indians as he did in the year 83, he*

19 Alexander McKee (1727-99), deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, 1794-99. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

*at present must be well acquainted with their bad situation.*[64] To the tribes, the king had forgotten them again, and Wayne at Greenville was the only practical option.

By the spring of 1795 a treaty between the tribes of the Ohio valley and the United States was nearing completion. Wayne had received special instructions from the new secretary of war, Timothy Pickering who, like Washington and Knox, realized that the advance of American settlement and not war was the easiest and most economical method of removing the Indians from the lands of the Ohio valley. A suitable boundary, according to Pickering, would be a line drawn from the mouth of the Cuyahoga to the forks of the Muskingum, at the crossing place above Fort Laurens (Lawrence) and thence west to the portage between the Miami and the Saint Marys and from the portage to the Ohio River.[65] All lands north and west of this general boundary line would be reserved for Indian use except the lands occupied by the western posts and certain areas in possession of the French and other white settlers, "who hold their lands by the consent of the United States."[66]

These provisions advocated by Pickering were followed by Wayne and incorporated into the final draft of the upcoming Indian treaty. The tribes began to assemble at Greenville in the summer and, according to Brant, "All appears by the movements of the Indians, that Wayne will have every thing done in his own way . . . the poor Indians must lose their Country."[67] Indeed, by the terms of the Treaty of Greenville signed by all the principal tribes of the Northwest on 3 August 1795, th Indians lost the greater portion of the Ohio valley.[68] In addition to giving up strategic land around the forts of Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, the tribes agreed to sell all lands not covered by the 1795 treaty south of the 1783 line to the United States only. The native claim for the Ohio River, the Indian barrier state, and the struggle for the Ohio valley was ended forever.

After the Treaty of Greenville, British officials and officers of the Indian Department endeavoured to maintain Anglo-Indian amicability. At Fort Erie, Simcoe told a group of Iroquois that the British had not deserted the tribes. The posts, explained the lieutenant governor, had been given to the United States only after all the treaty stipulations of 1783 had been complied with, and the trade with the Indians would now be easy because the British were free to enter or leave the Ohio country at any time. Therefore, pleaded Simcoe, unite and trust the king.[69] However, tribal loyalty to the British had died at Fallen Timbers, and all efforts at reconciliation were disdained by the Indian leaders.

In January, 1796, Dorchester instructed Simcoe to perform a survey of the king's stores and posts, to destroy everything that could not be removed, and to be prepared to evacuate at short notice.[70] On 1 June 1796 George Beckwith, adjutant general of Upper and Lower Canada, issued a general order to the commanders at Forts Ontario, Niagara, Miami, Detroit and Michilimackinac to evacuate the posts "with all convenient speed," taking care to pre-

20 The Sandusky conference, 1793. Watercolour by Lewis Foy. *(Montreal Museum of Fine Arts.)*

vent any disorders.[71] By 11 August 1796, the last fort was presented to American forces. The transfer was conducted efficiently and without incident. Timothy Pickering commented that "the deliveries, as far as we have received intelligence, have been made in the most handsome manner, on the part of the British."[72]

To the tribes of the Ohio valley, the treaty of Greenville provided a permanent boundary line; but, like the lines established in 1758, 1763, 1768, 1774 and 1775, the 1795 boundary was regarded as temporary by a Congress which had never lost sight of the dream of acquiring all the land between the Ohio and Mississippi and beyond. Although the Indians in 1795 had only relinquished territory in southern and eastern Ohio and southeast Indiana, the United States ensured itself of the final acquisition by asserting the right of pre-emption to the remaining lands of the Northwest. In addition, the Americans were granted 16 reserves in the Indian country for the use of the western posts and free communication between them. As Washington, Knox, Pickering and others had predicted, the large influx of settlers followed by rapid settlement destroyed the last vestige of the traditional and nomadic way of life for the tribes of the Ohio valley. The wilderness was hacked away, the game fled, and the beginnings of an industrial society appeared in the region.

The Ohio valley might have been preserved as an Indian state if the tribal confederacy had managed to remain united. But the Algonkian and Iroquoian tribes had a long history of mutual acrimony, and the common threat to their traditional existence was not sufficient to maintain an alliance and prevent the advance of the American frontier. Thus the disintegration at Sandusky in 1793 made the pretence of the existence of such an Indian state the merest of fictions.

A further deterrent was the refusal of Britain to join in a military alliance with the tribes of the Ohio valley. Overburdened with the costs of colonial responsibilities and engaged in a war with France, Britain was not interested in provoking a war with America by actively supporting native territorial claims. With the signing of Jay's Treaty, Britain's imperial involvement in the Ohio valley was ended.

The tribes were caught in the grip of two forces, an empire and a frontier, neither of which was particularly distinguished for mercy, and both of which were destined to resolve their differences by other methods than costly native wars. Both the British and the Americans regarded the Indians as expendable. Thus betrayed by their own political primitiveness and abandoned by the British at Fort Miami, the tribes lost the Ohio valley to the Americans.

## The Quiet Years (1796-1807)

### I

The signing of the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 and the evacuation of the western posts in 1796 had unquestionably reduced the influence and effectiveness of the British Indian Department among the tribes of the Northwest. The disgruntled and starving Indians, who had been unable to hunt or plant corn for the past two years as a result of the military campaigns, spent the harsh winter of 1795-96 at Swan Creek, on the north side of the Maumee River near present Toledo, Ohio, and were provisioned by the Indian Department from the king's stores at Detroit. Alexander McKee and other officers from the service hoped that in the spring of 1796 the Indians could be induced to move north into Canada and settle at Chenail Ecarté, an area 12 miles square just north of Lake St. Clair.[1]

The removal of the tribes from the United States was a slow and disappointing process; however, the British Indian Department wanted the Indians to be relocated by spring in time for planting and thus reduce the cost of the enormous consumption of provisions.[2] But the Indians were tardy, and the delays continued until several chiefs finally offered the excuse that they had planted corn at Swan Creek and wished to remain at that location in order to harvest the crop. Clearly, most of the Indians did not want to leave their ancient homelands in spite of the fact that the political authority for the future of native survival in the Ohio valley was now vested in the hands of their recent and hated enemies, the Americans. Instead of the expected

21 The post at St. Joseph, a British Indian Department centre on the upper lakes, 1800. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*


of the POST on the of S^t JOSEPH in
LAKE HURON
Scale 200 feet to an inch

exodus of thousands, only a few hundred Indians eventually migrated to the supposed sanctuary of British North America. In July some of the Shawnee under Captain Johnny and Blackbird moved to Bois Blanc Island in the Detroit River, opposite the grand home of Matthew Elliott. But it was not until 1797 that scattered bands finally trekked to Chenail Ecarté.[3]

With the American takeover of Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac in the late summer of 1796, the British Indian Department was faced with the new, if less formidable, task of managing Indian affairs during the few quiet years of peace. The surrender of the disputed western posts prompted a reduction of British military forces in Upper Canada, as an era of Anglo-American friendship was seemingly assured. Only 500 men of the Queen's Rangers and Royal Canadian Volunteers[4] were left to garrison Kingston, York and the replacement forts that were to be constructed in Canadian territory: Fort George at Newark on the west bank of the Niagara River; Fort Malden at Amherstburg on the Detroit River, and Fort St. Joseph, on the island of the same name at the mouth of the Saint Marys River.[5]

The re-location of the military garrisons and the construction of new posts as well as the termination of the long war with the United States for control of the Ohio valley necessitated a complete reorganization of the British Indian Department. At the request of Lord Dorchester, Alexander McKee devised a "Plan for the Future Government of the Indian Department" in June, 1796. In his report, the deputy superintendent general stressed the importance of continuing to employ the officers of the department to "use the utmost diligence to preserve and promote friendship between the Troops and the Indians . . ., and to maintain harmony at the King's [new] posts."[6] He also suggested that in addition to the usual employment of departmental storekeepers, clerks and interpreters, three superintendents of Indian affairs should be appointed, one for each of the replacement forts. As a result McKee recommended his son Thomas as superintendent for St. Joseph, Matthew Elliott for Fort Malden, and William Claus, a grandson of Sir William Johnson, for Fort George.[7] Just prior to his departure for England, Lord Dorchester approved the appointments, and the British Indian Department, thus restructured, assumed its new role of managing Indian affairs.

In June 1797 at St. Joseph, Alexander McKee and his son Thomas met with Ottawa and Ojibway to negotiate the purchase of the island which "the Indians readily agreed to," and to attempt to curb the traditional intertribal warfare between the Sioux and the Ojibway.[8] The Indians promised to visit and trade at the new British post and "appear [ed] to be friendly as usual."[9] Captain Peter Drummond, the commandant at St. Joseph, seemed content with the situation and noted with enthusiasm that the construction of the barracks and the buildings for the British Indian Department were progressing smoothly.[10] But the attitude of the British military after Greenville was that the Indians should be abandoned to their own devices, as there would be no future need for their assistance. The new object of the government, observed Thomas McKee, was "to have as few Indians to come to the Posts as possible in order to lessen the expenditure of Provisions."[11]

## II

The peacetime policy added new complications to the general administration of the Indian Department in Upper Canada. Since 1775 the department had faced continuous crises, and as a result great freedom had been bestowed on the various agents in regard to obtaining provisions and gifts for the British Indian allies. But for a decade after 1796, a period of comparative tranquility existed in the Northwest, and this meant the return to a rigid routine and the strict accounting of goods. To compound the situation the expenses of the Indian Department were defrayed from the army budget, and this created a definite cause for future friction. The old, irritating problem of military jurisdiction and authority in the affairs of the Indian Department was to reach a climax in the McLean-Elliott feud at Fort Malden in 1797.

As early as 1795, the department had been accused of depredations. Joseph Brant noticed that "Goods intended for the tribes [were] often not received. . . . The Enormous expense of which much seems to disappear before getting to the Indian country."[12] Lieutenant Governor Simcoe argued that the apparent unpopularity of the Indian Department arose "from the charges of peculaon and from the belief that the fficers of the Department foment ill ill between the Indians and the nited States."[13] He further con-dered the department as" an stablishment not only incompetent nd dangerous as far as concerns oreign nations, but to be too ex-ensive in its objects."[14]

These charges of pillage resulting n personal profit were not mere peculation or unfounded, particularly in the case of Matthew Elliott. In the autumn of 1796, traveller Isaac Weld estimated the size of Elliott's estate at the mouth of the Detroit River as 2,000 acres, a very large part of which was cleared and "cultivated in a style which would not be thought meanly of even in England."[15] The house, Weld stated, was the best in the whole district, and situated 200 yards from the river, the parlor windows afforded an excellent view of the Indian canoes passing and repassing before Bois Blanc Island.[16] Elliott used his farm as his Indian agency, and with the assistance of his storekeeper and clerk, George Ironside, exercised control of Indian affairs in the region. Alexander McKee had retired to his home on he nearby Thames River, and from here directed a general supervision f Indian affairs in Upper Canada.

The affluent life-style of Elliott and is customary liberality of goods oward the Indians, for which the rmy had to account, soon began to nnoy the military at Malden who ad been ordered to economize. In eturn the Indian Department was isgusted at the action of the British fficers who had agreed to lend 50 arrels of pork to the Americans at Detroit in the autumn of 1796 when supplies for the Indians appeared scarce. The problem of the distribution of supplies to the Indians was acute now that peace had come to the Northwest. The basis of the difficulty was that the military held the purse-strings and the Indian Department the power in regard to the Indians. To ensure that an accurate account of provisions and gifts could be maintained, the military decided that their officers should be present on each occasion in which Indians received goods. But small parties of Indians were constantly arriving to proclaim their loyalty to the British king and to receive gifts, as was the tradition. Since Elliott's farm was more than one mile from the British officer's quarters at Fort Malden, it was impossible for army representatives to be present at every occasion.

The commandant at Fort Malden (Amherstburg), Captain Hector McLean, initiated the feud in a letter of complaint to James Green, the military secretary at Quebec. After discussing the details of the constructioh of several buildings at the new post, McLean commented on the expenses of the enormous consumption of provisions by the Indians, and thought that the high costs could be checked without the least detriment to the Indian service.[17] McLean had hoped that the presence of officers during the distribution of goods would curb any excesses by the Indian Department. But Elliott refused to detain various Indian dignitaries in order to accommodate the army. This action prompted McLean to write two long letters to Green, in which the commandant accused the Indian Department of carelessness and lack of formality. McLean was astonished at the consumption of provisions and suggested as a remedy the gradual diminishing of the issue of provisions to the Indians, and that native visits to the post should be made less frequently. "I have reason to believe that their coming in so often is encouraged by Mr. Elliott."[18] McLean further objected to the fact that the government had to pay Elliott £160 per year for storage, because the Indian stores were kept at his farm and not at the garrison. In addition, since the farm was over a mile away, the officers found it inconvenient to attend every delivery of presents, particularly when such short notice was given and generally at the dinner hour. Also, the distance, argued McLean "renders the peculation the more easy, and detection less so."[19] Finally, the commandant delivered a scathing denunciation of Elliott.

> *He lives . . . in the greatest affluence at an expense of above a thousand a year. He possesses an extensive farm not far from the garrison stock'd with about six or seven hundred head of cattle & . . . employs fifty or sixty persons constantly about his house & farm, chiefly slaves. . . . How his wealth had been accumulated, . . . is well known.*[20]

Matthew Elliott, confident of the power of the Indian Department, appeared unperturbed at these verbal attacks and smugly continued the feud with McLean by issuing provisions to Indians, often in the absence of the army officers from Malden. But a week after the explo-

22 Fort George, Niagara River, one of the three main British Indian Department centres in Upper Canada. Sketch by James Walsh, about 1804. *(William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.)*

on regarding provisions, McLean ncovered another aspect of Elliott's ctivities—the supposed peculation bread. The normal practice in curing bread for the Indians was have Elliott send a requisition to e commanding officer at the fort r a specific amount. With the sign-g of the order form, Elliott would espatch his servants to the garson bakery to obtain the bread. owever, McLean noticed that lliott's negro slaves were picking up ome 20 to 25 loaves per day. pparently Elliott was getting free bread for himself and his large household staff from the garrison bakery under the pretext of acquiring it for the Indians. The commandant immediately ordered the commissary not to charge any bread to the government account unless delivered directly to the Indians for their own use.[21]

The irregularities in the Indian Department under Elliott at Fort Malden were exposed for the third time over the requisition for goods to supply the Indians at Chenail Ecarté during the winter of 1797-98. Elliott requested supplies for 534 Indians, but McLean received a return of Indians at Chenail to the number of 160 from Lieutenant Fraser, whom he commandant had sent to check he actual numbers.[22] The principal hief at Chenail, Chief Bowl, pported Fraser's figures. The false turn of Indians by Elliott and the ounting bitter feud with McLean ver provisioning and obtaining ead from the garrison bakery ally provoked the governor-inief, Robert Prescott, to dismiss atthew Elliott as Superintendent of dian Affairs at Fort Malden in December, 1797.[23] Thomas McKee was appointed to succeed Elliott.

The McLean-Elliott feud reflected the new policy of order and regulation so beloved by the peacetime army. Elliott, who had served the Indian Department faithfully for nearly 20 years in times of crisis, undoubtedly did not realize that the power of the department during the quiet years was to be curtailed, and that a rigid enforcement of regulations had replaced the more usual practice of laxity in which the attainment of a degree of personal profit was not considered unwarranted. Dismissed without the benefit of a proper investigation, Elliott became in effect the scapegoat for the common peculiarities of the Indian Department in Upper Canada. His conduct was not unlike that of most of the other members of the department, notably McKee. For the next 10 years Elliott was preoccupied with attempts to clear himself and obtain reinstatement.

## III

In addition to the peace negotiation with the upper lakes tribes at St. Joseph and the unfortunate Elliott scandal at Fort Malden, the Indian Department was confronted with another type of problem in the form of a dispute with Joseph Brant over the sale of the Grand River lands. The Haldimand grant of 1784 had provided the Iroquois with a "fertile and happy retreat" on the Grand River as a substitute for the loss of their traditional homelands in New York during the American Revolution. But by 1796 less than 2,000 Iroquois, mostly Mohawk, had taken advantage of the opportunity to live on this large tract of about 570,000 acres. This discouraging situation was compounded because of the gradual yet steady advance of white settlement in Upper Canada which began to surround the reserve. Game became scarce in the Grand valley, and Iroquois repugnance at being reduced to the status of yeomen resulted in economic depression for the Indians at Grand River.

In an apparent effort to alleviate the Indians' plight, Joseph Brant devised a plan whereby the future welfare of the Grand River Iroquois could be assured. The Mohawk leader rationalized that the sale of large sections of the reserve to British and American purchasers would provide the native people of the Grand valley with a sufficient fund for their future needs. The argument was convincing because such a large area was not needed by the Indians who were indifferent to cultivating the land. As a successful step in achieving his aims, Brant acquired the power of attorney in 1796 to sell the Indian lands along the Grand River, and this power was acknowledged and signed by 35 chiefs of the confederacy.[24] To finalize the business transactions, Brant held a large council with William Claus, superintendent of Indian affairs at Fort George, in November, 1796, at which the Mohawk entrepreneur argued for a legal deed to the Grand River lands of the Iroquois.[25] Brant contended that the Haldimand grant of 1784 not only constituted the creation of an estate in fee simple for the Indians, but recognized the Iroquois confederacy as a distinct nation, competent to arrange its own affairs with other sovereign states such as Great Britain and the United States.[26]

William Claus and the Indian Department, representing British interests, countered that the Six Nations, Brant's arguments notwithstanding, did not enjoy the status of a sovereign nation. Haldimand's actions, replied Claus, should not be construed as the authority to dispose of Indian property without the king's approval. Indeed, the question of the sale of Indian lands had been settled by the royal proclamation of 1763, which stated in part:

> *And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians to the great Prejudice of our Interests and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; . . . to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We . . . require, that no private Person do presume to make any Purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow Settlement; but that, if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us in our Name.*[27]

Although the proclamation acknowledged the validity of Indian land title, or native rights of prior occupancy, it did not accept the idea of Indian sovereignty over all lands not formally surrendered to the king.

The reply of Claus infuriated Brant who argued in vain that the Iroquois could no longer survive exclusively on hunting, and that their only recourse was to sell parts of the grant so they might obtain some form of financial relief. The debate continued for months and grew increasingly bitter. By June, 1797, wild rumours were spreading in Upper Canada that the Iroquois were angry because they could not sell their lands on the Grand River and that they might raise the hatchet in retaliation against the king's subjects. Further unconfirmed information was received that the French and Spaniards were planning an invasion of Upper Canada from the Mississippi.[28] In response to these alarms, and following the earlier instructions of the Duke of Portland of the Home Department, Lieutenant Governor Peter Russell held an important meeting with his executive council at Government House in York. The board unanimously agreed to capitulate to Brant's demands provided that the Indians formally transferred to the crown their "interest" in those Grand River lands which they wished to sell. The Indians readily agreed to this proviso and the transfer was arranged by February, 1798.[29] In return the crown sold the designated tracts, approximately 352,000 acres, to the various individual white purchasers with whom Brant was dealing. Although Brant insisted that he was acting on behalf of his people, his personal wealth was considerably augmented as a result of the sale, and in later years the Indian Department noted the destitute condition of the Grand River Indians.[30]

## IV

With the exception of the McLean-Elliott feud and the controversy over the sale of the Grand River lands, the Indian Department in Upper Canada experienced an unusual period of quiet between the years 1796 and 1807. At St. Joseph, in March of 1798, Peter Drummond requested £1,700 worth of presents for the Indians who appeared to have completely adapted to the British changeover from Michilimackinac;[31] and at Fort Malden, McLean wrote lengthy despatches outlining the stages of development of the new post and of the building and construction of the Indian Department storehouses and council house.[32] About a year after the dismissal of Elliott, Governor Prescott produced a return of issued provisions for 1797 and 1798 at Amherstburg and Chenail Ecarté. The figures showed a saving in 1798 (the year Elliott was no longer with the department) of 21,000 rations of provisions, 1,000 gallons of rum and 71,000 bushels of corn, amounting to upwards of £3,000, and that the Indians had actually received more in 1798 than in the year before.[33] This inventory sealed the already damaged career of Matthew Elliott for many years.

The next few uneventful months were soon shattered on 15 February 1799 by the death of Alexander McKee at his home on the Thames River. His passing initiated a distasteful dispute as to whether the patronage of the Indian Department should be under civil or military control. In Halifax, the Duke of Kent, commander-in-chief of all his majesty's forces in North America, appointed Colonel John Connolly as

23 ructural plan, Fort George, 1799. Note British
dian Department buildings, upper centre.
ublic Archives of Canada.)


PLAN of FORT GEORGE Upper Cana
Section through the Picketing facing the Curtains
Fort George
References
NIAGARA R

24 Fort Malden (Amherstburg), 1804, another of the main British Indian Department frontier posts. Note B and C, storehouse and building for Indian Department. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*



successor. But the new lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Peter Hunter, supported by Sir John Johnson in Montreal, argued for William Claus. During the interim J. Baby, A. Grant and Thomas McKee were appointed as temporary administrators of the Indian Department until further orders.[34] Hunter, Johnson and other senior officials of the department insisted that the new deputy superintendent general must be, like Claus, a man of considerable ability and experience regarding Indian affairs. The choice of Connolly, they maintained, was clearly political, and his appointment was unwise because a lack of training and knowledge in the tactful art of Indian affairs could seriously jeopardize His Majesty's Indian interests in the Northwest.[35] Opinions were exchanged for more than a year until 24 July 1800 when William Claus was finally accepted and appointed as colonel and deputy superintendent general. He held the position with honour and skill until his death in 1826.

With the appointment of William Claus the Indian Department settled back into the interminable tedium of Indian councils, gift giving, and pledges of British friendship. At Fort Malden, McLean decided that a reduction of the costly Indian presents would be desirable, particularly since the Americans were not pouring out supplies or attempting to detach the tribes from the king's interest.[36] Thomas McKee opposed the reductions and regarded the distribution of gifts as vital. If the traditional policy was not continued, he cautioned, it "may operate to the diminution, if not the total extinction of our influence and may infinitely prejudice H. M.'s Indian Interest in these parts."[37] The wisdom of McKee's advice was to be revealed later.

By the end of 1800 the years of friendly Anglo-American relations and an indifference toward the Indians produced a detached and relaxed attitude on the part of the British army in Upper Canada. The distribution of forces[38] illustrated the apparent lack of concern for defence:

| | |
|---|---|
| Kingston | 102 |
| York | 143 |
| Fort George | 243 |
| Fort Malden | 118 |
| St. Joseph | 38 |

For the Indian Department, the major concern continued to be the Grand River lands. In three major councils at Fort George in 1803, 1804 and 1806, the Iroquois argued relentlessly for their legal right to lease more and more of their lands in order to gain a financial redress from poverty.[39] But, although the Northwest and frontier of Upper Canada were quiet, relations between Great Britain and the United States at sea were rapidly deteriorating after 1803. With the renewal of war in Europe, the British government adopted a maritime policy which seriously damaged the commercial shipping of neutral nations. Confiscation of cargoes and impressment produced a wave of anti-British feeling in the United States, with demands by an aroused American public for a redemption of national honour.

## The Indian Department and the Northwest in the War of 1812 (1807-15)

### I

The Chesapeake Affair of June, 1807, and the bellicose American reaction destroyed the placid life in the weakly defended settlements of the Canadas and produced fear of invasion.[1] The position of Upper Canada was particularly precarious because the defensive strategy devised by the War Office and outlined to the new captain general and governor-in-chief of British North America, Sir James Craig, was to preserve the fortress of Quebec and subordinate all other considerations.[2] Since the garrisons in the upper province were woefully inadequate (even as late as November of 1808 a strength return of only 411 rank and file was shown), it became abundantly clear that once again the future security of Upper Canada was to be dependent on the allegiance and fighting qualities of the Indian tribes of the Northwest. As a result, the heretofore waning prestige and respect for the Indian Department was quickly and wholeheartedly revived by the British.

During the winter of 1807-08, Craig developed a native policy to meet the alarming situation in the Northwest. He corresponded frequently with Francis Gore, the worried lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, and issued various instructions that were to guide the conduct of the Indian Department for the next three hectic years. Craig reasoned that in the event of a war, the Indians would not be idle, and if England did not use them, they would undoubtedly be "employed against us." Therefore, he continued, the Indians must be conciliated by the British, but their chiefs must be persuaded not to engage in a premature attack on the Americans. Thus the agents should avoid making any commitment with them, at least in "public."[3] In another despatch the governor reminded Gore of the "long-lasting ties" between the king and the tribes, and suggested that provisions could be supplied to the Indians to enable them to protect themselves against the Americans who "obviously desired to take their country." Craig stated further that

> *the officer of the Indian Department must be diligent and active, the communication must be constant, these Topicks must be held up to them not merely in Great Councils and public Assemblies, they should be privately urged to some of their leading men, with whom endeavours should be used to lead them to a confidence in us.*[4]

The dual native policy of Craig, one public and one private, was very reminiscent of Haldimand's successful efforts in 1783. As before, agents were to court and secure Indian loyalty to the king, and thus preserve British imperial and territorial jurisdiction in the Northwest by confounding the expansionist ambitions of the United States. Gore fully supported the plan and ordered William Claus to Fort Malden, where he was to assemble the chiefs, "consult privately" with them and remind them of the "Artful and Clandestine manner, in which the Americans have obtained possession of their lands, and of their obvious intention of ultimately possessing themselves of the whole and driving the Indians out of the Country."[5] However, the officers of the Indian Department were cautioned to dissuade the tribes from any warlike action until or unless the British should be at war with the United States.

To achieve a more positive assurance of the successful implementation of his policy, which required delicate and intricate negotiations with the various tribal leaders, Craig desired officers of experience and high quality in the Indian service. This was particularly important since

> *The Indian Nations owing to the long continuance of Peace have been neglected by us, and from the considerable curtailments made in the Presents to those People it appears, that the retaining their attachment to the King's Interests has not of late years been thought an object worthy of serious consideration.*[6]

For the British Indian Department, Fort Malden at Amherstburg was the key Indian centre in Upper Canada. But, unfortunately, the superintendent, Thomas McKee, was seldom sober and his excessive rum drinking had drastically undermined his influence with the Indians. As time was critical and tactful diplomacy vital, Matthew Elliott, "the only man capable of calling forth the energies of the Indians," was reinstated as superintendent.

## II

The spring of 1808 initiated the annual pilgrimage of the various Indian bands to the three western British posts, and the officers of the Indian Department anxiously looked forward to holding secret councils with them. At Amherstburg on 25 March a group of Shawnee under Captain Johnny Blackbeard and the Buffalo assembled to hear the British rhetoric. Like Sir John Johnson in 1782-83, and Dorchester, Simcoe and Alexander McKee in 1794, William Claus began anew the old diplomatic rituals. The Shawnee were told that the king was trying to maintain peace with the Americans, but if he failed, the Indians could expect to hear from the British, and together they would regain the country taken from them by the Americans.[7]

The work of regaining the affections of the Indians gathered momentum and in July, 1,000 warriors with about 100 chiefs, including the influential Shawnee leader Tecumseh who carried on Joseph Brant's dream of a united Indian confederacy, met with Lieutenant Governor Gore, Claus and Elliott at Amherstburg. Although the innocuous public councils were conducted with the greatest decorum, formality and military pomp as in 1783, the "private communications with confidential chiefs, afford . . . hopes, of a cordial assistance if we show ourselves in any force to join them."[8] To the delight of Gore and Craig, Tecumseh informed Claus that the different Indian nations were collecting on the Wabash in order to preserve their country from any encroachments. But the Shawnee leader spoke a great deal about the Fallen Timbers-Fort Miami fiasco, and reminded Indian Department officers of the many chiefs who fell because of that action. Gore realized

25 Fort Malden, Amherstburg, and Navy Yard and
Detroit River, 1812, by Catherine Reynolds.

that the Indians would have to see actual signs of British military strength before they would act firmly on the side of the king. However, the native policy inaugurated by Craig, in which the British engaged in winning the support of the Indians within American territory, was an unqualified success. The visit of more than 5,000 Indians to Fort Malden in the autumn of 1808 was the culmination of 12 months of work and preparation, and indicated clearly the extent of the achievement.[9]

In spite of the overwhelming eagerness of the Algonkian tribes of the Northwest to accept a realignment with the British and fight the Americans again, the Iroquois of Upper Canada were not so enthusiastic. They had suffered cruelly during the American Revolution, particularly in Sullivan's campaign of 1779; and although Joseph Brant had died in 1807, he had taught the Iroquois to remember the two bitter lessons of 1783 and 1794 when the British had abandoned the Indians to the mercy of American expansion. Thus at a gathering in the Indian council house outside Fort George in August of 1808, the Iroquois told William Claus

> *of the great distress they are in for Bread . . . that they had come to a Determination to sit quiet in case of any quarrel between the King and America and not to spill the Blood of the white men, and that their Friendship for the King was firm.*[10]

In fact at two further meetings in March, 1809, the Iroquois complained vehemently about the difficulties they were having with the white settlers around Newark, who had squatted on their lands, stolen their hogs, worked their horses, given them no redress and told them that the Indian possessed no land.[11]

## III

The renewed power of the British Indian Department accentuated by their skillful managing of the various tribal councils in 1808 was evidenced by the "Askin Affair" during the winter of 1809-10. John Askin, Jr., acting superintendent and storekeeper for the Indian Department at St. Joseph, was charged with pilfering and accused of committing other misdemeanors by Lieutenant Dixon, the military commandant at that post. Gore referred the matter to Elliott, who was of course well acquainted with such problems. Elliott thought that the suspension of Askin would make an unfavourable impression on the minds of the Indians, and since every exertion at this time was required from the officers of the department, the reinstatement of the storekeeper should become effective immediately.[12] Gore complied, and to maintain harmony between the army and the Indian Department, another officer was sent to replace Dixon.[13] By 1810 the humiliations experienced by the Indian Department during the "quiet years" seemed vindicated.

Various tribal delegates constantly visited the British Indian centre of Fort Malden, Amherstburg to pledge their support to the king and to receive gifts and provisions in return. As there were no instructions to alter policy, the Indian Department continued to win and maintain the allegiance of the various tribes. But in the summer of 1810, native dissatisfaction at American encroachments on their lands, and British inspiration, made it increasingly difficult for Claus, Elliott and others to control the Indian appetite for war. In July, 125 Sauk and Fox arrived at Amherstburg in a wretched condition of poverty and requested clothing, kettles, guns, ammunition and other necessities. In council Elliott urged peace, but he excited the Indians by telling them to "keep your eyes fixed on me; my tomahawk is now up; be you ready, but do not strike until I give the signal."[14] The dramatic oratory of Elliott was reminiscent, both in tone and content, of the "Tomahawk Speech" of Sir John Johnson at Sandusky in 1783.

The problem of Indian unrest reached a peak in November, 1810, when 200 Potawatomi, Ottawa, Winnebago, Sauk and Shawnee assembled at Amherstburg for a council. Tecumseh acted as spokesman for the tribes and informed the British officers present that

> *We are now determined to defend it* [our Country] *ourselves, and after raising you on your feet leave you behind but expecting you will push forwards towards us what may be necessary to supply our wants.*[15]

Elliott was astounded by these words and wrote to Claus stating that the speech "fully convinces me that Our Neighbours are on the eve of an Indian War, and I have no doubt that the Confederacy is almost general."[16] Already, 6,000 Indians had been served with "their annual Presents and Expenditure of Provisions" from Amherstburg, but Elliott was now fully aware of the potential dangers and endeavoured to prevent the Indians from engaging in premature hostilities with the United States.

The November council placed Sir James Craig in a difficult and embarrassing position. His native policy initiated in 1808 had worked too well. Thus in a desperate attempt to reverse the native trend the governor told Francis Gore to instruct the officers of the Indian Department to dissuade the tribes from their projected plan of hostility with the United States. The chiefs were to understand clearly that they "must not expect any assistance from us."[17] Gore quickly relayed the new orders to Claus and Elliott, and added that to leave no possible suspicion of flavouring the projected hostilities of the Indians, arms and ammunition should be withheld from those tribes who advocated war.[18]

By the summer of 1811 the officers of the British Indian Department were striving frantically in councils to prevent an Indian war by attempting to convince various influential chiefs that the time was not ripe for a rupture with the Americans. But the Indian desire for war was now unshakable, particularly since they had received a powerful stimulant in the new religion of the Prophet. The original name of this Indian visionary and philosopher was *Lalawéthika* and he was the half-brother of Tecumseh. In 1805 *Lalawéthika* was influenced by the religious revival taking place among the white settlers on the northwest frontier and particularly by itinerant Shaker preachers, whose jerking, dancing and excessive physical activity stirred mystical forces within him. During a frightful epidemic of sickness among the Shawnee, *Lalawéthika* was overcome by a "deep and awful sense" of his own wickedness and fell into the first of many trances, during which he supposedly met the Indian Master of Life. When he revived, *Lalawéthika* announced himself to be a prophet and changed his name to *Tenskwatawa* (from the saying of Jesus, "I am the door"). The Prophet preached against the use of liquor and pointed to a new path, "beautiful, sweet and pleasant," a pure life which embodied a return to traditional Indian values.[19] His emotional appeals, which soon broadened into an anti-white doctrine, and his alliance with Tecumseh inspired almost every tribe in the Northwest that rallied at the Prophet's town.

Sporadic Indian raids began to harass the American back settlements along the Wabash River during the spring and summer of 1811. Public opinion in much of the United States was convinced that British intrigue and instigation was behind the revival of Indian resistance. An Ohio newspaper noted that "it appears that there is a general combination of the Indian tribes that their aim is the inhabitants of these states, and that they are prompted to these measures by British (Indian) agents, who constantly excite them to hostility against the country."[20] The rapid deterioration of Indian-American and Anglo-American relations was convincing proof that Craig's new policy of 1811 had not taken effect.

Following the November 1810 council, Tecumseh continued to organize a united Indian confederacy, and eventually departed for the south in the summer of 1811 in the vain hope of winning the support of the Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee and others. During his absence William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, advanced with a large army against the Prophet's town. Although Tecumseh had instructed the chiefs to avoid hostilities, the approach of the Americans caused great uneasiness among the Indians and they decided to engage Harrison near Tippecanoe Creek on 7 November. The early morning attack drove the Americans back, but after two hours of bitter fighting the Indians were pushed into a swamp and gave up the contest, leaving 38 bodies on the field of battle. The victors suffered 188 casualties, but claimed Tippecanoe as a glorious victory and condemned the British for their participation in the affair since "British muskets were found on the battlefield."[21] Governor Harrison charged in a letter that "within the last three months, the whole of the Indians on this frontier, have been completely armed and equipped out of the king's stores at Malden."[22]

## IV

The Battle of Tippecanoe terminated Craig's 1811 policy of native pacification. For several months the British Indian Department had made genuine efforts to prevent an Indian war, but the vacillation of policy and the long delays in communicating often different instructions had hampered the effectiveness of the department and confused the visiting chiefs. The only alternative was renewal of the friendship and

26 Major General Sir Isaac Brock (1769-1812), military and civil administrator of Upper Canada (1811-12). *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

alliance policy of 1808. With the threat of war imminent, Sir George Prevost, the new captain general and governor-in-chief of British North America, was anxious for additional troops. The British regulars and fencibles immediately available in Canada totaled roughly 5,600 effectives, of which only 1,200 were garrisoning the widely scattered posts in Upper Canada, the area most exposed to attack.[23] But Isaac Brock, recently promoted to the rank of major-general, disliked the defensive concept long held by the British War Office that Upper Canada would have to be abandoned in the face of an American invasion. In early December he wrote a long letter to Prevost and argued that the Indians were eager to avenge themselves upon the Americans, and that a strong stand could and should be made. If the western Indians were supplied by the British Indian Department and encouraged to make war, Brock reasoned, the Americans would be kept too busy to threaten Upper Canada; but,

*before we can expect an active cooperation on the part of the Indians the reduction of Detroit and Michilimackinac must convince that people, who conceive themselves to have been sacrificed in 1794, to our policy, that we are earnestly engaged in the war.*[24]

Once again Indian support was considered vital for the preservation of Upper Canada. Prevost, however, had been instructed to exercise forbearance and to avoid offending the United States by any overt act which might give the Americans justification for war.[25] England was engaged in a bitter struggle with

Napoleonic France in Spain and had no interest in provoking a colonial war with America. Therefore Prevost urged caution, as he was determined not to create an incident. The conservative attitude of the governor was reflected in the instructions issued by Sir John Johnson in May "for the Good Government of the Indian Department." The superintendent general avoided a detailed discussion of Indian relations, but did urge the officers of the department to continue "your utmost endeavours to promote His Majesty's Indian Interest in general."[26] Therefore throughout the spring of 1812, the British Indian Department secretly prepared the tribes for war.

The British policy in the years before the War of 1812 of enlisting the Indians for the defence of Upper Canada was not restricted merely to those tribes who inhabited the region of the Great Lakes. In the Minnesota Sioux country, for example, the foremost British fur trader on the upper Mississippi, Robert Dickson, had volunteered his services to the king in 1811. During the long harsh winter of 1811-12 Dickson, prompted by humanitarian and political motives, distributed £1,500 worth of supplies to the starving Indians and this generous act was to prove most profitable for His Majesty's government.[27] Throughout that winter American agents attempted to influence the Indians by "making them unusual presents of goods and inciting them in the most pressing manner to visit the President of the United States at Washington."[28] This American agitation and encroachment threatened the future prosperity of the fur trade in the region. Thus, motivated by economic self-interest, his Indian associations[29] and loyalty to the British crown, Dickson was prompted to endeavour to frustrate American intentions.

He began to rally Indian support for the British by sending "belts" throughout the Northwest "offering every inducement to take up the hatchet against the United States."[30] Evidently he made no secret of his power and sentiments for Ninian Edwards, the governor of the Indiana Territory, warned the secretary of war that "Dickson hopes to engage all the Indians in opposition to the United States by making peace between the Chippewa [Ojibway] and Sioux and having them declare war against us."[31] Dickson enjoyed a complete success in allying the Indians to the British cause. The religion of the Prophet, the encouraging councils with the Indian Department at Amherstburg and their hatred of the Americans recently accentuated by their losses at Tippecanoe, drove the tribes into a natural alliance with the British against the common enemy. As a ruse some of the chiefs accepted the American invitation to visit Washington early in 1812. But even while this contingent was en route, 800 Winnebago, Sauk and Fox warriors were gathering at the Rock River rapids ready to fall upon the American border settlements.[32] The raids commenced in the first days of spring and by May "all the Americans except two had fled from Prairie du Chien, in consequence of the avowed hostility of the Savages toward them."[33]

The influence and achievements of Dickson encouraged Brock to send him a confidential query as to the number of Indians he could muster and the amount of supplies required. The letter reached Dickson early in June at the Fox-Wisconsin portage. He replied that Indian support for the king had already been assured, and that he had about 250-300 "friends" who would be ready at St. Joseph about the end of the month.[34] From Green Bay a few days later Dickson despatched a contingent of Sioux, Winnebago and Menominee under Chief Weenusate to co-operate with the British at Fort Malden. With 130 other warriors from these three tribes he marched for St. Joseph and arrived at that post on 1 July 1812.

At Amherstburg throughout May and June, Elliott and Claus were continuously engaged in organizing the large numbers of Indians that were converging on the British post from all regions of the Northwest. Tecumseh was located near the Prophet's town with 600 more warriors. The Shawnee leader regretted that the tribes had fought the Americans in the previous autumn, but he was anxious for the British to commit themselves openly. In fact to further inflame Anglo-American relations, Tecumseh visited Fort Wayne on 17 June and told the American Indian agent that he was going to Amherstburg for powder and lead.[35] Thus by June of 1812, as the government of the United States began to push its cumbersome war machine slowly into motion, a host of Indian warriors, prepared for battle, waited patiently at the British Indian Department posts of St. Joseph and Fort Malden for the declaration of war.

## V

News of the war reached St. Joseph on 8 July, along with Brock's instructions for Captain Charles Roberts, the military commandant, to adopt the "most prompt and effectual measures to possess yourself of Michilimackinac," and to make full use of the friendly Indians and the fur traders. Roberts' command consisted of only 45 men of the 10th Royal Veterans, but he managed to muster 180 loyal fur traders, and with the assistance of John Askin, Jr., 300 Ojibway and Ottawa who were in the process of bartering their furs for trade goods. Dickson's warriors augmented the contingent to over 400 Indians. With this mixed force Roberts reached Michilimackinac in the early morning of 17 July. The discovery of the British and Indians surrounding the fort came as quite a shock to Lieutenant Porter Hanks and the American garrison, who were uninformed of the declaration of war. Hanks was unprepared for a lengthy siege and was unwilling to chance a possible Indian massacre. He therefore agreed to a capitulation which granted his men the honours of war.[36]

The loss of Michilimackinac compounded the strain on Brigadier General William Hull, who was beset with difficulties at Detroit. The Indians under Tecumseh had rendered logistics impossible, and in an effort to re-open their supply lines the Americans had suffered two setbacks in skirmishes at Brownstown and Monguagan on 5 and 9 August.[37] Hull realized that only a speedy capture of Fort Malden would restore the prestige of the United States; thus he wrote imploring the governors of Ohio and Kentucky to send militia reinforcements. But at the same time, because of the fall of Michilimackinac which had "opened the northern hive" of Indians, Hull ordered the abandonment of the isolated and indefensible Fort Dearborn (Chicago). Captain Nathan Heald, commander at that post, commenced the withdrawal of his 100 men, women and children on 15 August; but the local Potawatomi had received word of the British-Indian successes, and excited by the prospect of a victory, 400 warriors led by Black Bird attacked and butchered the retreating column. The few survivors were ransomed by the British.[38]

The American reverses, added to their military ineptitude and tardiness, encouraged Major General Isaac Brock to plan an attack on Detroit. With 300 British regulars, 400 Canadian militia, and supported by about 600 Indians under Tecumseh, he effected a bold crossing of the Detroit River and demanded the surrender of the town. Hull, who was also the governor of Michigan Territory, was responsible for the welfare of the inhabitants. The menace posed by the Indians had undoubtedly become an obsession with him and he feared for the safety of the women and children. With these problems weighing heavily upon him, Hull surrendered on 16 August 1812.[39]

The victories at Michilimackinac and Detroit provided a quick and decisive reversal of the military situation, and credit must be given in large measure to Elliott, Claus and the officers of the Indian Department who collected and organized the vital native allies for the British war effort in the opening months of the war. Also these successes encouraged the Indians already on the side of the king, won over the waverers, and made neutrals of those who might have joined the Americans. In September, for example, Brock noted that the Iroquois of Grand River, who had earlier professed neutrality, were assembling in great numbers at Fort George. "They appear ashamed of themselves and promise to whipe away the disgrace into which they have fallen by their late conduct."[40] In fact, for the remainder of the military campaign in 1812, the Indians provided valuable service in the British cause as they participated in the Muir expedition against Fort Wayne in September, and at Queenston Heights in October and Frenchman's Creek in November along the Niagara sector.

William Claus concluded the first year of the War of 1812 in the Indian council house near Fort George, encouraging and maintaining Iroquois allegiance to the king. At Amherstburg Thomas McKee remained dead drunk, but Matthew Elliott, although over 70 years old, was still active and worked in close alliance with Tecumseh. In the Northwest, Robert Dickson, soon to be appointed as "Agent and Superintendent to the Western Indians,"[41] arranged for the distribution of supplies to the Indians for the winter of 1812-13. He also summoned several bands of Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Ottawa, Winnebago and Sauk to assemble at Green Bay in preparation for being sent south as reinforcements. In response a large force of about 500 warriors gathered under

27 The American fort at Niagara from the British side of the Niagara River, about 1812. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*



the leadership of the Sauk war chief Black Hawk, and were eventually despatched to the Detroit front in order to participate in the 1813 campaign.[42]

## VI

The second year of the war opened in January on the Detroit front with a decisive and bloody British-Indian victory at Frenchtown in which the American army of General Winchester was nearly annihilated. "The Zeal and Courage of the Indian Department," observed the British area commander Henry Proctor, "was never more conspicuous than on this Occasion."[43] In the Northwest Robert Dickson continued to recruit warriors to the British cause. At Michilimackinac an aide, John Askin, Jr., commented that "every Indian that can bear arms on Lake Michigan and Huron, from Saginaw Bay to Matchedock, will exert himself to drive away the Americans."[44] In April Dickson was at Prairie du Chien organizing various Indian bands, and by June he had returned to Michilimackinac with 600 more warriors of which about 100 were Sioux from the Lake Traverse region. Throughout the spring and summer of 1813, Dickson was responsible for sending 1,400 to 1,500 Indians to the Detroit front.[45]

Bolstered and encouraged by the vast numbers of these Indian allies and supported by Tecumseh, the British in early May despatched an expedition under Proctor against the American post of Fort Meigs on the Maumee River. A siege and battle ensued in which an American relief column suffered 200 killed and more than 600 prisoners. Although a total success for the combined British-Indian force, the weakness of the Indians as a fighting force became glaringly apparent here. After the battle most of the Indians, satisfied with their victory, dispersed with their booty and prisoners, leaving Proctor and Tecumseh with less than 20 chiefs and warriors. The Indian attitude shocked Proctor who was prompted to declare that "under present circumstances at least, our Indian force is not a disposable one, or permanent, tho' occasionally a most powerful aid."[46]

In July, Robert Dickson finally arrived at Detroit from Michilimackinac with a force of Ojibway, Ottawa, Menominee, Winnebago and Sioux. Procter seemed exceedingly happy to have these reinforcements and wrote enthusiastically that Dickson had "succeeded to the full Extent of his Hopes among the Indian Tribes."[47] For more than two weeks over 800 Indians lounged around Detroit, gobbling up food from the British Indian Department stores at a frightening rate, and chafing at the lack of excitement. Proctor soon realized that another expedition was necessary in order to preserve tribal interest and respect for the king; accordingly, a British-Indian force was organized and sent to the Ohio basin in late July. Proctor explained, "It being absolutely requisite, for several urgent reasons, my Indian Force should not remain unemployed, and being well aware that it would not be moveable except accompanied by a regular Force, I resolved, notwithstanding the Smallness of that Force to move, and where we might be fed at the Expense of the Enemy."[48]

The combined army moved across Lake Erie to Fort Meigs where an unsuccessful attempt was made to lure the American garrison into an ambush with a sham battle started in the woods by two parties of Indians under Tecumseh. The failure of these tactics discouraged Proctor who decided against attempting an assault on the fort. The Indians soon became annoyed and impatient at the inactivity and many began to desert. Those warriors who remained were determined to attack something and suggested the weakly defended Fort Stephenson, a post on the Sandusky River which guarded Harrison's supply depot. Dickson carried a white flag to the post and demanded surrender, but the American commander, Major George Croghan, refused. This determined American response depressed Proctor even more and he lapsed into indecision once again. But Dickson had told Black Hawk that the fort would be taken, and Elliott and other members of the Indian Department warned Proctor that unless the place was stormed, the British would be unable to depend on any continuation of tribal support. Thus Proctor reluctantly ordered an advance in the open against two sides of the fort on 2 August. The troops "displayed the greatest Bravery," he reported, *the greater of who, reached the Fort and made every Effort to enter: but the Indians who had proposed the Assault, and had it not been assented to, would have ever stigmatized the British character, scarcely came into Fire, before they ran off out of its Reach.*[49]

After the battle,[50] which cost the British 96 casualties, the warriors abandoned the expedition and quickly returned to Detroit. Here they were received with dignity and presented with a bountiful distribution of presents and supplies by the Indian Department in order to keep them happy and in a warlike mood. The great problem in the autumn of 1813 for the British was in supplying the Indians with food. Captain Robert Barclay of the Royal Navy observed that "the quantity of Beef and Flour consumed here is tremendous there are such hordes of Indians with their wives and children."[51] Barclay soon compounded the difficulty by losing his fleet and control of Lake Erie at Put-in-Bay on 10 September. American naval supremacy isolated the British "Right Division" at Detroit, and prevented adequate supplies from reaching that post or Michilimackinac.[52] Thus the food problem became even more severe. As early as 6 September, Proctor had written Prevost about the shortage of supplies and the Indian dissatisfaction.

*The long expected Supplies can not any longer be delayed, without the most frightfull Consequences. The Indian and his Family, suffering from Cold, will no longer be amused with Promises. His Wants he will naturally attribute to our Neglect at least; and Defection is the least of Evils we may expect from him.*[53]

The destitution and the weakened defensive position of the British garrison, along with the rapidly advancing American army under Harrison, convinced Proctor that the forts at Detroit and Amherstburg together with the various public buildings should be destroyed, and that the troops and Indians must withdraw.

The decision of Proctor aroused vehement opposition on the part of the Indians. In a fiery speech in council Tecumseh reminded that officer of his pledge never to draw a foot off British ground;

*but now, father, we see you are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our father's conduct to a fat animal, that carries its tail upon its back, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off.*[54]

The anger, frustration, and bitterness expressed by the Shawnee leader was shared by the other chiefs who remembered 1783 and 1794. To the Indians, the British abandonment of Detroit and Fort Malden in September of 1813 was a third betrayal.

Despite the protestations of the chiefs, Proctor conducted a slow and agonizing retreat along the Thames River. The Indians reluctantly followed, and acting as a rear guard, they delayed the American pursuit by skirmishing with the enemy at Dolsen's and Chatham, but by 5 October the British were forced to turn and engage Harrison in a major battle near the Moravian Town, the new home of the Indian survivors of the Gnadenhutten Massacre of 1782. Many of the Indians had become disheartened, and contrary to the pleas of Matthew Elliott a number of Ottawa, Ojibway, Potawatomi, Wyandot and Shawnee deserted. Those warriors that remained positioned themselves in a swamp to the right of the British. The American advance was so rapid that the British and Indians were not yet cleared of Indian women and children nor of the sick and the baggage. Tired and discouraged the ranks of the 41st fired two ragged volleys at the charging enemy and then promptly surrendered. Having in vain endeavoured to call the men to a sense of duty and seeing no advantage in remaining, Proctor quitted the ground and narrowly escaped capture by the American cavalry. "I cannot but observe," he wrote, "that the Troops do not seem to have had that Confidence in themselves, that they have shewn on every former occasion, and which had produced a conduct that I witnessed with Pride and satisfaction."[55] The Indians under Tecumseh, however, executed their part faithfully and courageously and turned the left of the enemy. But after maintaining the fight against the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers for about an hour and witnessing the death of their Shawnee leader, the Indians finally retired through the woods in good order. During the final phase of the affair "the Conduct of the Enemy's Cavalry was marked by peculiar cruelty to the Families of the Indians who had not time to escape or conceal themselves."[56]

The casualties suffered by combatants vary from account to account. The British admitted to 12 killed and 36 wounded.[57] Eventually 246 assembled at Ancaster, but Richardson states that 600 regulars were captured.[58] This figure contrasts with the reports of Richard Bullock, an officer under Procter, and Prevost who state that only 450 British soldiers were available at the start of the battle.[59] All agree that the Indians had 33 killed; and Harrison indicates that in the American force of some 3,000, only 12 were killed and 22 wounded.[60]

The battle at the Moravian Town, more popularly known as the "Battle of the Thames," virtually terminated the War of 1812 on the Detroit front. The remnants of the British "Right Division" retreated to Burlington Heights and linked with the "Centre Division." The Indian allies of Procter who had not always been reliable, dispersed to their various towns. As a result of the battle many bands remained neutral for the duration of the war, whereas others decided to sue for peace with the Americans at Detroit. For Tecumseh, the Thames provided the death knell for his United Confederacy – an Indian alliance which proved like others to be a futile attempt to preserve traditional native values and regional hunting grounds. When the War of 1812 began, the Shawnee leader joined the British and was given the title of brigadier general. He distinguished himself throughout the conflict; but the British had promised never to yield an inch of their soil, and when Procter retreated from Amherstburg, Tecumseh knew that his dream was irretrievably lost. He no longer wanted to live, and he died in the only way that seemed to him appropriate, covering the retreat of Proctor's British army for which he had nothing but distrust and contempt.

Although the "Right Division" ceased to exist, their campaigns for more than a year had provided invaluable service to the British war effort. Detroit, Frenchtown, Meigs, Stephenson and the Thames had absorbed the military energies of the states of Ohio and Kentucky and the territory of Michigan. The American militia and regulars from these areas would have been of immense value at Queenston Heights, Stoney Creek, Beaver Dams, Crysler's Farm or Châteauguay. In spite of the disappointing conduct of Procter and the army at the Thames, it must be remembered that with the defeat of Barclay, the outnumbered and now isolated British were without adequate provisions or armament. Thus under the circumstances, the decision of Procter to retreat was wise and the harsh criticism leveled against the British general as a result of the disastrous battle, which ruined his military career, was unwarranted. Finally the existence of the "Right Division" until October of 1813 enabled Robert Dickson and the British military to establish a firm allegiance with the remaining tribes of the Northwest, and this achievement was to be of vital importance during the last year of the war.

## VII

As Matthew Elliott led the shattered remains of Tecumseh's confederacy toward Burlington Heights, William Claus was busily engaged at the head of the lake in preparing the Six Nations of the Grand River, and a number of Iroquois bands from villages in Lower Canada for the counterattack against Fort George. In May, 1813, after a gallant defence against superior American forces and guns, the British retreated from Fort George, Newark, Queenston Heights, Chippewa and Fort Erie. But the American advance was checked by bold British action at Stoney Creek and the Forty in early June, and by a complete victory at Beaver Dams in which Iroquois warriors under Dominique Ducharme and William Kerr of the Indian Department forced the surrender of 500 enemy soldiers. Indian casualties were 15 killed and 25 wounded.[61]

Throughout the summer of 1813 the Indians provided inestimable service as 800 of them lurked about the woods in the vicinity of Fort George and forced the Americans to remain huddled behind the safety of their breastworks. The fierce reputation of the warriors was so effective that "a few shots and a little yelling from about 20 of them" produced a panic in the enemy camp, and fears were expressed that Proctor and all the Indians had arrived and a general attack was forthcoming.[62] The constant dread of Indian raids on the pickets and the overcrowded conditions produced sickness and demoralization. The American general Peter B. Porter wrote disgustedly that "We have an army at Fort George which for two months past has lain panic-struck, shut up and whipped in by a few hundred miserable savages, leaving the whole of this frontier, except the mile in extent which they occupy, exposed to the inroads and depredations of the enemy."[63]

By December the American force for the defence of Fort George had been reduced to 100. The rest of the army, composed mostly of militia, had drifted away on the expiration of their period of enlistment or deserted because of the cold weather, sickness, fear or boredom. Supported by Claus, Elliott and the Indians, the British easily recaptured Fort George and promptly proceeded

28 Upper Canada and the Northwest, 1796-1818.



to capture Fort Niagara across the river; and in retaliation for the burning of Newark, the British attacked and burned the American towns of Lewiston, Black Rock and Buffalo. For his participation in these latest and successful exploits Elliott, who had led the Indians against the American towns, was praised "for his Zeal and activity as Superintendent of the Indian Department, and I am happy to add that thro' his Exertions, and that of his Officers no Act of Cruelty . . . was committed by the Indians towards any of their Prisoners."[64]

After the counterattack campaigns in December of 1813, Matthew Elliott, who was nearly 75 years of age, was overcome by a serious illness and returned to the old house of the late Joseph Brant at Burlington. Although his sickness persisted, Elliott continued to manage the affairs of the western Indians from the beach at the head of the lake. But by early May, his great mental anxiety relative to the Indians under his charge and his unremitting bodily exertions beyond what his strength at his advanced age could support so completely exhausted him that Gordon Drummond, the new British administrator of Upper Canada, feared that "His Majesty has lost one of his most faithful and Zealous servants."[65] Indeed although his physicians had despaired for some time and had actually "given him over for three successive days," Elliott stubbornly clung to life and lingered until 7 May 1814, when he finally died.

With the death of Elliott and the bad health of William Claus, the appointment of William Caldwell as superintendent to the western Indians and acting deputy superintendent of Indian Affairs became effective immediately.[66] Both Riall and Drummond had insisted that Thomas McKee, the obvious choice as successor, not be appointed as he had been "getting shamefully drunk" on the beach, causing a great deal of mischief among the Indians by "speaking to them improperly," and allowing liquor to be sold to them in great quantities, which "renders them outrageous and easy to be worked upon."[67] Thus for the remainder of the war on the Niagara front, Claus and Caldwell conducted the affairs of the Indian Department, but unfortunately these two men became embroiled in a controversy with "Chief" John Norton over the jurisdiction of the Indians during the hostilities.

## VIII

William Claus had always maintained that the Indian Department should possess sole jurisdiction and authority over Indian affairs. But the British military found this argument difficult to accept, particularly as the large expenditures and bountiful distribution of presents to the Indian allies came from the army supply stores. Thus during the War of 1812 the problem of authority over provisioning the Indians became acute and was not finally settled until October, 1813, when a "General Order Affecting the Awards of Presents to the Indians Warriors" was posted. By this order the Indian Department was told to co-operate with His Majesty's officers or any "Chief of Renown" who enjoyed the confidence and possessed influence over the warriors; and to comply with the requisitions for presents by the military officer in command where Indians served.[68]

To William Claus and the Indian Department the general order was a victory for one "Chief of Renown." John Norton, who had continually attempted to undermine the influence of the department since the beginning of the war. Originally from Scotland, Norton first arrived in Canada as a private in the 65th Regiment and was discharged in 1788. He served for a while as a trader along the Miami River, but in 1795 Joseph Brant took the young man to the Grand River where he eventually became an interpreter to the Mohawks at Fort George. In 1800 Norton resigned this appointment and returned to the Grand River and assumed the customs and manners of an Indian. By 1812 he had gained considerable influence among the Mohawks, and had attained the status of an Indian leader of repute.

During the War of 1812 he unquestionably served the crown as an effective servant in several battles. At Queenston Heights, for example, Roger Sheaffe noted that the success of the British operation "is chiefly to be ascribed to the judicious position taken by Norton and the Indians with him on the woody brow of the high ground."[69] Norton also participated at Frenchman's Creek in November and throughout the summer campaign of 1813 along the Niagara front. But Norton became increasingly angry at Claus and the Indian Department because of their interference with him and his Indians.[70] Clearly, Norton wanted an independent command unfettered by any military or civil bureaucratic shackles. He did not want to report to Claus, "only a Deputy of Sir John Johnson," but preferred to reward his Indians separately. Thus Claus was most disturbed when Prevost, who was always suspicious of the Indian Department as a jealous clique, agreed in 1813 by the "General Order" to grant a discretionary power to various officers and chiefs to distribute presents and rewards to the Indians who fought in the British interest.[71] A second blow to the prestige and power of the Indian Department occurred in March of 1814, when Chief John Norton was commissioned as "Captain and Leader of the Five Nations Grand River Indians or Confederates," and given power "to reward the faithful Services of the Warriors Acting with him, . . . and that an ample Proportion of Presents be put up Separately for the Indians of the Five Nations, to be distributed under Captain Norton's directions."[72] Indeed, Norton was allotted three-eighths of the presents and ammunition which he thought was too little and which Claus thought was too much. By the spring of 1814, the influence and popularity of Norton with the British military was decidedly great and his complete autonomy was assured by Prevost's directive which stressed that there should be no interference from the officers of the Indian Department.

Seemingly confident of his omnipotence, Norton was not content with controlling the Six Nation Iroquois, but endeavoured to extend his influence over Matthew Elliott's western Indians as well as bribing them with liquor and supplies. His obvious lust for power alienated the Mohawk who expressed dissatisfaction at the appointment and conduct of Captain Norton as their leader and a number of Iroquois chiefs affirmed that they have a "Head Man, who the King has appointed and they want no other" than William Claus.[73] Nonetheless Norton insisted that the disposition of the Indians toward him, notwithstanding the exertion of the Indian Department and a portion of the Mohawks, was most favourable.[74]

In June 1814, William Caldwell held a council with his Indians in an attempt to resolve any differences. Caldwell told the Indians that if they wanted to join Norton they must indicate such clearly, since the Indians could not be furnished with provisions and clothing by both. Neywash spoke for the Western Indians and observed that "As to the Snipe [Norton] . . . I can only say, He speaks loud, and has Strong Milk, and Big Breasts, which yield plentifully."[75] But Caldwell was assured that if he could supply the Indians in an equally generous manner, they would remain loyal to him and thus to the Indian Department. Indian diplomacy was never more calculated.

In order to successfully achieve his ambitions of power and leadership, Norton distributed lavish amounts of presents and supplies to the Indians in an effort to win their loyalty. The actions of Norton aroused the indignation and jealousy of the officers in the Indian Department who had been instructed to carefully ration provisions to the tribes at this time. Nonetheless Caldwell reported that the department would not show to our Indians" any anxiety or uneasiness on the subject of their joining Captain Norton because such conduct would make them suppose that a Party Spirit and not true Patriotism prevailed amongst us, and that we could not act without unanimity among ourselves."[76]

The feud between Norton and the Indian Department became so strained that Gordon Drummond directed Claus and Caldwell to take a conciliatory line of conduct toward Norton as the means most likely to produce a good understanding between all parties," particularly while employed in Cooperation with His Majesty's Troops, against the Enemy of their Country."[77] However all efforts to gain a spirit of harmony were frustrated and only the termination of the war ended the bitter friction between Claus and Elliott and John Norton. In fact the unhappy conclusion to the affair was that Norton became so insolent and insubordinate that he was finally discharged in 1815. Nonetheless his contribution, like those of Dickson, Elliott, Claus and Caldwell, was considerable in that he recruited, organized and led an efficient fighting force of Indians in the cause of the king.

## IX

While Norton and the British Department quibbled over the authority and provisioning of Indians on the Niagara front, significant events, largely inspired by Robert Dickson, were occurring in the Northwest in 1814. With the defeat of Proctor and the predominant use of British regulars during the siege of Fort Erie, the only large-scale employment of Indians was left to the vast and strategically important region of the Northwest. Although the United States went to war to redress national honour and capture Canada, the British and Canadian fur traders of the upper Great Lakes region and beyond, supported by the local tribes, also saw an opportunity to wage a war of conquest.[78] For the fur traders and the Indians, the War of 1812 became a common struggle to preserve the lands of the Northwest against American westward expansion.

In the autumn of 1813, after visiting York in order to make the necessary arrangements for the transportation of provisions and to receive his instructions as agent and superintendent, Robert Dickson travelled to the Northwest.[79] He spent the bitterly cold winter of 1813-14 at Lake Winnebago where he encouraged the Indians to retain their allegiance to the British crown. In a letter to his ex-fur-trading partner John Awe on Christmas Day, Dickson recounted, "I have seen all the Indians of the Rock River and a good number from Wisconsin. I am most heartily sick and tired of this distributing of goods and wish for the spring. I hear nothing but the cry of hunger from all Quarters."[80] In February of 1814, Dickson was "entirely destitute of provisions," and by March he wrote, "There is no situation more miserable than to see objects around you dying with hunger, and unable to give them but little assistance. I have done what I could for them, and will in consequence starve myself."[81] Dickson managed to survive the winter by eating black bread and roots, and in April, after overcoming severe physical hardships, he reached the Fox-Wisconsin portage with a number of loyal warriors.

According to Dickson the American threat from St. Louis was the chief danger for the British and Indians in the Northwest. "It is unfortunate that we are required in another Quarter," he confessed; "we should find something worth fighting for there."[82] The thoughts of Dickson echoed those of the British and Canadian fur traders of the region who wished to preserve the Northwest for the king, keep their fur-trading interests intact and allow the Indians to roam freely as before. This was the British fur-trade strategy. The American offensive against Prairie du Chien and Michilimackinac in 1814 was precisely what the British merchants desired, as it kept the Indians at home and necessitated the forwarding of British regulars to the Northwest. Dickson and the other traders hoped that if the Americans were decisively repulsed in the Northwest and peace negotiated with the British in complete possession of the region, the British fur-trade monopoly could be secured at the expense of the territorial ambitions of the United States.

For the remainder of the spring, Dickson recruited Indian warriors, and at Green Bay he was joined by loyal Sioux, Menominee and Winnebago bands. In May he despatched the Sauk and Fox to guard the Rock Island rapids on the Mississippi River against a possible American attack which he feared might come from St. Louis. Early in June, Dickson and 300 warriors arrived at Michilimackinac where Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, the military commandant of that post, held a large and impressive council with the Indian bands who pledged their support to the king. The Sioux chief Wabasha spoke for the western Indians and stated in part that "We have the good fortune to have 'the Red Head' [Dickson] for a friend, who in spite of the barriers which the Americans have made, always found a passage to come and save the Indians from perishing."[83] Other chiefs praised "the courage and good heart" of Dickson, and Prevost reported that "most of the Indians would have been lost to the British cause had it not been for the judicious, resolute and determined conduct of Mr. Dickson and his foresight and promptitude in forwarding supplies after Procter's defeat."[84]

Since Michilimackinac was the key to the Indian country of the upper Mississippi valley, the retention of the island fortress was imperative for the British, particularly as the maintenance of the tribal loyalty and the defence of that vast country were at stake. But Michilimackinac was but one of two doors to the Northwest, and the Americans had control of the other at St. Louis. In fact, the Americans planned a twin offensive in 1814 against Prairie du Chien and Michilimackinac in an attempt to gain hegemony over the entire area. One prong was assembled at St. Louis under General Clark, the governor of Missouri Territory. This force ascended the Mississippi in May, and meeting only feeble resistance from the Sauk and Fox at Rock Island, the Americans pushed toward Prairie du Chien and captured the town on 2 June.[85] After constructing a stockade which he named Fort Shelby, Clark, apparently content with his success, returned to St. Louis but left a small force to guard the town and the new post.[86]

The news of the capture of Prairie du Chien reached the British at Michilimackinac on 21 June. Robert McDouall saw immediately the necessity of endeavouring by every means possible "to dislodge the American General from his new conquest, and make him relinquish the immense tract of country he had seized upon in consequence and which brought him into the very heart of that occupied by 'our friendly Indians'."[87] Thus at the risk of weakening his own position, the British commander despatched an expedition under William McKay, a leading fur trader in the region, to retake Prairie du Chien. Both the British military and fur-trade interests had no alternative, for if the Americans were allowed to remain in possession of the area,

> *there was an end to our connection with the Indians, . . . tribe after tribe would be graned* [sic] *over or subdued, & thus would be destroyed the only barrier which protects the Great trading establishments of the North West & the Hudson's Bay Company. Nothing could then prevent the enemy from gaining the source of the Mississippi, gradually extending themselves by the Red River to Lake Winnipeg from whence the descent of Nelson's River to York Fort would in time be easy. The total subjugation of the Indians on the Mississippi would either lead to their extermination by the enemy or they would be spared on the express condition of assisting them to expel us from Upper Canada.*[88]

The small British force was joined en route by voyageurs and Indians. By the time McKay reached Fort Shelby his contingent had swelled to 650, of which 120 were "Michigan Fencibles, Canadian Volunteers and Officers of the Indian Department, the remainder Indians who proved to be perfectly useless."[89] After a curt exchange of notes the American detachment surrendered on 19 July. The British were once again supreme in the region and although McKay was not impressed with the efforts of the Indians who pillaged the houses in the town, he praised the Canadians and officers of the Indian Department who "behaved as well as I could possibly wish."[90] As a crowning touch and to complete the victory in a symbolic sense McKay modestly renamed Shelby, Fort McKay. Following this gesture of victory, McKay promptly retired to his bed, for he had contracted a severe case of the mumps.

While Prairie du Chien was exchanging flags, a second and larger American expeditionary force of 700 had sailed from Detroit for Michilimackinac under the leadership of the hero of Fort Stephenson, Lieutenant Colonel George Croghan. The five American naval vessels were delayed by contrary winds and did not reach St. Joseph until 20 July. After storming the island and finding it deserted, the Americans burned the fort and public buildings. Following this success they captured a North West Company vessel, the *Mink*, burned the fur-trading post at Saint Marys (Sault Ste. Marie), and murdered a number of Indian families camped about the post.[91] By 26 July, Croghan was anchored off Michilimackinac, but the high elevation prevented his guns from engaging the fort. For several days the Americans waited, as Croghan was reluctant to attempt a landing and assault against the Indians in the dense and unfamiliar woods.

Although the force for the defence of Michilimackinac had been greatly reduced as a result of McKay's expedition, McDouall wrote confidently that "We are here in a very fine state of Defense the Garrison and Indians in the highest spirits, and all ready for the attack of the Enemy."[92] Croghan finally decided to land on 4 August, and McDouall, realizing that no British relief column was near, immediately unleashed the Menominee under Tomah who

> *commenced a spirited attack upon the Enemy, who in a short time lost their second in Command and several other Officers . . . . The Enemy retired in the utmost haste and confusion . . . till they found shelter under the very Broadside of their Ships anchored within a few yards of the Shore – They re-embarked that Evening and the Vessels immediately hauled off.*[93]

The Americans had been exposed to the fire of 140 British regulars and two field guns, which McDouall has positioned behind a low natural breastwork, and the furious attack of the Indians in the woods. The brief but fierce contest had cost Croghan 15 killed and 48 wounded, whereas British and Indian losses were negligible.[94]

On their return trip to Detroit the Americans located and destroyed the schooner *Nancy*, the only remaining British vessel on the upper lakes, which had been maintaining communications with Michilimackinac.[95] But the commander of the *Nancy*, Lieutenant Miller Worsley, and his small crew managed to reach Michilimackinac by canoe. Since the American schooners *Tigress* and *Scorpion* had been left to patrol Lake Huron and prevent supplies from reaching Michilimackinac via the York-Lake Simcoe-Georgian Bay route, Worsley quickly devised a plan to capture the two vessels. With the assistance of Lieutenant Andrew Bulger of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, Robert Dickson and 50 men, all in four small boats, Worsley surprised and captured the *Tigress* at the passage of the Detour (near Drummond Island) on 3 September. Two nights later the unsuspecting *Scorpion* was boarded and became an easy victim for Worsley and a British crew in the *Tigress*, which was still flying the American pennant.[96] These acquisitions provided the Royal Navy with a makeshift force on Lake Huron, and if the war had continued until 1815 there undoubtedly would have been a naval battle to decide the supremacy of the upper lakes.

Michilimackinac was ignored for the duration of the war, but American attempts to dislodge the British in the Northwest continued against Prairie du Chien. Early in July, a Major John Campbell and 120 regulars and rangers had been despatched from St. Louis to reinforce Fort Shelby. At the Rock Island Rapids this force was attacked and mauled by about 400 Sauk and Fox under the determined leadership of Black Hawk, "a zealous partisan of the British cause." The Americans suffered 16 killed and 21 wounded in the engagement; Indian casualties were unknown, but considered slight.[97] The timely arrival of the gunboat *Governor Clark*, which was retreating from Prairie du Chien following McKay's victory, rescued the survivors and the Americans retreated to St. Louis.

The news of Campbell's defeat angered the Americans, and a second and larger expedition was organized in August against the Indians at Rock Island and the British at Prairie du Chien. The commander of this contingent of 350 men and 8 gunboats was Major Zachary Taylor, future president of the United States. At Fort McKay the British were aware of Taylor's movements, and to bolster Indian courage Lieutenant Duncan Graham of the Indian Department and 30 men, accompanied by Sergeant James Keating of the Royal Artillery with a 3-pounder and two swivel guns, were sent down to the villages along the Rock River.[98] The small British harrassing force was augmented by 1,200 Fox, Sauk, Winnebago, Sioux and Kickapoo who swarmed to the side of the king in eager expectation of another victory.[99] In the early morning of 5 September, Graham, Keating and the Indians surprised and attacked Taylor's flotilla which was anchored in the shallow waters of the Rock River. The accuracy of the guns under Keating and the intensity of the Indian attack under Black Hawk convinced the Americans of the futility of attempting to destroy the villages and of their inability to recapture Prairie du Chien. With the Indians in pursuit for about two miles, Taylor who had lost 3 killed and 8 wounded, retreated to the Des Moines River and constructed Fort Johnson. In October 1813, he burned the fort and withdrew to St. Louis.[100] No further American efforts were made against Prairie du Chien, and the British and Indians remained supreme in the Northwest for the duration of the war.

After receiving word of the repulse of Taylor, Robert Dickson, accompanied by Andrew Bulger who was to assume command at Fort McKay, left Michilimackinac on 29 October for Prairie du Chien with five boatloads of presents and supplies for the Indians.[101] Combatting the bitter cold the group reached their destination one month later. The situation at Fort McKay was critical as the Indians were starving and the militia garrison was in a mutinous state. Relations between Dickson and Bulger became strained almost immediately, because Dickson insisted that the Indians be fed from the king's stores at Prairie du Chien.[102] Bulger countered that he would not allow Dickson to usurp the authority of the military, and the difficulty was not settled until McDouall ordered that as of 23 February 1815, "the Indian Department on the Mississippi is subject to and entirely under the orders of Captain Bulger."[103] McDouall reported that Dickson had shown a bias in feeding the Indians, and especially the Sioux bands, and that his conduct had placed the garrison and other western Indian allies in danger of further starvation. In consequence. Dickson was recalled to Michilimackinac, deprived of his appointment as agent and superintendent of the Western Indians, placed under arrest and detained until the spring when news of peace reached the Northwest. After his dismissal and release in the spring of 1815, Dickson journeyed to Quebec where he petitioned Sir Gordon Drummond, the governor, for an investigation of his conduct during the War of 1812. The case was referred to the government in London where Dickson obtained a hearing and a complete vindication. His services to the British cause were fully recognized and he was rewarded with the commission of lieutenant colonel and retired with a pension of £300 per year.

Although the Treaty of Ghent announcing the cessation of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States was signed Christmas Eve, 1814, the British at Prairie du Chien did not receive official notification of the peace until 20 May 1815. As a result Bulger had established a defensive position at the Rock Island Rapids, and in the hopes of discouraging another attack from St. Louis, he sent out several war parties of Indians in the spring to raid the American settlements in the surrounding areas. So intense were these raids that one St. Louis newspaper lamented, "The Indians continue their hostility upon our frontiers. They have taken more scalps within the last six weeks than they did during the whole of the preceding spring and summer upon this frontier."[104] Despite the failure of supplies and ammunition, most of the Indians of the Northwest maintained their steadfast allegiance to the British who reigned supreme as far south as Rock River until the spring of 1815.

Toward the end of March, Gordon Drummond sent orders to McDouall to restore Michilimackinac and Prairie du Chien to the United States as soon as the garrison and stores could be removed to the new designated site at Drummond Island. Not unexpectedly, McDouall was extremely upset and bitter over this British surrender.

*Our negociators, as usual, have been egregiously duped: as usual, they have shewn themselves profoundly ignorant of the concerns of this part of the Empire. I am penetrated with grief at the restoration of this fine Island, 'a fortress built by Nature for herself.' I am equally mortified at giving up Fort McKay to the Americans. . . . Sir Gordon Drummond's order is however, positive, and of course leaves no alternative but compliance.*[105]

At Fort McKay, Captain Andrew Bulger held an Indian council on 22 May 1815. The chiefs were informed of the terms of the peace and of the fact that the British, as in 1796, were forced to evacuate. When informed of the situation "the whole hearted man and unflinching warrior, Black Hawk, cried like a child saying our Great Mother [Great Britain] has thus concluded, and further talk is useless."[106] Two days later, after distributing presents of pork, flour, cloth, tobacco, iron, guns, powder, shot and ball to the Sauk and other tribes, and leaving the Indians "without want" and in a situation more comfortable than in former years, the British gathered their

29 **Tecumseh or Tecumtha (1768-1813).** *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

remaining possessions, burned the fort and departed. Bulger's force reached Michilimackinac in June, and on 18 July 1815, having previously removed guns, provisions and stores to the new post at Drummond Island, McDouall formally surrendered Michilimackinac to Colonel Butler of the United States Army.[107] British domination of the upper Mississippi valley of the Northwest was ended forever.

## The End of an Era (1815-30)

### I

According to Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, the United States undertook to end hostilities with the tribes and to restore to the Indians the rights and privileges which they possessed in 1811.[1] In compliance with this stipulation, the tribes of the upper Mississippi valley of the Northwest were invited to send a deputation of chiefs to a council at Portage des Sioux, a village on the west bank of the Mississippi River and a convenient central location for the tribes. The American commissioners headed by William Clark, who was both governor of Missouri Territory and superintendent of Indian Affairs for the United States west of the Mississippi River, had difficulty in persuading some of the native bands to agree to a council. Many chiefs were bitterly reluctant and the Sauk and Fox were openly defiant.

By July 1815, however, about 2,000 Sioux, Osage, Iowa, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Delaware and Kickapoo had assembled and established temporary camps along the river at Portage des Sioux to hear the American offer. Between July and September a number of treaties were concluded between the Americans and those Indians present, and on 18 September the happy commissioners returned in triumph to St. Louis.[2]

But the Sauk remained aloof and insolent, and boldly declared that they would never consent to relinquish their traditional lands to the United States. As a result of the Sauk refusal to negotiate a peace treaty and based on the recommendation of the commissioners, American troops invaded Sauk country and built a fort. This action persuaded Black Hawk to capitulate for the moment and on 13 May 1816 he signed a treaty which in effect recognized the validity of the 1804 treaty at St. Louis.[3] The Sauk decision induced the remaining bands of Sioux, Winnebago and Ottawa to negotiate treaties throughout the summer of 1816; and in March of 1817, the Menominee finally agreed to cede their lands. The United States was now in complete control of the North west.

Throughout the negotiations between the Americans and the Indians, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, based at Michilimackinac and after 18 July 1815 at Drummond Island, received countless bands of Indians from the Northwest who clamoured for presents and advice at the British post. William McGillivray, the chief director of the North West Company, made a final plea to keep Michilimackinac British and thus secure Upper Canada, the fur trade in American territory and the friendship of the Indian tribes. Gordon Drummond was prepared to stall and was "disposed to think as much procrastination should be resorted to as may admit of your receiving the specific commands of His Majesty's Government on that Subject."[4] But 1815 proved less successful than 1783, particularly since the Americans were in firm possession of Fort Malden and southwest Upper Canada. Thus, although the British feared Indian reprisals such as the Pontiac rebellion, and were angry because Americans had violated Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent by moving troops into Indian territory which they had not held in 1811, frontier security was theorized to be considerably safer if Fort Malden were returned to the British. With this foremost in the minds of the British strategists, Malden and Michilimackinac were quietly exchanged in July of 1815.

For their part the Americans saw every Indian visit to the British posts as the beginning of a new British plot to encourage the revival of a tribal confederacy which would fall like a scourge on the defenceless American frontier back settlements. There was no doubt that a number of Indian bands had become extremely attached to the British. At a Drummond Island council in June 1816, for example, a loyal Winnebago chief addressed an officer of the Indian Department as follows:

> *I detest the Big Knives* [Americans] *from the bottom of my heart, and never took from them a glass of whiskey nor a needle, which is a convincing proof of my dislike to them. Father, I know of no other Father but you, and never will be considered or taken for a Bastard, which would be so if I acknowledged the Big Knives to be my father also.*[5]

But Lieutenant General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, the new captain general and governor-in-chief of British North America, sent explicit orders to McDouall that the Indians of the Northwest must be told "distinctly and explicitly" that the British government would neither assist nor countenance the tribes in any hostility against the United States.[6]

The British evacuation of Michilimackinac in 1815 thus destroyed the last vestige of the British fur trade in the American Northwest. But the loss was not great since the wealth of the trade had been centred for some time north and west of Lake Superior in Canadian territory. Also, Article 3 of Jay's Treaty, which had allowed the free access of British traders across the border, was argued by the United States to be void as the result of the Treaty of Ghent. Finally, the Convention of 1818 established the 49th parallel from the Lake-of-the-Woods to the Rocky Mountains as the international boundary between British North America and the United States. These three events completed the loss of British imperial and territorial hegemony in the Old Northwest, and their control and influence over the tribes of the region. Although Indians continued to visit the king's posts at Drummond Island and Fort Malden, these visits had no political significance. Indeed, the new "era of good feeling" was so confidently and enthusiastically grasped by the British military that by 1819 the forces for the defence of Upper Canada were greatly reduced, and only small detachments were left to garrison Kingston, Fort George, Fort Erie, Fort Malden, Penetanguishene and Drummond Island; and of 173 officers, 80 were absent for the winter.[7]

## II

The Treaty of Ghent and the American evacuation of Fort Malden on 1 July 1815, however, did not immediately dampen the war spirit which continued to permeate the atmosphere, particularly in the Detroit-Amherstburg region. The steadfast loyalty of the Indian tribes to the British and the friendliness with which visiting chiefs were received by officers of the Indian Department at Fort Malden aroused angry jealousy on the part of the Americans. The Indians only accentuated the mutual and increasing acrimony which characterized Anglo-American relations in the area at this time. A number of incidents throughout 1815 and 1816 kept the bitterness temporarily alive.

The refusal of the Americans to yield the little island of Bois Blanc, which lay very close to the Canadian shore in front of the fort and village of Amherstburg, to the British following the American departure from Fort Malden in July was the first of the difficult problems which plagued relations between the two countries. The British had occupied the island since 1796 and before; but since regular navigation travelled along the narrow passage between Bois Blanc and the Canadian mainland, the Americans claimed that, according to the Treaty of 1783, the international boundary ran through the middle of the channel and thus the island was the property of the United States. The dispute, which threatened to erupt into violence, was eventually settled only through the intervention of an international commission which finally awarded the island to Canada.[8]

The Bois Blanc Island dispute so angered Colonel Reginald James, the British military commander at Fort Malden, and the civilian population of Amherstburg and Sandwich that Americans who ventured into Canada, either socially or on business, became fearful of being

30 **William Claus (1765-1826), deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, 1800-26.** *(Public Archives of Canada.)*

"beaten to death." The feelings of hostility against citizens of the United States was of such intensity that one American, a Mr. Chittenden who remained at Fort Malden to guard some public property, was pillaged by order of Colonel James, who also suggested that if the American resisted his men should "blow out his brains."[9]

The animosity was not restricted to the Canadian side alone. In September of 1815 Lieutenant Alexander Vidal, a British naval officer, was arrested by a mob at a public house on the American side of Lake St. Clair while attempting to recover stolen property and searching for deserters. Vidal was tried and found guilty of riot; he was fined $631.[10] Less than a month after the unhappy Vidal episode, the senseless murder of a Kickapoo Indian named Akochis on the Detroit River by American soldiers further provoked and inflamed the international feud. The Indian had been hunting squirrels with some friends on Grosse Island, but was detected by a party of American soldiers who, apparently fervently committed to defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the United States, chased the Indian intruders away. In his eagerness one soldier fired at the retreating canoe and killed the Kickapoo. There was a brief investigation but no charge was laid.[11] The incident was particularly dangerous and delicate because the Kickapoo Indians had been visiting their "friends" at Fort Malden, and the Americans were convinced that efforts were being made to revive the British protectorship over Indians in the United States.

But the threat to the United States of the rise of a new Indian confederacy encouraged and supported through the machinations of the British was non-existent by 1815-16, in spite of the wild imaginings and accusations of Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan. Although several dozen bands of Indians continued to visit the British Indian Department centres each year at Drummond Island and Fort Malden to receive rations and the traditional presents.[12] British policy, official and unofficial, was strictly and completely opposed to a revival of the Anglo-Indian alliance.

Governor Cass, however, was annoyed at the influence of the British Indian Department agents at Fort Malden, and at the large quantities of presents annually distributed to the Indians who "largely live under the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." According to Cass the American frontier was in a constant state of turmoil because the Indians "assault the Inhabitants, steal their horses, kill their cattle and hogs, and forcibly enter their houses;" and these Indian depredations, protested the governor, usually occurred after the natives had visited the "British agents" at Fort Malden for presents and counselling. Cass appeared to possess a real fear of the revival of a "Tecumseh Confederacy," "prompted by Indian restlessness and the Zeal of the British Indian Department." To support his contention, he noted that the Sauk war chief, Black Hawk, and a large party of Indians were presently at Malden, and that the greater proportion of Indians east of the Mississippi River made annual visits to the Canadian side. The governor speculated that the British agents were keeping the Indians friendly and loyal in case of future hostilities between the United States and Great Britain, and that "the Indians are kept in a state of feverish excitement . . . their minds are embittered and poisoned towards us."[13] Cass concluded by stating that the development of a humane and sound policy by the government of the United States toward bringing the Indians within the pale of civilization was rendered fruitless "by the interference of the British Indian agents." Thus to avoid the supposed potential spread of death and desolation on the American frontier, Cass proposed three recommendations: remonstrate firmly with the British government; prevent the Indians from crossing the Detroit River into Canada, and use military force, if necessary, to implement the plan.

### III

But the long letter of Lewis Cass in 1819 coincided with the reduction of British military forces in Upper Canada and a renewed spirit of Anglo-American cordiality. The Treaty of Ghent, the Rush-Bagot Agreement, and Convention of 1818 initiated an "era of good feeling" in which Britain's traditional Indian allies were sacrificed once again as expendable pawns in the game of international diplomacy. Various chiefs, and in particular the Sauk chief Black Hawk, faithfully continued to make the annual trip to the British at Fort Malden, but the days of Anglo-Indian military alliances had irretrievably vanished. In fact during the futile "Black Hawk War" in 1832, when the Sauk attempted to defend their lands against the tide of American westward migration, the British were conspicuously absent.

Official British Indian policy had developed by the 1820s into a plan to civilize and Christianize all the Indians residing in Canada and to establish reserved territories for their exclusive use. The Indian was no longer viewed as a valuable military ally, and the purpose of cultivating the tribes as "prospective allies on the battlefield" against the United States was now considered unnecessary. There were no more wars for the warriors to fight on behalf of Great Britain, and the need for continuing the distribution of supplies and gifts to the tribes through the agency of the Indian Department was being seriously questioned.[14]

In 1829 a clear explanation of the new native policy, which was aimed at diminishing the expenses of the government, was given by Sir John Colborne, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. Colborne suggested that "civilization" could be extended to the Indians of the province through "a fund created for their future support by granting leases of their lands, and selling part of them." This proposal, he contended, was preferable to the system which had evolved over the years, and which had "occasioned an enormous expense without conferring any benefit on the Indians, or insuring their friendship." The lieutenant governor also proposed that expenses could be saved by fixing the periods of issue of presents to the Indians at Amherstburg, and that this would minimize the trouble with the Indians travelling through the United States. But of vital significance was the suggestion to actively employ the superintendents "in collecting the Indians in villages, and inducing them to cultivate their lands, and divide them into lots."[15] In conclusion, Colborne urged that education and religious instruction for the Indian children should be provided, as well as expenses for medical attention.[16]

At the same time as Colborne made his recommendations, Sir James Kempt, the administrator of Lower Canada, after careful research, also made suggestions for improving the condition of the Indians. Like Colborne, Kempt urged that the Indians be collected in considerable numbers and settled in villages where they could cultivate the land. Kempt also agreed that provision should be made for their religious improvement, education and instruction in husbandry. To complete the process of "civilization," the administrator wanted to afford the Indians assistance in building their houses and in procuring seed and agricultural implements, and to commute where practicable, a portion of their presents for this latter purpose.[17]

The plans put forward by Colborne and Kempt were carefully studied by Sir George Murray, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Murray concurred with his lieutenants and noted that

> *the course which had hitherto been taken in dealing with these people has had reference to the advantages which might be derived from their friendship in times of war, rather than to any settled purpose of gra-*

31 British post at Drummond Island, 1815. *(Public Archives of Canada.)*



*dually reclaiming them from a state of barbarism and of introducing amongst them the industrious and peaceful habits of civilized life.*[18] Thus British policy changed at this time from a utilitarian plan of using Indians as allies to a paternal programme of gradually incorporating the Indians into white society.[19]

The development of the Indian reserve system in the Canadas was nurtured following the War of 1812, and reached an initial form of maturity by 1830. The plan also had origins in Wilberforce, the Clapham Sect, and the abolition of slavery movement; the Aborigines Protective Association which protested for better treatment of native peoples throughout the British empire, and generally a new form of philanthropic liberalism which was sweeping the British government. In addition, various influences from the United States, namely the work of the American Methodists, the development of a factory system for trading with the Indians, and the popularity of American novels which stressed the "noble savage" image, had an appreciable effect in determining the new policy for the Indian peoples of the Canadas.

In the early Leatherstocking Tales, such as *The Pioneers* (1823), *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), and *The Prairie* (1827), for example, James Fenimore Cooper did not characterize the Indian as did Hugh H. Brackenridge, *Indian Atrocities* (1782), as "the Animals Vulgarly called Indians," nor did Cooper refer to the Indian, as did George Washington in 1783, as a wolf," both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in shape." To Cooper the Indian was ennobled, and marked by the qualities of savage nobility, bravery, cunning, courage and artfulness in hunting and war.[20] Natty Bumpo, the "beau ideal" of the frontiersman to Cooper, mediated between the civilized and the savage. Other works such as Charles Mead's *Mississippian Scenery* (1819), James Eastburn and Robert Sand's *Yamoyden* (1820), the anonymous *Land of Powhatan* (1821), Lydia Sigourney's *Traits of the Aborigines of America* (1822) and John A. Stone's *The Last of the Wampanoags* (1829) echoed this new theme.

The Indian, no longer a threat to eastern civilization in North America, was now viewed with sentimentality, and the beginnings of a Hiawathan character began to take root in popular legend. In *Traits of the Aborigines of America*, Mrs. Sigourney first contrasts civilized whites unfavourably with noble savages and then, recalling frontier warfare and the mutual butchery, pleads for the Christianization and civilizing of the Indian.

*Oh! make these foes*
*Your friends, your brethren, give them the mild arts*
*Social and civiliz'd, send them that Book*
*Which teaches to forgive, implant the faith*
*That turns the raging vulture to the dove,*
*And with these deathless bonds secure the peace*
*And welfare of your babes.*[21]

The poem of Lydia Sigourney clearly showed the degree to which the attitude toward the Indian had shifted from the days of Brackenridge and Washington.

For the British Indian Department, 1830 marked the great transformation. Agents were not merely to secure the loyalty of the tribes to the king but now were expected to shoulder the "white man's burden," and carry civilization and Christianity to His Majesty's "Red children in the forest."[22] The proposals of Colborne and Kempt were approved by Murray and the lords of the Treasury, and after making the necessary administrative changes the British Indian Department ceased as a branch of the military and became, as a Department of Indian Affairs, a branch of the public service.[23]

With the development of a paternal reserve system, the Indian Department was confronted with a new and different challenge which was quite unlike anything experienced during its remarkable 75-year military history. The old days of courting the allegiance of the Indian tribes against the Americans and of distributing various gifts, flags and medals of George III to visiting chiefs at colourful ceremonies complete with military pomp and formality were now only a glorious memory.

Since the founding of the Indian Department under Sir William Johnson in 1755, the service had proven of invaluable assistance to His Majesty's government in controlling and manipulating the tribes, and thus in maintaining British territorial hegemony in the wilderness frontiers of North America. Without the ability and determination of individual agents such as Butler, McKee, Elliott, Dickson and a host of others, who encouraged the Indians to support the king, a realignment of

32 Fort McKay (Prairie du Chien), 1815, Indian salute and farewell to the British. Tradition indicates that the two figures in lower right are Black Hawk and the British commandant, Andrew Bulger, exchanging farewells. Painting by Peter Rindisbacher. *(McCord Museum, Montreal.)*

the international boundary between Canada and the United States, to the detriment of Canada, was a dangerous possibility in 1783, 1794 or 1814. Throughout the war against the French, but most particularly during the American Revolution, the struggle for the Ohio valley and the War of 1812, the British Indian Department and the Indian allies won convincing victories on the frontiers which retarded the advance of American civilization. This allowed the scattered and sparsely populated settlements in British North America to achieve a sense of security and confidence, and prevented their being engulfed by the continual threat of American republicanism.

But 1830 marked the end of an era. Sir William Johnson had died in 1774; John Butler in 1796; Alexander McKee in 1799; Matthew Elliott in 1814; Robert Dickson in 1823; William Claus in 1826, and John Johnson in 1830. These extraordinary men had established a high precedent for future officers of the Department of Indian Affairs, and their major characteristics of loyalty, devotion, patience, skill and tireless energy in the face of often seemingly insurmountable difficulties provide their finest epitaph.

33 Uniform of an officer in the Indian Department derived from a written description of 1823; watercolour by Charles C. Stadden.



## Appendix A.
## Treaty of 1795.

A Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Tribe of Indians, called the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawoenoes, Ottawas, Chipewas, Putawatames, Miamis, Eel River, Weeas and Kickapoas.[1]

To put an end to a destructive war, to settle all controversies and to restore harmony, and a friendly intercourse between the said United States and the Indian Tribes. Anthony Wayne, Major General, commanding the Army of the United States and sole commissioner for the good purpose above mentioned, and the said Tribes of Indians, by their Sachems chiefs and Warriors met together at Grenville[2] the head quarters of the said army, have agreed on the following articles, which when ratified by the president with the advice and consent of the senate of the United States, shall be binding on them and the said Indian Tribes.

Article 1st. Henceforth all Hostilities shall cease. Peace is hereby established and shall be perpetual and a friendly intercourse shall take place between the said United States and Indian Tribes.

2d. All prisoners shall on both sides be restored. The Indians, prisoners to the United States shall be immediately set at liberty. The People of the United States still remaining prisoners among the Indians shall be delivered up in ninety days from the date hereof to the general or commanding officer at Grenville, Fort Wayne or Fort Defiance and Ten Chiefs of the said Tribes shall remain at Grenville as hostages untill the delivery of the prisoners shall be effected.

3d. The General Boundary line between the Lands of the United States and the Lands of the said Tribes shall begin at the mouth of Cayahoga River and run thence up the same to the portage between that and the Tuscarrawas branch of the Muskingum, then down that Branch to the crossing place above Fort Lawrence thence westerly to a fork of that branch of the Great Miamis River running into the Ohio, at, or near which fork stood Lorimier's Store & where commences the portage between the Miamis of the Ohio & St. Mary's River, which is a branch of the Miamis which runs into Lake Erie, thence a westerly course to Fort Recovery which stands on a branch of the Wabash, then south westerly in a direct line to the Ohio so as to intersect that river opposite the mouth of Kentucky or Cuttawa River.

And in consideration of the Peace now established, of the goods formerly received from the United States, of those now to be delivered & of the yearly delivery of goods now stipulated to be made hereafter: & to indemnify the United States for the Injuries and expenses they have sustained during the war. The said Indian Tribes do hereby cede & relinquish for ever all their claims to the Lands lying Eastwardly & Southward of the General Boundary Line now described and those lands or any part of them shall never hereafter be made a cause or pretence on the part of the said Tribes, or any of them, of war, or Injury to the United States or any of the people thereof.

And for the same consideration and as an evidence of the returning friendship of the said Indian Tribes, of their confidence in the United States and desire to provide for their accommodation & for that convenient intercourse, which will be beneficial to both parties. The said Indian Tribes do also cede to the United States the following pieces of land to wit. (1) one piece of Land two miles square at the head of the navigable water, or Landing on the St. Mary's River near Girty's Town. (2) one piece of Land six miles square at or near Lorimier's Store before mentioned. (3) one piece six miles square at the head of the navigable water of the Auglaize River (4) one piece six miles square at the confluence of Auglaize & Miamis Rivers where Fort Defiance now stands. (5) one piece six miles square at or near the confluence of the Rivers St. Mary's and St. Joseph's where Fort Wayne now stands or near it. (6) one piece two miles square on the Wabash River at the end of the portage from the Miamis of the Lake and about eight miles westward from Fort Wayne. (7) one piece six miles square at the Ouatanon or old Weea Towns on the Wabash River. (8) one piece twelve miles square at the British Fort on the Miamis of the Lake at the Foot of the Rapids. (9) one piece six miles square at the mouth of the said River where it empties into the Lake. (10) one piece six miles square upon Sandusky Lake where a Fort formerly stood. (11) one piece two miles square at the lower rapids of the Sandusky River. (12) the Post of Detroit and all the Land to the North, the west and the South of it, of which the Indian Title has been extinguished by gifts or grants to the French or English Government, and so much more land to be annexed to the District of Detroit, as shall be comprehended between the River Rasine on the South Lake St. Clair on the North and a line the general course whereof shall be six miles distant from the west end of Lake Erie and Detroit River. (13) the Post of Michilimackinac and all the Lands on the Island, on which that post stands, and the main land adjacent, of which the Indian Title has been extinguished by gifts or grants to the French or English Governments and a piece of land on the main, to the north of the Island to measure six miles on Lake Huron or the streight between Lakes Huron and Michigan and to extend three miles back from the water of the Lake or streight – and also the Island of De Bois Blanche being an extra and voluntary gift of the Chippawa nation (14) one piece of Land six miles square at the mouth of Chikago River emptying into the S.W. end of Lake Michigan where a fort formerly stood. (15) one piece twelve miles square at or near the mouth of the Illinois River emptying into the Mississippi. (16) one piece six miles square at the old Peorias Fort & village near the south end of the Illinois Lake on said Illinois River.

And whenever the United States shall think proper to survey and mark the boundaries of the lands hereby ceded to them they shall give timely notice thereof to the said Tribes of Indians that they may appoint some of their wise Chiefs to attend and see that the Lines are run according to the Terms of this Treaty.

And the said Indian Tribes will allow to the people of the United States a free passage by Land and by water, as one and the other shall be found convenient, thro' their country along the chain of posts herein before mentioned, that is to say, from the commencement of the portage aforesaid at or near Lorimier's Store, thence along said portage to the St. Mary's and down the same to Fort Wayne and then down the Miami to the Lake Erie, again from the commencement of the portage at or near Lorimier's store along the portage from thence to the River Auglaize and down the same to its Junction with the Miami at Fort Defiance; again from the commencement of the portage aforesaid to Sandusky River and down the same to Sandusky Bay & Lake Erie & from Sandusky to the Post which shall be taken at or near the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of the Lake & from thence to Detroit – again from the mouth of Chikago to the commencement of the portage between that River and the Illinois and down the Illinois River to the Mississippi, also from Fort Wayne along the portage aforesaid which leads to the Wabash and then down the Wabash to the Ohio.

And the said Indian Tribes will also allow to the People of the United States, the free use of the Harbours and mouths of Rivers along the Lakes adjoining the Indian Lands for sheltering vessels & Boats & liberty to land their Cargoes where necessary for their safety.

Article 4h. In consideration of the peace now established and of the cession & relinquishments of Lands made in the preceding article by the said Tribes of Indians and to manifest the liberality of the United States, as the great means of rendering this peace strong & perpetual, the United States relinquish their claims to all other Indian Lands northward and southward of the Great Lakes & the waters uniting them, according to the boundary Line agreed on by the United States and the King of Great Britain in the Treaty of Peace made between them in the year 1783.

But from this relinquishment from the United States the following tracts are explicitly excepted 1st The Tract of 150 000 acres near the rapids of the River Ohio which has been assigned to General Clarke for the use of himself & his warriors. 2d The post of St. Vincennes on the River Wabash & the lands adjacent of which the Indian title has been extinguished. 3d The Lands at all other places in possession of the French people and other white settlers among them, of which the Indian Title has been extinguished as mentioned in the 3d article And 4h The Post of Fort Massae towards the mouth of the Ohio. To which several parcels of land so excepted, the said Tribes relinquish all the title and claim which they or any of them may have.

And for the same consideration and with the same views as above mentioned the United States now deliver to the said Indian Tribes a quantity of goods to the value of Twenty Thousand Dollars, the receipt whereof they do hereby acknowledge & henceforward every year for ever the United States will deliver at some convenient place northward of the River Ohio, like useful goods, suitable to the circumstances of the Indians of the value of

Nine Thousand five hundred Dollars, reckoning that value at the first cost of the goods in the city or place in the United States where they shall be procured.

The Tribes to which these goods are to be delivered annually & the proportions, in which they are to be delivered are the following.

1 To the Wyandots to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
2 To the Delawares to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
3 To the Shawenoes to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
4 To the Miamis to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
5 To the Ottawa's to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
6 To the Chippawa's to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
7 To the Putawatomies to the Amount of one Thous. Dollars.
8 To the Kickappo, Weea, Eel River, Piankashaw & Kaskaskeas Tribes to the Amount of Five Hundred Dollars each Tribe.

Provided that if either of the said Tribes shall hereafter as an annual delivery of their share of the Goods aforesaid, desire that a part of their annuity should be furnished in domestic animals, Implements of Husbandry & other utensils convenient for them, and in compensation to useful artificers who may reside with or near them & be employed for their benefit, the same shall at the subsequent annual deliveries be furnished accordingly.

Article 5h. To prevent any misunderstanding about the Indian Lands relinquished by the United States in the 4h Article, it is now expressly declared that the meaning of that Relinquishment is this. The Indian Tribes who have a right to those Lands are quietly to enjoy them; hunting planting & dwelling thereon so long as they please without any molestation from the United States. But when these Tribes or any of them shall be disposed to sell their lands or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States, and untill such sale the United States will protect all the said Indian Tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the United States & against all other white persons, who intrude upon the same. And the said Indian Tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the said United States and no other power whatever.

Article 6h. If any citizen of the United States or any other white persons shall presume to settle upon the Lands now relinquished by the United States, such citizen or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States & the Indian Tribe on whose Land the settlement may be made may drive off the settler or punish him in such manner as they shall think fit, and because such settlements, made without the consent of the United States will be injurious to them as well as to the Indians the United States shall be at liberty to break them up & remove & punish the settlers as they shall think proper & so effect that protection of the Indian Lands herein before stipulated.

Article 7h. The said Tribes of Indians parties to this Treaty shall be at liberty to hunt within the territory & Lands which they have now ceded to the United States without hindrance or molestation, so long as they demean themselves peacably & offer no injury to the people of the United States.

Article 8h. Trade shall be opened with the said Indian Tribes & they hereby respectively engage to affor protection to such persons with thei property as shall be duly licensed to reside among them, for the purpose of Trade & to their agents & servants, but no person shall be permitted to reside at any of their Towns or hunting camps who is not furnished with a license for that purpose under the hand and seal of the superintendent of that department North west of the Ohio or such other Person as the President of th United States shall authorize to gra such licenses to the end that the said Indians may not be imposed on in their Trade. And if any license Trader shall abuse his privilege by unfair dealing upon complaint and proof thereof, his license shall be taken from him & he shall be further punished according to the Laws of the United States. And if an person shall intrude himself as a Trader without such license the said Indians shall take & bring him befor the Superintendent or his Deputy to be dealt with according to law.

And to prevent impositions by forged Licence the said Indians shall at least once a year give information to the superintendent or his deputie of the names of the Traders residing among them.

Article 9h. Lest the firm piece and friendship now established should be interrupted by the misconduct of individuals, the United States and the said Indian Tribes agree that for injuries done by individuals on either side, no private revenge or retaliation shall take place, but instead thereof complaint shall be made by the party injured to the other by the said Indian Tribes or any of them to the President of the United States or the Superintendent by him appointed; and by the superintendent or other person appointed by the President, to the principal chiefs of the said Indian Tribes or of the Tribe to which the offender belongs and such prudent measures shall then be pursued as shall be necessary to preserve the said peace & friendship unbroken untill the legislature (or great council) of the United States shall make other equitable provision in the case to the satisfaction of both parties.

Should any Indian Tribes meditate a war against the United States or either of them and the same shall come to the knowledge of the beforementioned tribes or either of them, they do hereby engage to give immediate notice thereof to the General or officer, commanding the Troops of the United States at the nearest Post. And should any Tribe with hostile intentions against the United States or either of them attempt to pass thro' their country, they will endeavour to prevent the same, and in like manner give information of such attempt to the General or officer commanding as soon as possible that all causes of mistrust & suspicion may be avoided between them and the United States. In like manner the United States shall give notice to the said Indian Tribes of any harm that may be meditated against them or any of them that shall come to their knowledge. And do all in their power to hinder and prevent the same, that the friendship between them shall be uninterrupted.

Article 10h. All other Treaties heretofore made between the United States and the said Indian Tribes or any of them since the Treaty of 1783, between the United States and Great Britain that come within the purview of this Treaty shall henceforth cease and become void.

In Testimony whereof the said Anthony Wayne and the Sachems and War Chiefs of the beforementioned Nations and Tribes of Indians have hereunto set their hands and seals.

Done at Grenville in the Territory of the United States, north west of the Ohio, on the Third Day of August one thousand seven hundred and ninety five.

[signed]
Anthony Wayne

## Appendix B.
## Indian Stores, Michilimackinac, 1814.

*Invoice of Sundry Indian Stores* delivered Robert Dickson Esqr. Agent & Superintendent of the Western Nations by order of Lieut. Coln. McDouall, Comdg Michilimackinac.[1]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arm Bands | | Pairs | Thirty |
| Buttons | | doz | Twenty four |
| Beads | | Pounds | Thirty |
| Brooches | | No | Eighteen hundred and 74 |
| Ball & Shot | | lbs | Five thousand & 460 |
| Blankets | 1 point | No | One hundred & seventy nine |
| | 1½ do | " | Ninety |
| | 2 do | " | One hundred & ninety seven |
| | 2½ do | " | Eleven hundred & three |
| | 3 do | " | Two hundred & ninety five |
| Cotton striped | | Yards | Four hundred & eight |
| Cloth Broad | | " | One hundred & fifty one |
| Candle week | | Balls | Six |
| Ear bobs | | Pairs | Twelve hundred & fifty |
| Epaulets | | No | Ten |
| Flints | | " | Four thousand five hundred |
| Feathers | | " | Ten |
| Files & Rasps | | " | Eighteen |
| Gorgets | | " | Forty |
| Garnets | | Bunches | Fifteen |
| Gartering | | Gro. | Eleven |
| Guns | Muskets | No | Five |
| | Common | " | One hundred & five |
| | Chiefs & fine | " | One hundred & thirty eight |
| Gun powder | | lbs. | Three thousand nine hundred & 33 |
| Hats Laced | | No | Twenty seven |
| Handfs | Silk | " | Four hundred & sixteen |
| | Cotton | " | Fifty |
| Hangers | | " | Eighteen |
| Hooks Cod | | " | Two hundred |
| Iron | | Pounds | One hundred & two |
| Knives butcher | | No | Five hundred & sixty six |
| Kettles Tin | | " | Sixty |
| Lace Brocade | | Yards | Two hundred |
| Molton | | Yards | Two hundred |
| Needles | | No | Three thousand five hundred |
| Pistols | | " | Six |
| Ribbon | | Yds | Nine hundred |
| Skins deer | | No | Fifty |
| Silk Sewing | | Pounds | One |
| Steel | fire | No | Seventeen hundred and thirty two |
| | German | lbs | Forty two |
| Sheeting Russia | | Yds | Seventy five |
| Saches silk | | No | Five |
| Lines Cod | | " | Fourteen |
| Strouds | | Yds | Eighteen hundred & twenty |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flour | | lbs | Four thousand |
| Thread | Sewing | lbs | Forty eight |
| | Net | " | Eighteen |
| Twine | | " | Twenty eight |
| Tommyhawks | Pipe | No | Four |
| Vermillion | | lbs | Fifty eight |
| Wampum collar's | | No | Nine |
| Worms | Gun | Gro: | Two |

Indian Department Michilimackinac
29th Octr 1814
*Jno Askin*

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## Appendix C

Upper Canada: Lieut.-Governor Sir John Colborne to R. W. Hay, York, 3 May 1829[1]

Dear Sir,

Since the receipt of your letter of the 3rd of December, I have collected such information respecting the Indian Department, as now enables me to offer an opinion how far it may be expedient to carry reduction, and what measures should be adopted to diminish gradually the expense incurred in conveying the annual presents to the Indians settled in Upper Canada, and to those who have been accustomed to assemble at Drummond's Island, and Amherstburg, from the territory of the United States.

It appears I think, that a considerable decrease in the expense of the establishment of the Indian Department may be effected in a few years, if the course which has been pursued with the Mossissagas [Missisagas] of the Credit should be observed with the other tribes. You will perceive by the annexed report, from the Revd. Mr. Magrath, that a very extraordinary and beneficial change has taken place at that station.

Under the superintendence of attentive resident agents, civilization may be extended to the whole of the Indians of this Province, and fund created for their future support by granting leases of their lands, and selling part of them.

We have been involved, for many years, in a system which has occasioned an enormous expense without conferring any benefit on the Indians, or insuring their friendship. A great effort will now, I hope, be made to ameliorate their condition and to place their children under zealous instructors.

No alteration can yet take place with propriety, in the amount of the presents issued to the Indians who resort annually to Amherstburg from the United States, or to those who have been accustomed to visit Drummond's Island; but some expense may be saved by fixing the periods of issue at the former place .... [He recommends a number of staff rearrangements in the Indian Department.]

These four Superintendents should be actively employed in collecting the Indians in villages,[2] and inducing them to cultivate their lands, and divide them into lots. They should encourage them to send their children to the schools which will be prepared for their reception. They will be able probably to persuade the Chiefs to give their consent, that the sums due to them for the lands sold to Government shall be expended on their houses, and in furnishing them with agricultural implements, cattle, etc. They can explain to them the benefit the tribes will receive from their lands being leased, and in certain cases, from their being sold, with the sanction of the Lt. Governor and the usual Council....

It is, however, highly important to let the Indians feel that they are indebted to our Government for the benefits which may be expected to result from establishing schools, and appointing religious teachers, and that all improvements proceed from us. The American Methodists are using great exertions to maintain their influence. They have taken Indian children into the States for the purpose of raising subscriptions, and they have a few days since requested that they may be allowed to import bibles, tracts, and clothing for the Indians on the Rice Lakes....

It will also be expedient to allow a charge of thirty or forty pounds a year at each station for medical attendance. A special Order will be required to authorize the Lt. Governor to consent to the Indian Reserves being disposed of, if in certain cases it should be desirable to alienate them. Several Chiefs have expressed their wish to have schools established, and to bring their tribes together.

The Americans have lately adopted a plan for civilizing the Indians in some parts of the United States; and have formed respectable establishments of missionaries, school masters, farmers, and mechanics. I think we should have similar establishments. The expense must be borne in the first instance by Government, but I have no doubt that we may depend on being able to make the Indians support themselves and all the establishments recommended, at no distant period....

## Appendix D.

## Indian Leaders and Notables of the British Indian Department, 1755-1830.

*Hendrick or Tiyanaga (1680-1755)*

1680 – Born near Canajoharie, Mohawk valley, New York. Elected a sachem of the Mohawk when quite young.

1718 – Visited England.

1740s – Through efforts of Sir William Johnson, became active in holding the Iroquois to the interests of the British. Uncle of Caroline, first of Johnson's Indian housekeepers. A bold warrior, but also an outstanding orator and leader of his people. Struggled to preserve traditional Iroquois culture and lands from white incursion.

1745 – Aided Sir William Johnson in organizing a Mohawk force for the campaign against the French under Baron Dieskau.

1755 – In vanguard of Johnson's provincial army, was ambushed and bayoneted after falling off his horse and being unable to rise. Died 8 September, battle of Lake George.

*Pontiac or Ponteach (about 1720-1769)*

1720 – Born about 1720 in an Ottawa village on Maumee River at mouth of Auglaize River, Ohio.

1755 – Ally of the French; participated in Braddock's defeat near Fort Duquesne.

1756 – Commanded 1,000 Algonkian Indians at Oswego.

1761 – At Detroit council; ignored by Sir William Johnson. His hatred of the English, loyalty to the French and genuine interest in preserving the culture and land of his people resulted in his leadership of a loosely formed confederacy composed of the Ottawa, Ojibway and Potawatomi. Other tribes joined, particularly after the defeat of the French and establishment of the British in the frontier posts.

1763 – 7 May to 15 November, besieged British at Detroit; defeated British at Bloody Bridge. His action encouraged other Indians who massacred garrisons at Sandusky, Venango, Le Boeuf, Presque Isle, Miami, St. Joseph, Ouiatenon and Michilimackinac. Indians also defeated Lieutenant Cuyler and British relief column for Detroit, near Point Pelée; other warriors besieged Fort Pitt until defeated at Bushy Run; Seneca destroyed supply column at Devil's Hole near Niagara Falls. Pontiac the inspiration but not the organizer or general leader of these several Indian victories.

1766 – Although "Pontiac's War" (a misnomer) was terminated within one year, the Ottawa chief did not formally surrender to Sir William Johnson until 23 July at the Oswego council.

1769 – After a drinking session, was murdered by an unknown Indian with a tomahawk blow to the back of the head at Cahokia near British post, Fort Chartres, on Mississippi River.

### *Mary or Molly Brant (1736-1796)*

1736 – Born in Mohawk valley, New York. Iroquois upbringing; sister of Joseph Brant.

1753 – Followed Caroline as Sir William Johnson's housekeeper. Presided as the "brown Lady Johnson" at Fort Johnson, then Johnson Hall for 21 years. Had eight recorded children by Johnson: Peter, George, Elizabeth, Magdalene, Margaret, Mary, Suzanne and Anne; all six girls married white men.

1777 – With outbreak of American Revolution, fled with other Loyalists to Niagara. Most active throughout the war in keeping Six Nation Iroquois attached to the British cause.

1784 – Settled at Cataraqui (Kingston, Upper Canada).

1796 – Died 16 April, Kingston, Upper Canada.

### *Joseph Brant or Thayendanegea (1742-1807)*

1742 – Born in Canajoharie, Mohawk valley, New York; but some accounts say along banks of Ohio River. Mother a Mohawk, father uncertain, though unfounded speculation it was Sir William Johnson.

1755 – Present and under care of Sir William Johnson at battle of Lake George. Educated at Moor's Protestant Charity School at Lebanon, Connecticut; graduated 1763.

1765 – Married an Oneida woman and settled in Mohawk valley. Acted as interpreter and aided missionaries in teaching Christianity to Indians.

1773 – Married half-sister of his first wife who had died.

1774 – Became secretary to Guy Johnson in the British Indian Department.

1776 – Visited England. Most active in cause of British crown during American Revolution. Served as captain and later colonel, and fought in close alliance with Loyalist corps of Butler's Rangers. At Wyoming Valley, German Flats and Cherry Valley (1778); Sullivan's campaign (1779), and along Ohio against Clark (1781).

1780 – Married Catharine, a Mohawk girl, at Niagara, possibly a daughter of George Croghan.

1784 – Led Mohawk to Grand River lands in Upper Canada (Haldimand Grant). Given power of attorney by Iroquois to surrender, sell and collect payment for Grand River lands, and to form a fund and provide an annuity when game and traditional life-style vanished; accused of fraudulent use of attorney trust (1797). Sold three-fifths of total land to whites, much of it to Americans at immense personal profit.

1793 – At Sandusky conference. Brant's long attempts to form a united Indian confederacy in opposition to American westward expansion failed here; his gamble to achieve a compromise boundary which would satisfy the Algonkian, Iroquois and Americans proved unsuccessful.

1795 – killed drunken son Isaac in self-defence; completely cleared. Translated prayer book of Church of England into Iroquois. Settled quietly in a magnificent two-storey house at Burlington Bay, Upper Canada. Extremely wealthy in later years; owned seven to eight slaves and a four-horse carriage.

1807 – Died 24 November, Burlington, Upper Canada.

### *Little Turtle or Michikinikwa (1752-1812)*

1752 – Born in a Miami village on Eel River, about 20 miles from present Fort Wayne, Indiana.

1775-83 – Fought with British during American Revolution. Became an influential leader of the Algonkian confederacy in their struggle to preserve the Ohio valley from American encroachment.

1790 – Led Indians at Harmar's defeat.
1791 – Commanded tribes at St. Clair's defeat, thus assuring his military reputation.
1794 – Did not command at Fallen Timbers; had lost his leadership in council to the more belligerent Shawnee such as Captain Johnny and Blue Jacket. Although he led the attack against Fort Recovery in June, was opposed to fighting Wayne in August.
1795 – One of first chiefs to sign the Treaty of Greenville, 3 August. Capitulated to the white world; acquired white customs and disease. Worked to obtain Indian support for further land cessions. Prestige among his people dropped sharply, but he managed to keep Miami from supporting the British in War of 1812.
1812 – Died 14 July at Fort Wayne, Indiana.

*The Prophet or Laulewasika or Tenskwatawa (1768-1837)*
1768 – Born about 1768 near Chillicothe, now Oldtown, Ohio. Twin, brother or half-brother of Tecumseh.
1805 – Announced that he was a prophet and possessed mystical powers; clearly was largely influenced by the Shakers and their unusual religious practices such as the "finger tip" dance in which they shook sin out of their bodies. Preached for a return to traditional Indian values and urged the renunciation of sin and white customs; anti-white doctrine an early example of the "Red Power" movement.
1811 – 7 November, blundered into defeat by Harrison at Tippecanoe. Influence lost after battle; did not participate in the War of 1812. Received a pension, a courtesy from the British government; lived in Canada until 1826.
1837 – Died November, Wyandotte County, Kansas.

*Tecumseh or Tecumtha (1768-1813)*
1768 – Born in the Shawnee village of Piqua on the Mad River near present Springfield, Ohio.
1774 – Father killed during Dunmore's War in Kentucky.
1780 – Piqua destroyed by Kentucky militia during American Revolution.
1789 – Elder brother killed in a raid against a Tennessee back settlement.
1794 – At battle of Fallen Timbers, 20 August.
1811 – Not present at battle of Tippecanoe, 7 November; had travelled south to attempt to induce Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw and Creek to join his united Indian confederacy. Like Pontiac and Joseph Brant, worked to form an alliance of all the tribes in opposition to the territorial ambitions of Americans.
1812 – Joined British and made a brigadier general during the War of 1812. Provided invaluable service to the British cause, particularly in the first few months of the conflict. Completely disrupted Hull's supply lines and won a decisive victory at Brownstown, 5 August; at capture of Detroit, 16 August.
1813 – Won a crushing victory against Kentucky militia during the siege of Fort Meigs, 5 May. At Fort Stephenson, 1 August. The British retreated from Amherstburg, 27 September, and Tecumseh's dream of preserving traditional Indian values and land and a united confederacy was irretrievably lost. Killed 5 October at the battle of the Thames near Moravian Town, Upper Canada, fighting against the hereditary foe and loyally covering the retreat of the British, who had abandoned his people to the mercy of American expansion three times in a generation.

*Black Hawk or Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak (1767-1838)*
1767 – Born at great Sauk village on Rock River in present state of Illinois. Traded with Spaniards at St. Louis until 1804 when Americans took control.
1804 – Harrison Treaty, forcing Sauk and Fox to cede all their lands east of the Mississippi, never accepted as valid by Black Hawk who was not present at signing. As a result of American westward expansion and pressure tactics on the tribes, Black Hawk developed a hearty dislike for the United States.
1812 – Joined the British at outbreak of the War of 1812; worked in close harmony with Robert Dickson.
1813 – At battles of Frenchtown, Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson. Following death of Tecumseh, Black Hawk became the most influential Indian ally of the British, and Dickson appointed him head chief of the Northwest tribes.
1814 – Won victories over Campbell and Taylor at the battles of Rock Island Rapids, 21 July and 5 September.
1815 – 24 May, Bulger and the British burned Fort McKay and left the Northwest. Black Hawk and the Indians of the region forever; the farewell scene was admirably re-

created in a painting by Peter Rindisbacher.
1816 – Reluctantly signed a treaty of peace between the Sauk and the United States, thus adhering to the old 1804 treaty.
1816-29 – Visited the British at Fort Malden annually to receive presents and exchange good wishes.
1832 – Fought a futile war against the Americans in an effort to retain some of the Sauk lands east of the Mississippi (Black Hawk War).
1838 – Died 3 October at Sauk village on Des Moines River, Iowa, west of the Mississippi. His grave violated and all private possessions stolen.

*Sir William Johnson (1715-1774)*
1715 – Born in Smithtown, County Meath, Ireland. Adopted by his uncle, Admiral Sir Peter Warren.
1738 – To Mohawk valley estates of his uncle in New York; inherited property in 1752.
1739 – Took Catherine (Catty) Weissenberg, an indentured German girl, as his housekeeper; three children by her: Anne (b. 1740), John (b. 1742) and Mary (b. 1744).
1745 – Married Catherine on her deathbed.
1746 – Became "Colonel of the Six Nations;" influence and prestige among the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, supreme and of invaluable assistance to the British in their struggles with the French and Algonkian Indians.
1747 – Took Caroline, niece of the Mohawk sachem Henrick, as his housekeeper; three children by her: William of Canajoharie, Charlotte and Caroline.
1753 – Following death of Caroline, took Mary (Molly) Brant, another Iroquois girl, as his housekeeper; by her he had eight recorded children (*see* Mary Brant, above).
1755–Appointed superintendent of Indian affairs, Northern Department; became "Father of the British Indian Department." Won victory at battle of Lake George, 8 September; awarded a baronetcy.
1756 – Appointed George Croghan as his deputy agent for Indian affairs at Fort Pitt.
1759 – Following death of John Prideaux, commanded British and Indians at siege of Fort Niagara and forced surrender of Pouchet after winning crushing victory at battle of La Belle Famille, 25 July.
1762 – Appointed son-in-law Daniel Claus as deputy west of Ottawa River, headquarters at Detroit, and nephew and son-in-law Guy Johnson as deputy east of Ottawa River, headquarters at Oswego.
1763 – Made serious error in Indian diplomacy at Detroit council by ignoring Pontiac.
1764 – Instrumental in arranging truce with hostile tribes in July at Niagara council; finally concluded at Oswego council with surrender of Pontiac, 1766. Drafted "Observations" for "Future Management of Indian Affairs in America" which proved unworkable, mainly because of lack of taxable funds.
1766 – Appointed Thomas Polk as deputy for southern tribes and Joseph Gorham as deputy for Nova Scotia.
1768 – Key figure at Fort Stanwix Treaty cession which guaranteed the Ohio River as the eternal boundary between Indian and white. Lived his last years in great comfort and wealth at Johnson Hall on his Mohawk valley estates. Constant Indian visitors were always treated with kindness and good grace.
1774 – Died 11 July, Johnson Hall, Mohawk valley, New York; a loyal servant of the king.

*John Stuart (1700-1779)*
1700 – Born in Scotland.
1748 – Migrated to South Carolina.
1755 – Appointed Superintendent of Indian affairs, Southern Department. Active in negotiating treaties with the Creek and Cherokee in the Floridas and Carolinas in the 1760s.
1775 – Ordered arrested by the South Carolina assembly for attempting to incite Cherokee to the British interest. Campaigned throughout American Revolution in the Floridas, organizing the Seminole and Cherokee and cooperating with the British war effort in the south.
1779 – Died 25 March, Pensacola, Florida.

*George Croghan (about 1715-1782)*
1715 – Born about 1715 in Dublin, Ireland.
1741 – Came to America. Became influential Indian trader, agent and land speculator; established a home in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Spoke several Indian dialects and imitated in many ways the manners and customs of an Indian of the Eastern Woodlands.
1752 – Ohio trading interests ruined at Pickawillany.
1756-59 – Appointed a deputy superintendent in the British Indian Department. Campaigned against the French in Ohio.

1764 – To England to lobby for inland colonies and a strong independent Indian Department.

1768 – Played important role at Treaty of Fort Stanwix.

1772 – Resigned from the Indian Department and turned to land speculation. His journal (1745-75) constitutes one of the best sources for an understanding and appreciation of the history of the pre-Revolution American frontier.

1782 – Died in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in poverty.

### *Daniel Claus (1727-1787)*

1727 – Born in Benningham in the German States.

1748 – To America; spent first years in Mohawk valley, New York.

1755 – Became interpreter in British Indian Department under Sir William Johnson. Fought against French at Lake George (1755) and Niagara (1759).

1762 – married Anne, oldest daughter of Sir William Johnson. Appointed deputy superintendent of Indian affairs for Canada; active throughout 1760s in the management of Indian affairs.

1776 – New York property confiscated by rebels; to England; returned to command Canadian Indians during American Revolution. Argued throughout the war with Carleton, John Butler and Joseph Brant over the improper employment of the Indians.

1781 – Wrote *A Primer for the Use of the Mohawk Children*.

1783 – To England in an effort to obtain compensation for property losses in New York during the American Revolution.

1787 – Died in Cardiff, Wales.

### *Joseph Chew (about 1720-1798)*

1720 – Born about 1720 in Virginia.

1774 – Appointed a secretary in the British Indian Department.

1776 – Visited England with Joseph Brant, Daniel Claus and Guy Johnson. Served as secretary throughout American Revolution and struggle for the Ohio valley.

1798 – Retired after 24 years' service. Died in Montreal, Lower Canada. His sons were *John Chew*, who succeeded his father as secretary of the Indian Department, 1798-1806, and *William Johnson Chew*, who was appointed storekeeper at Niagara for the Indian Department in 1794, and was later at Fort George, Upper Canada.

### *Guy Johnson (about 1730-1788)*

1730 – Born about 1730 in Ireland. To America; entered Indian Department under the guidance of his uncle, Sir Willam Johnson. Active against French, 1756-60.

1762 – Married his cousin Mary, second daughter of Sir William Johnson; appointed deputy superintendent of Indian affairs for the Six Nations.

1774-82 – Following death of Sir William Johnson, appointed superintendent general of Indian affairs; to England, 1776; contributed to ensuring continued loyalty of the Iroquois to the British during the American Revolution. His position in the Indian Department, however, did not enhance his reputation. Did not return to America until 1779-81.

1782 – Suspended from the British Indian Department and became accountable for £75,272 when various officials in the department complained that they had not received full supply orders or pay over the last few years.

1783 – Returned to England; charges of misappropriation remained unresolved.

1788 – Died 5 March, Haymarket, London, England.

### *John Butler (1725-1796)*

1725 – Born in New Haven, Conn.

1742 – Migrated to Mohawk valley, New York.

1755 – At battle of Lake George. Served in the Indian Department under Sir William Johnson against the French.

1759 – Commanded the Iroquois at the battle of La Belle Famille, 25 July.

1776-77 – Assistant Indian superintendent at Niagara; became loyal supporter of the king during the American Revolution.

1777 – At Oriskany. Organized Loyalist corps of Butler's Rangers, with rank of major; later promoted to lieutenant colonel (1780). The military record of this unit during the American Revolution was unsurpassed. By the end of the war the Rangers and their Indian allies were masters of the Ohio valley and the Northwest. This large area which they successfully defended was lost at the negotiation tables in 1782-83.

1783 – Appointed commissioner of Indian affairs at Niagara.

1784 – Rangers and other Loyalists established the village of Butlersburg on the west bank of the Niagara River.

1792-96 – Appointed and served as Indian superintendent to the Six Nations at Newark (formerly Butlersburg), Upper Canada. Died 14 May 1796 at Newark.

### *Sir John Johnson (1742-1830)*

1742 – Born 5 November, Mohawk valley, New York; eldest son of Sir William Johnson and heir to his estates. Early life spent quietly in upper New York. Tutored by his father in Indian diplomacy through 1760s.

1773 – Married Mary Watts of New York City.

1774 – Fled to Canada with outbreak of American Revolution; New York properties confiscated. Organized a Loyalist unit – the King's Royal Regiment of New York (Johnson's Greens) – and participated in forays against the Americans on the upper New York frontier.

1782-1828 – Served as superintendent general of Indian affairs; spent most of these years in England or at home in Montreal. The affairs of the Indian Department for the most part were delegated to the deputy superintendent and regional superintendents.

1787 – Appointed to the legislative council of Quebec.

1796 – Appointed to the legislative council of Lower Canada.

1830 – Died 4 January, Mount Johnson, near Montreal, Lower Canada.

### *Alexander McKee (1720-1799)*

1720 – Born in Ireland.

1740 – About 1740, to Pennsylvania; engaged in farming and the fur trade.

1772 – Succeeded George Croghan and appointed deputy agent at Fort Pitt in Indian Department. Learned Indian languages and adopted many of their habits; named "White Elk" by Shawnee; married Indian woman (1769); acquired property near Pittsburgh.

1778 – Fled Pittsburgh with Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty; loyal to British during American Revolution; lost about £10,000 in property confiscations during the war; reached Detroit safely and appointed captain in the Indian Department; fought in the service of the king with the Indians against the Americans throughout the Revolution.

1783-94 – Acted as agent in the British Indian Department and worked closely with the tribes who fought to preserve Ohio River boundary.

1789 – Member of Land Board for district of Hesse, upper province of Quebec (later Upper Canada).

1793 – At fateful Sandusky conference.

1794-99 – Served as deputy superintendent of Indian affairs; spent last three years of his life quietly at his home on the Thames River.

1799 – Died 15 January at Thames River home, Upper Canada.

### *Matthew Elliott (1739-1814)*

1739 – Born County Donegal, Ireland.

1761 – Emigrated to Pennsylvania.

1763 – Served in Bouquet expedition against the Indians; throughout 1760s engaged in Indian trade with headquarters in Pittsburgh; married a Wyandot woman, two children, Matthew and Alexander.

1778 – To Detroit with Alexander McKee and Simon Girty; Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton thought his loyalty to the king was suspect and sent him to Quebec; returned to Detroit and made a captain in the British Indian Department; most active during American Revolution; led Indians in several engagements but particularly at Vincennes (1779), in the Bird expedition against Kentucky (1780), and at Sandusky (1782), and Blue Licks (1782).

1783 – Led Douglas peace party to Detroit.

1783-94 – Active in council with the Indians throughout the struggle for the Ohio valley.

1784 – Established beautiful home on Detroit River near mouth of Lake Erie; area known locally as Elliott's Point.

1794 – Married Sally Donovan of Detroit, three children – Sarah Anne, Francis Gore and Robert Barclay.

1796 – Appointed superintendent of Indian affairs at Fort Malden (Amherstburg).

1797 – Dismissed for "irregularities;" member of Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada and member of Hesse Land Board.

1808-14 – "Only man capable of calling forth the loyalties of the Indians;" reinstated as superintendent of Indian affairs at Fort Malden.

1812 – Commanded Indians with Tecumseh at surrender of Detroit; supplied and organized tribes in interest of the king throughout the War of 1812.

1813 – Criticized for loose handling of Indians at "Frenchtown Massacre" (January), at Fort Meigs (May), Fort Stephenson (August) and Moravian Town (October); led Indians at capture of Fort Niagara (December).

1814 – Died 7 May, Burlington, Upper Canada.

### *Simon Girty (1741-1818)*

1741 – Born near Sherman's Creek, Perry County, Pennsylvania.

1756 – Captured by Seneca; learned language and customs of the Iro-

quois; returned to the white world as the "white savage."
1774 – Served as an interpreter in Dunmore's War.
1778 – To Detroit with Elliott and McKee; served throughout American Revolution as an interpreter in the British Indian Department; at torture of Colonel Crawford (1782), and thus scandalized by Hugh H. Brackenridge in *Indian Atrocities* (1782).
1783 – Married a white captive of the Shawnee named Catherine Mallott who was very young and reported to be of exceptional beauty.
1783-96 – Provided loyal service to the British, and to the Indian Ohio River boundary claim during the struggle for the Ohio valley.
1796 – Moved to a 200-acre farm near Amherstburg, Upper Canada, as a result of Jay's Treaty; lived quietly there for many years.
1812 – Mentally willing but physically incapable of campaigning in the field against the Americans during the War of 1812.
1818 – Died 18 February, Amherstburg, Upper Canada; his fierce reputation and exceptional ability in leading Indians in time of war made him a special target of American historians who unjustly portrayed him as savage and brutal. Brothers: *George Girty* – litte known; *James Girty* – an interpreter in the British Indian Department; prominent in the 1808 Amherstburg councils.

*George Ironside (1760-1830)*
1760 – Born in Scotland; earned an M.A. degree from King's College, Aberdeen.
1792 – Was trading with the Indians along the Auglaize River and living with Isabella, niece of the Shawnee Tecumseh; date of arrival in America unknown; appointed agent for the British Indian Department.
1796 – Appointed storekeeper and clerk under Matthew Elliott at Amherstburg; lived at Amherstburg for the rest of his life.
1812 – Employed in the British Indian Department.
1816-20 – Served as clerk in the department at Amherstburg.
1820-30 – Following death of John Askin, Jr., appointed and served as superintendent of Indian affairs at Amherstburg.
1830 – Died Amherstburg, Upper Canada.

*William Claus (1765-1826)*
1765 – Born upper New York; son of Daniel Claus; grandson of William Johnson; early years spent in understanding the Indians and the wilderness frontier.
1796 – Succeeded John Butler as superintendent to the Six Nations at Fort George (Newark).
1800-26 – Following death of Alexander McKee, served as deputy superintendent of Indian affairs.
1812 – At outbreak of War of 1812 was also lieutenant colonel of the First Regiment of Lincoln Militia; commanded militia of Upper Canada from Newark to Queenston Heights.
1813 – May, last British officer to leave Fort George in face of American advance.
1813-14 – Served with dignity and ability in the British Indian Department throughout the War of 1812; quarreled with John Norton over the provisioning and handling of the Indian allies; survived the dispute.
1826 – Died 11 November at Fort George, Upper Canada.

*John Askin, Jr. (1762-1820)*
1762 – Born at l'Arbre Croche, an Ottawa village, Great Lakes region; not to be confused with his father John Askin (1739-1815); mother an Ottawa woman.
1807 – Serving as clerk and storekeeper for the British Indian Department at St. Joseph.
1809-10 – Acting superintendent and storekeeper at St. Joseph and involved in the "Askin affair" – charged with pilfering and making a profit from the Indian Department stores; unlike Elliott in 1797, was cleared.
1812 – 17 July, organized and commanded about 300 Ottawa and Ojibway Indians at the capture of Michilimackinac; worked closely with Robert Dickson throughout the War of 1812 organizing and despatching Indian allies to the British at Amherstburg, Detroit and Prairie du Chien.
1814 – Promoted to captain in the British Indian Department.
1816-20 – Appointed and served as superintendent of Indian affairs at Fort Malden (Amherstburg).
1820 – Died at Amherstburg, Upper Canada.

*Thomas McKee (about 1770-1815)*
1770 – Born about 1770 possibly at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; son of Alexander McKee and an Indian woman.
1796 – Appointed superintendent of Indian affairs at St. Joseph; had served briefly as an officer in the 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans).
1797 – Replaced Matthew Elliott as superintendent of Indian affairs at Fort Malden (Amherstburg).

1799 – Married Therese Askin, eldest daughter of John Askin Sr. of Detroit and Amherstburg.
1808 – Excessive rum drinking and lack of respect or influence with the Indians, plus the Chesapeake crisis of 1807 resulted in removal from his Indian Department post; replaced by Matthew Elliott.
1813 – Left Amherstburg with the retreating army of Procter.
1814 – Spent much of the year as an obnoxious drunk on the Burlington beach in Upper Canada.
1815 – Died in Lower Canada; dissipation and alcohol ruined his career.

*John Norton (about 1768 – about 1831)*
1768 – Born about 1768 in Scotland.
1788 – Discharged as a private in the 65th Regiment of Foot while serving in Canada.
1789 – To Detroit where employed by John Askin Sr. as an Indian trader along the Miami River.
1792 – Met Joseph Brant and returned with the Mohawk leader to the Grand River lands in Upper Canada.
1796 – Became an interpreter to the Mohawk at Newark and later at Fort George.
1800 – Resigned and returned to the Grand River; completely adopted the habits and customs of an Iroquois.
1805 – To England on behalf of Brant to argue for a transferable title to the Grand River lands.
1812-14 – Zealous and active in the cause of the king; led a band of Indians at Detroit, Queenston Heights and throughout the 1813 campaign on the Niagara front; became embroiled in a controversy with William Claus, William Caldwell and the British Indian Department over authority to manage his own particular band of Indians independent of departmental control; induced Prevost to detach him from all control or subordination in the affairs of the Six Nations; lost favour with some of the Grand River Iroquois chiefs.
1815 – Became insolent and insubordinate to British military officers and was finally discharged from all duties or management of Indian affairs.
1823 – Living at Grand River; killed an Iroquois, Big Arrow, and promptly fled to England; drew a pension from the British government and lived his last years in England.
1831 – Died about 1831 in England; he drew his pension until October of that year.

*William Caldwell (1747-1822)*
1747 – Born in Ireland; migrated to America prior to 1774.
1774 – Participated in Dunmore's War.
1777 – Staunch Loyalist; raised a company of Butler's Rangers and appointed a captain in the corps.
1778 – Most active in the royal cause throughout the American Revolution; at Wyoming, German Flats and Cherry Valley raids.
1779 – Fought against Sullivan.
1782 – In Ohio campaigns; at Sandusky and prominent at Battle of Blue Licks where the legendary Daniel Boone was routed.
1783 – Settled along Detroit River in township of Malden.
1794 – Most sympathetic to Indian Ohio River boundary claims; led a contingent of "white auxiliaries" from Detroit-Malden township region to support Indians against Wayne at Fallen Timbers.
1796-1811 – Assisted in planning the Amherstburg town site; engaged in a rivalry with Matthew Elliott over provisioning the new British garrison at Fort Malden with beef; served for a while as justice of the peace for Essex; became a colonel in the Essex militia; two children – "Billy" and "Mary" – by a Wyandot woman.
1812 – Appointed quartermaster general of militia with the British "Right Division" during the War of 1812; at capture of Detroit.
1814 – Appointed superintendent to the western Indians following the death of Elliott; appointed acting deputy superintendent general of Indian affairs when Claus became incapacitated owing to a long illness.
1815 – December, suspended from his posts in the Indian Department because tribal chiefs expressed their dislike for him; Indian loyalties divided between Caldwell and the department and John Norton; retired on half pay and spent last years quietly at Amherstburg.
1822 – Died at Amherstburg, Upper Canada.

*Robert Dickson (1765-1823)*
1765 – Born in Dumfries, Scotland.
1786 – To Canada; engaged at Fort Erie in loading goods for the northwest fur trade.
1787 – Employed as interpreter and storekeeper for the British Indian Department at Michilimackinac; attended grand council of Indians on 12 July.
1797 – Married To-to-win, a young maiden of the Wah-pe-ton-wan

Sioux, and solidified his growing fur-trade interests; considerable influence with the tribes of the northwest, particularly the Minnesota Sioux; based at Lake Traverse.
1806 – Organized short-lived Robert Dickson and Company.
1808 – Became member of Michilimackinac Company, also a failure.
1812 – Became a most valuable ally of the British and organized the tribes of the northwest against Americans; at capture of Michilimackinac (July); spent remainder of year recruiting Indians and despatching them to the assistance of the British on the Detroit front.
1813 – Appointed agent and superintendent to the western Indians; responsible for collecting and sending 1400-1500 warriors to the British in this year alone; at Fort Stephenson affair (August).
1814 – Continued to rally Indians to the British cause; at successful defence of Michilimackinac (August); and participated in the daring capture of the American schooners *Tigress* and *Scorpion* (September) on Lake Huron; to Fort McKay where a feud developed with the British military and Andrew Bulger over the feeding of the Indians; deprived of his appointment in the Indian Department.
1815 – Completely vindicated at a hearing in Quebec; rewarded with title of lieutenant colonel and retired with a pension of £200 per year.
1816-17 – Plan to provision Selkirk settlement on Red River with beef failed.
1820-23 – Travelled aimlessly throughout Red River colony and upper Great Lakes hoping to reestablish his fur trade interests.
1823 – Died 23 June at Drummond Island; unfortunately for Canadians the heroic exploits of Robert Dickson during the War of 1812 are little known; his military record and achievements on behalf of this country should place him beside Brock and Tecumseh in the esteemed annals of Canadian history.

*Thomas "Tige" Anderson (about 1786-1858)*
1786 – Born about 1786, place unknown.
1814 – Raised a company of "Mississippi Volunteers" in the service of the king; at capture of Prairie du Chien (July); served as commandant at Fort McKay (Prairie du Chien) through the summer.
1815 – September, appointed a captain in the British Indian Department at Drummond Island.
1816 – August, appointed interpreter, storekeeper and clerk for the Indian Department at Drummond Island.
1828 – Removed with military garrison to Penetanguishene.
1858 – Died at Penetanguishene, Canada.

### The Regime of Sir William Johnson

1 *See* E. H. Blair, ed., *The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes* . . . (Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1911-12), 2 vols.; H. E. Hale, ed., *The Iroquois Book of Rites* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1963); George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960); Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1972), p. 26.

2 Helen Broshar, "The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1920), p. 229.

3 *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed., E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany: Weed Parsons, 1853-87) (hereafter cited as *Documents Relative to New York*), Vol. 3, p. 393, Governor Dunmore to Committee for Trade and Plantations respecting New York, 22 February 1687.

4 French attempts to win Iroquois favour through religion are scattered throughout the volumes of the Jesuit Relations. British missionary endeavours are discussed in J. W. Lydekker, *The Faithful Mohawks* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1938), pp. 8-9, and Barbara Graymont, op. cit., especially Ch. 2, pp. 26-47.

5 New York (Colony), *An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes transacted in the Colony of New York, from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751, by Peter Wraxall*, ed., C. H. McIlwain (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1915), p. ix.

6 Anthony F. C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 113.

7 James Adair, *Adair's History of the American Indians*. Ed. S. C. Williams (Johnson City: Watauga Press, 1930), p. 452.

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84 *See* H. K. Letcher, "The Imperial Designs of John Graves Simcoe: First Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, 1792-1796" (M.A. thesis, Wayne State University, 1930), and S. F. Wise, "The Indian Diplomacy of John Graves Simcoe," *Canadian Historical Association, Report for 1953* (1954), pp. 36-44.

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87 Ibid., p. 224, Proceeding of the Indian Council at the Glaize, 30 September 1792.

88 Ibid., pp. 242-3, Speech of the Western Indians, Foot of the Miami Rapids, 28 October 1792.

89 Ibid., pp. 256-60, Six Nations Council at Buffalo Creek, 13 November 1792.

### Indian Confederacy: The Collapse (1793-96)

1 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 1, p. 301, Speech of the Confederate Indian Nations at the Glaize, n.d.

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5 *MPHSC*, Vol. 24 (1894), pp. 554-5, Simcoe to Butler and McKee, Navy Hall, 22 June 1793.

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7 *Upper Canada Gazette*, 11 July 1793.
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13 Ibid., p. 17, Journal of Captain Brant: Proceedings at the General Council held at the Miami Rapids, May-August 1793.
14 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 97, Joseph Brant to Joseph Chew, Niagara, 26 September 1793.
15 *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1893), p. 336, Brant to Chew, Grand River, 25 March 1794.
16 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 97, McKee to Simcoe, Miami Rapids, 22 August 1793.
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18 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, pp. 83-4, Dorchester to Simcoe, Quebec, 7 October 1793.
19 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 98, E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, pp. 85-6, Proceedings of a Council with the Six Nations, Buffalo Creek, 10 October 1793.
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21 Ibid.
22 This was, in fact, the wish of the Home Department; *see* PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 318, Dundas to Simcoe, Whitehall, 16 March 1794, and E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, p. 187.
23 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 98; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, pp. 149-50; United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 480, Speech of Lord Dorchester to the Seven Nations of Canada, Quebec, 10 February 1794.
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25 For an excellent account of British intrigue with the Indians in the Ohio valley, *see* Reginald Horsman, "The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 49 (1962), pp. 269-90.
26 *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), p. 351, McKee to Chew, Miami Rapids, 8 May 1974, and E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, p. 234.
27 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, p. 126, Journal of Colonel Alexander McKee, Indian Country, 22 October 1793.
28 William Clark, "Journal of General Wayne's Campaign," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 1 (1915), pp. 418-44, and Dale Van Every, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 287.
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32 Ibid., 17 May 1794.
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36 Ibid., p. 360, England to Wyandot Assembled, Detroit, 6 August 1794.
37 Ibid., p. 362, England to Simcoe, Detroit, 8 August 1794.
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39 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 490; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, p. 372, Wayne to the Western Indians, Headquarters, Grand Glaize, 13 August 1794.
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41 Ibid.
42 *Upper Canada Gazette*, 10 December 1794.
43 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 492.
44 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 248; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), p. 382, Intelligence of Sergeant George Huffnogle, Detroit, 10 November 1794.
45 Isaac Weld, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 215.
46 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 448, 491, reprinted in *The Scots Magazine*, Vol. 56 (1794), pp. 790-1.
47 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, p. 8; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), p. 372, McKee to Chew, Camp Near Fort Miami 27 August 1794.
48 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 2, p. 396, Campbell to England, Fort Miami 20 August 1794.
49 Ibid.
50 PAC, MG12, WO1, Vol. 14, Campbell to England, Fort Miami, 21 August 1794
51 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 491; PAC, MG12, WO1, Vol. 14, Correspondence between Campbell and Wayne, Fort Miami 21 and 22 August 1794.
52 PAC, MG12, WO1, Vol. 14; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, p. 21, Englan to Simcoe, Detroit, 30 August 1794.
53 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 494.
54 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, pp. 121-5, Simcoe to the Indian Nations Assembled at the Wyandot Village, 13 October 1794; W. L. Stone, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 391-3.
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shank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, pp. 150-1, William Johnson Chew, Storekeeper for the British Indian Department at Niagara, to Joseph Chew, Niagara, 24 October 1794.

56 United States. Congress. Senate. Indian Affairs Committee, op. cit., pp. 34-7, E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, pp. 263-4, Treaty of Kanandorque, 11 November 1794.

57 For a complete discussion of the negotiations between Grenville and Jay, *see* Samuel F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), and for a criticism, *see* A. L. Burt, *United States*. An interesting insight into the philosophy of the 18th-century British political and mercantile mind is found in PAC, MG23, A2, Vol. 9, pp. 52-61, "Consideration on the propriety of Great Britain abandoning the Indian posts and coming to a good understanding with America, July 1794."

58 Hawkesbury to Grenville, Addiscombe Place, 17 October 1794, PRO, 30/8, Chatham Papers, Bundle 152, quoted in G. S. Graham, "The Indian Menace and the Retention of the Western Posts," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 15 (1934), p. 47.

59 For the text of Jay's Treaty, 19 November 1794, *see* United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., *Foreign Relations*, Vol. 1, p. 470, and Samuel F. Bemis, op. cit., Appendix 6, pp. 321-4.

60 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 100; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, pp. 185-6, Portland to Dorchester and Simcoe, Whitehall, 19 November 1794.

61 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 101; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, p. 251, Dorchester to Portland, Quebec, 1 January 1795.

62 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., *Indian Affairs*, Vol. 1, p. 528; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, pp. 252-3; Anthony Wayne to the Indians of Sandusky, Greenville, 1 January 1795.

63 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, p. 279, England to McKee, Detroit, 30 January 1795.

64 Ibid., p. 330, Brant to Joseph Chew, Grand River, 17 March 1795.

65 Anthony Wayne, *Anthony Wayne, a Name in Arms: Soldier Diplomat, Defender of Expansion Westward of a Nation: The Wayne-Knox-Pickering-McHenry Correspondence*, ed., R. C. Knopf (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1959) p. 394, Pickering to Wayne, War Office, 8 April 1795.

66 Ibid., p. 395.

67 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 248; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 408-9, Brant to Colonel John Butler, Grand River, 23 July 1795.

68 United States. Congress. State Papers, op. cit., *Indian Affairs*, Vol. 1, p. 562; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 410-9; PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 319; PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 248; United States. Congress. Senate. Indian Affairs Committee, op. cit., pp. 39-45, and for a text of the Treaty of Greenville, 3 August 1793 *see* Appendix B.

69 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 319; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 4, pp. 83-7, Simcoe to the Six Nations Assembled, Fort Erie, 28 August 1795.

70 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 4, pp. 180-1, Dorchester to Simcoe, Quebec, 25 January 1796.

71 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 105; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 4, p. 286, Beckwith to the Commander of the Western Posts, Quebec, General Order of 1 June 1796.

72 Quoted in Nelson V. Russell, op. cit., p. 270.

### The Quiet Years (1796-1807)

1 Colonel McKee had purchased the land at Chenail Ecarté in May of 1790, and the intention was to eventually offer the Indians the area for settlement; *see* PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 105, letters of McKee to Joseph Chew, Secretary of Indian Affairs, Detroit, 4 September 1795, and Dorchester to Portland, Quebec, 18 June 1796. In 1850, part of this area became what is now known as Walpole Island, Indian Reserve No. 46.

2 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 250; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 499-500, A. McKee to Captain James Green, Military Secretary, Detroit River, 22 January 1797. In 1796 alone, the Indians consumed 96,000 rations and 3,500 bushels of corn, and an extra allowance was promised and granted.

3 PAC, RG10, A4, Vol. 14, Council at Chenail Ecarté, 30 August 1796; Reginald Horsman, *Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ., 1964), p. 116.

4 The Queen's Rangers was a Loyalist regiment, and under the command of John Graves Simcoe fought gallantly throughout the American Revolution until the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in October of 1781. The unit was reformed in 1792-93 as a pioneer corps for service in Upper Canada, and was disbanded in 1802. The Royal Canadian Volunteers was a provincial corps raised in 1794. This regiment was stationed in Upper Canada until 1802, when it was disbanded.

5 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 1206, Peter Russell, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, to Lieutenant General Robert Prescott, Governor-in-chief and Commander of the Forces in British North America, York, 20 August 1796.

6 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 249; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 451-5, Colonel Alexander McKee to Lord Dorchester, Detroit, 7 June 1796 (Plan for the Future Government of the Indian Department).

7 Ibid.

8 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 250; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 518-9, Captain Peter Drummond to James Green, Island of St. Joseph, 29 June 1797.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 *MPHSC*, Vol. 23 (1895), pp. 31-2, Thomas McKee to Prideaux Selby, Secretary of Indian Affairs, Amherstburg, 12 August 1804.

12 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Simcoe*, Vol. 3, p. 314, Joseph Brant to Joseph Chew, Grand River, 5 March 1795.

13 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 319, Simcoe to Dorchester, Kingston, 4 March 1795.

14 Ibid.

15 Isaac Weld, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 343-59.

16 Ibid.; *see also* Reginald Horsman, *Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ., 1964), pp. 120-2.

17 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 250; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 524-5, McLean to Green, Amherstburg, 3 August 1797.

18 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 250; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 535-9, McLean to Green, Amherstburg, 14 September 1797.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., *see also* Reginald Horsman, *Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. 1964), pp. 128-32.

21 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 250, McLean to Green, Amherstburg, 23 September 1797.

22 Ibid., McLean to Green, Amherstburg, 18 October and 17 November 1797.

23 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 110, Prescott to Portland, Quebec, 27 December 1797.

24 Ibid., Vol. 321, Brant's Power of Attorney to sell the Grant River Lands, 2 November 1796.

25 Ibid., Speech of Joseph Brant to William Claus Respecting Indian Lands, Fort George, 24 November 1796.

26 Ibid., and Charles M. Johnston, ed., *The Valley of the Six Nations; A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand River* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1964) (hereafter cited as *Valley of the Six Nations*), introduction, pp. xliv-xlv.

27 Quoted in Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, p. 70.

28 Ibid., pp. 87-9.

29 Ibid., pp. 97-8 (Transfer of Grand River Tracts to the Crown, 5 February 1798).

30 Charles M. Johnston, "Joseph Brant, the Grand River Lands and the Northwest Crisis," *Ontario History*, Vol. 55 (1963), pp. 280-1.

31 *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 596-8.

32 Ibid., pp. 620-1; PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 251, McLean to Green, Amherstberg, 17 August 1798.

33 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 112, Prescott to Portland, Quebec, 13 November 1798.

34 Ibid., Prescott to Portland, Quebec, 5 March 1799.

35 PAC, MG24, A6, Peter Hunter Papers, Hunter to Portland, Quebec, 28 December 1799.

36 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 252; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), pp. 631-5, McLean to Sir John Johnson, Amherstburg, 24 May 1799.

37 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 252; *MPHSC*, Vol. 20 (1892), p. 637, Thomas McKee to William Claus, Amherstburg, 5 June 1799.

38 PAC, MG24, A6, Peter Hunter Papers, Distribution of Forces in Upper Canada, Quebec, 1 December 1799.

39 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, pp. 104-5, 105-9; W. L. Stone, op. cit., Vol. 2, Appendix, pp. xiv-xxxv, Iroquois Councils at Fort George, 8 October 1803, 29 June 1804 and 28 July 1806.

### The Indian Department and the Northwest in the War of 1812 (1807-15)

1 For the effects of the Chesapeake Crisis on the affairs of Upper Canada and its significance in Anglo-American relations, *see* A. L. Burt, *United States*, pp. 241-8; Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1962), pp. 102-4; E. A. Cruikshank, "The Chesapeake Crisis as it Affected Upper Canada," *Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records*, Vol. 24 (1927), pp. 281-322, and Sir Isaac Brock, *The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, K. B.*, ed. F. B. Tupper (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1847), pp. 60-3, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Brock to Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, York, 25 July 1807.

2 Details of British defence measures for Canada are found in J. Mackay Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 71 ff.

3 Canada. Public Archives, *Report on Canadian Archives for 1896* (Ottawa: 1897), p. 31, note B, Craig to Gore, Quebec, 6 December 1807.

4 *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 232-3, Craig, to Gore, Quebec, 28 December 1807.

5 PAC, RG10, A4, Vol. 11, Gore to Claus, York, 29 January 1808, enclosing "Secret Instructions." An excellent brief account of the British intrigue among the tribes during this period is Reginald Horsman, "British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 45 (1958), pp. 51-66.

6 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 136; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 239-40, Craig to Gore, Quebec, 10 March 1808.

7 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 136; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 242-4, Colonel William Claus, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, and James Girty, Interpreter, to Shawnee Assembled, Amherstburg, 25 March 1808.

8 PAC, RG10, A4, Vol. 11; *MPHSC*, Vol. 23 (1895), pp. 34-57, Indian Council at Amherstburg, 11 and 13 July 1808.

9 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 256, Claus to Prideaux Selby, 18 January 1809.

10 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Records of Niagara in the Days of Commodore Grant and Lieut.-Governor Gore, 1805-1811* (Niagara-on-the-Lake: Niagara Historical Society, 1931), p. 63, Claus to Selby, Indian Council House, Fort George, 10 August 1808.

11 Ibid., pp. 84-9, Proceedings of Councils with the Six Nations at the Council House, Fort George, 10 and 13 March 1809.

12 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 256, copies of letters and documents regarding the charges and disagreements between the officer commanding at St. Joseph and the storekeeper of the Indian Department at that post, York, 26 February 1810.

13 PAC, RG10, A4, Vol. 3, the dispute at St. Joseph, 1810.

14 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 143; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 269-70, Elliott to Claus, Amherstburg, 9 July 1810.

15 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 143; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 275-77, Speech of Tecumseh to Major Taylor, commandant at Fort Malden, Amherstburg, 15 November 1810.

16 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 143; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 277-78, Elliott to Claus, Amherstburg, 16 November 1810.

17 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 143, *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 280-81, Craig to Gore, Quebec, 2 February 1811.

18 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 143, Gore to Claus, York, 26 February 1811.

19 The religious doctrine of the Prophet found similar expression in the teachings of the Paiute, Wovoka, in 1889-90, and the philosophy of the Seneca,

Handsome Lake. For example, to be a follower of the religion of Handsome Lake, a life concept known as Gaiwiio is to possess and express a somewhat nostalgic and deeply emotional identification with Indianness itself, as opposed to identification with white men and white-dominated organizations, and in some cases of a desire for personal spiritual salvation achievable by a renunciation of sin and the acceptance of the leadership of Handsome Lake and the Great Spirit. These themes are developed in Anthony F. C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1970), Robert M. Utley, *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), and Alvin M. Josephy, *The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Leadership* (New York: Viking, 1961).

20 *Western Intelligencer*, 11 August 1811.

21 *Scioto Gazette*, 27 November 1811.

22 *Western Intelligencer*, 25 December 1811.

23 PAC, MG12, WO17, Vol. 1516, Strength returns, Canada, 25 November 1811.

24 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 673; Sir Isaac Brock, op. cit., pp. 123-30, Brock to Prevost, York, 2 December 1811.

25 For the diplomatic manoeuvring in the spring of 1812, *see* William R. Manning, ed., op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 613 ff., and Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1962), pp. 208-16.

26 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 146; *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 295-304, Instruction for the Good Government of the Indian Department, received by Sir George Prevost, Quebec, 1 May 1812.

27 Confidential statement of Robert Dickson, received at Fort George, 14 July 1812, in W. C. H. Wood, ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920-28), Vol. 1, pp. 426-7.

28 Ibid.

29 In 1797, Dickson had married To-to-win, the sister of an influential chief of the Wah-pe-ton-wan Sioux. He had established a trading post at Lake Traverse in Minnesota and traded with most of the tribes on the upper Mississippi, but particularly with the Sioux.

30 *Western Spy*, 21 March 1812.

31 Quoted in E. A. Cruikshank, "Robert Dickson, the Indian Trader," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, Vol. 12 (1892), p. 138.

32 Louise P. Kellogg, op. cit., p. 279.

33 *Western Spy*, 23 May 1812.

34 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 256; W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol 1, p. 424, Dickson to J. B. Clegg, Military Secretary to Brock, 18 June 1812.

35 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 676, Claus to Brock, Amherstburg, 20 June 1812.

36 Ibid., John Askin, Jr., to W. Claus, Michilimackinac, 18 July 1812. Askin never saw so determined a set of people as the Chippewa (Ojibway) and Ottawa. "Since the Capitulation, they have not tasted a single drop of liquor, nor even killed a fowl belonging to any person, a thing never known before, for they generally destroy everything they meet with."

37 A. C. Casselman, ed., *Richardson's War of 1812, with Notes and Life of the Author* (Welland: Tribune Office, 1896-1908), pp. 26-46; Alec R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1958), pp. 96-7, 100-04.

38 Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 126-8; Mentor L. Williams, ed., "John Kinzie's Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, Vol. 46 (1953), pp. 343-62.

39 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 688; A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., pp. 49-92, Brock to Prevost, Detroit, 17 August 1812.

40 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 677; Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, p. 197; and *see* G. F. G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1950), pp. 145-65.

41 PAC, C series, Vols. 257, 1220, Prevost to J. McGill, J. Richardson, and William McGillivray, Quebec, 2 January 1813; Noah Freer, military secretary to Prevost, to Sir John Johnson, Quebec, 27 March 1813.

42 Benjamin Drake, *The Life and Adventures of Black Hawk: With Sketches of Keokuk, the Sac and Fox Indians, and the late Black Hawk War* (Cincinnati: E. Morgan and Co., 1850), pp. 63-4; Reginald Horsman, "Wisconsin and the War of 1812," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol. 46 (1962), pp. 7-8.

43 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 7-9, Proctor to Sheaffe, Sandwich, 25 January 1813; and *see* J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1965) (hereafter cited as *Incredible War*), p. 114, and Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 164-71.

44 Quoted in E. A. Cruikshank, "Robert Dickson, the Indian Trader," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, Vol. 12 (1892), p. 145.

45 Louise P. Kellogg, op. cit., p. 300; Reginald Horsman, "Wisconsin and the War of 1812," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol. 46 (1962), p. 8; E. A. Cruikshank, "Robert Dickson, the Indian Trader," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, Vol. 12 (1892), p. 146; PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 257, Dickson to Procter, Michilimackinac, 21 June 1813, List of Warriors sent to Detroit.

46 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 35, Procter to Prevost, 14 May 1813; and for the Fort Meigs campaign, *see* Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 173-91; A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., pp. 148-77; J. Mackay Hitsman, *Incredible War*, pp. 127-8.

47 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 43, Procter to Prevost, Sandwich, 4 July 1813.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 44, Procter to Prevost, Detroit, 9 August 1813.

50 For the battle of Fort Stephenson, *see* J. Mackay Hitsman, *Incredible War*, p. 150; Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 205-7; A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., pp. 177-89.

51 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 268, Barclay to Sir James Yeo, commander of the British naval forces on the Great Lakes, 1 September 1813.

52 C. P. Stacey, "Another Look at the Battle of Lake Erie," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 39 (1958), p. 51.

Undaunted by the loss of the Lake Erie route, the British managed to effectively supply the upper ports in 1814 by despatching provisions north from York, across Lake Simcoe to Georgian Bay and thence to Michilimackinac. This alternate route was vital as the upper posts held the key to the West.

53 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 269, Procter to Prevost, Detroit, 6 September 1813.

54 A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., p. 206, Speech of Tecumseh in Council, Amherstberg, 18 September 1813.

55 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 680, Procter to Francis De Rottenberg, Civil and Military Administrator of Upper Canada, Ancaster, 23 October 1813.

56 Ibid.

57 *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), p. 556; E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Documentary History of the War of 1812* (Welland: Tribune Office, 1896-1908) (hereafter cited as *Documentary History*), Vol. 6, pp. 254-7.

58 A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., p. 218.

59 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Documentary History*, Vol. 6, pp. 254-7; W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 322-3; and *see* Victor Lauriston, "The Case for General Procter," in Morris Zaslow, *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812: A Collection of Writings giving a Comprehensive Picture of the War of 1812 in Upper Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 121-9.

60 A. C. Casselman, ed., op. cit., p. 241; Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 226; J. Mackay Hitsman, *Incredible War*, p. 157.

61 For the battle of Beaver Dams, 24 June 1813, *see* E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Documentary History*, Vol. 6, pp. 126-7, and Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, pp. 199-206.

62 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *Documentary History*, Vol. 4, p. 204, Charles Askin to his father, John, 10 Mile Creek, 8 July 1813.

63 Ibid., Vol. 6, pp. 283-4, Porter to John Armstrong, Secretary of War, Black Rock, 27 July 1813.

64 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 682, Major General Phineas Riall to Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, 7 January 1814.

65 *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 551, Drummond to Prevost, Kingston, 3 May 1814.

66 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 1222, appointed as of 18 May 1814.

67 *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 527, Drummond to Prevost, Kingston, 31 March 1814.

68 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, p. 206.

69 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 605, Sheaffe to Prevost, Fort George, 13 October 1812; Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, p. 206.

70 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 109-10, Norton to Prevost, Burlington Bay, 1 June 1813.

71 G. F. G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 31 (1950), p. 186.

72 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, pp. 219-20, Noah Freer, military secretary to Prevost, to Drummond, Quebec, 1 March 1814.

73 *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), pp. 534-5.

74 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, p. 221, Norton to William Jervois, aide-de-camp to Drummond, East End Beach, 30 May 1814.

75 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 726-7, Speech of Neywash to Caldwell, Beach, 14 June 1814; Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, pp. 221-2.

76 *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), pp. 594-5, letter from William Caldwell (unaddressed), Burlington, 22 June 1814.

77 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations*, pp. 222-3.

78 This theme is discussed in detail by Julius W. Pratt, "Fur Trade Strategy and the American Left Flank in the War of 1812," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 40 (1935), pp. 246-73.

79 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 257; *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), pp. 423-4, Dickson to Secretary Freer, Michilimackinac, 23 October 1813.

80 Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., "Dickson and Grignon Papers, 1812-1815," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, Vol. 9 (1882), p. 282, Dickson to Lawe, 25 December 1813.

81 Ibid., pp. 289-92, 300, Dickson to Lawe, 4 February and 11 March 1814.

82 Ibid., p. 292, Dickson to Lawe, 4 February 1814.

83 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 257, Speech of the Sioux chief Wabasha at the Michilimackinac Council, 5 June 1814.

84 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 270, Prevost to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Quebec, 10 August 1814.

85 *Kingston Gazette*, 26 August 1814. The paper reported that "nine or ten trunks full of Dickson's property was found, among which are papers and other belongings, some of which date back to 1786."

86 G. F. G. Stanley, "British Operations in the American Northwest, 1812-15," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 22 (1943), p. 97.

87 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 685; *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 611, McDouall to Drummond, Michilimackinac, 16 July 1814.

88 Ibid.

89 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 685; *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 623, McKay to McDouall, Prairie du Chien, Fort McKay, 27 July 1814.

90 Ibid.

91 *Kingston Gazette*, 9 September 1814.

92 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 685; *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 629, McDouall to Drummond, Michilimackinac, 28 July 1814.

93 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 275, McDouall to Prevost, Michilimackinac, 14 August 1814.

94 General accounts of the battle of 4 August 1814 can be read in Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 242-5, and J. Mackay Hitsman, *Incredible War*, pp. 204-5.

95 *See* E. A. Cruikshank, "An Episode of the War of 1812. The Story of the Schooner 'Nancy'," *Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records*, Vol. 9 (1910), pp. 75-126.

96 *MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), pp. 643-4; W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 278, McDouall to Drummond, Michilimackinac, 9 September 1814. The two captured vessels were renamed *Surprise* and *Confiance*.

97 For the battle at Rock Island Rapids, 21 July 1814, *see MPHSC*, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 622; Milo M. Quaife, "An Artilleryman of Old Fort Mackinac," *Burton Historical Collection Leaflet*, No. 6 (1928), pp. 39-40; Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 249-50.

98 Milo M. Quaife, "An Artilleryman of Old Fort Mackinac," *Burton Historical Collection Leaflet*, No. 6 (1928), p. 40.

99 Thomas G. Anderson, "Journal at Fort McKay, August 10-November 23, 1814," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, Vol. 9 (1882), p. 232. Anderson to McDouall. Captain "Tige" Anderson replaced McKay as the British commandant at Prairie du Chien in the summer of 1814.

100 Alec R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 251; Reginald Horsman, "Wisconsin and the War of 1812," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol. 46 (1962), p. 13. Taylor lost 3 killed and 8 wounded.

101 *See* Appendix B for a typical invoice of gifts distributed to the tribes by the British Indian Department in 1814.

102 PAC, RB8, C series, Vol. 258, Dickson to Drummond, Prairie du Chien, 17 January 1815.

103 Quoted in Louise A. Tohill, "Robert Dickson: A Story of Trade, War and Diplomacy" (M. A. thesis, Minnesota, 1927), p. 73.

104 *Kingston Gazette*, 29 April 1815; St. Louis newspaper dated 16 March 1815.

105 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 688, McDouall to Bulger, Michilimackinac, 5 May 1815; *see also* G. F. G. Stanley, "British Operations in the American Northwest, 1812-15," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 22 (1943), p. 106; and for a discussion of the political and diplomatic effects of the Treaty of Ghent on the Northwest, *see* Charles M. Gates, "The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 26 (1939-40), pp. 499-510.

6 Thomas G. Anderson, op. cit., p. 201.

7 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 538, McDouall to Robinson, 21 July 1815.

### The End of an Era (1815-30)

1 W. C. H. Wood, ed., op. cit., Vol. 3, p 524; and *see* Vincent T. Harlow and F. Madden, eds., *British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 481.

2 R. L. Fisher, "The Treaties of Portage des Sioux," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 19 (1933), pp. 495, 504-5.

3 Benjamin Drake, op. cit., p. 90.

4 *MPHSC*, Vol. 25 (1894), pp. 622-3.

5 Quoted in A. L. Burt, *United States*, p. 378, n. 16.

6 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 167, Addison to McDouall, 15 July 1816.

7 PAC, MG12, WO17, Vol. 1523, Strength return, Canada, 25 December 1819.

8 For details, *see* A. L. Burt, *United States*, pp. 381-2.

9 Detroit. Public Library, Burton Historical Collection, William Woodbridge Papers, Austin E. Wing to William Woodbridge, Detroit, 9 July 1815.

10 A. L. Burt *United States*, pp. 382-3.

11 PAC, RG8, C series, Vol. 258, Lt. Col. James to Governor Lewis Cass, Sandwich, 5 October 1815, and Evidence of the Kickapoo, Chemango, at the inquest of the murder of Akochis, Indian Reserve, Malden, 6 October 1815.

12 Over 2,000 Indians were rationed at Amherstburg in 1816; *see* Detroit. Public Library, Burton Historical Collection, George Ironside Papers, Amherstburg, 14 December 1816.

13 Detroit. Public Library, Burton Historical Collection, Silas Farmer Papers, Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, Detroit, 3 August 1819.

14 Robert J. Surtees, "The Development of an Indian Reserve Policy in Canada," *Ontario History*, Vol. 61 (June 1969), p. 89.

15 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 388; V. T. Harlow and F. Madden, eds., op. cit., pp. 591-2, Colborne to Secretary R. W. Hay, York, 3 May 1829.

16 For Colborne's letter which provides an excellent and early example of the philosophy which eventually brought about the development of a paternal reserve system in Canada, *see* Appendix C.

17 PAC, RG10, A5a, Vol. 5, Kempt to Colborne, Quebec, 16 May 1829.

18 Ibid., Vol. 116, Murray to Kempt, 25 January 1830.

19 Robert J. Surtees, op. cit., p. 97.

20 Roy Harvey Pearce, *The Savages of America, A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), pp. 196-212.

21 Lydia H. Sigourney, *Traits of the Aborigines of America. A Poem* (Cambridge: Hilliard & Metcalf, 1822), pp. 177-8.

22 Robert J. Surtees, op. cit., p. 92.

23 PAC, RG10, C2, Vol. 456, General order, 13 April 1930.

### Appendix A

1 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 319.

2 Greenville was written as Grenville (SIC) by Wayne or his secretary throughout the articles of peace.

### Appendix B

1 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 258.

### Appendix C

1 PAC, MG11, CO42, Vol. 388.

2 Reserves.

# Bibliography

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The most productive sources of information for the study of the British Indian Department in North America are the Manuscript and Record Groups in the Public Archives of Canada.

MG11 contains the voluminous Colonial Office Papers. CO42 includes original correspondence and enclosures from the governors, lieutenant governors, and administrators of Quebec, Lower Canada, Upper Canada and the Upper Provinces of Canada. The series covers the period from 1700 to 1909 and includes some interdepartmental correspondence and miscellaneous communications. Volumes used have been cited throughout the endnotes.

MG12 Contains the War Office Papers, which were used sparingly here. However, WO1, Vol. 14, the correspondence between Dorchester and Simcoe in 1794, and WO28, Vol. 10, Indian Department: Letters and Papers, 1775-1782, were of some use.

MG19 includes Fur Trade and Indians, 1763-1867, and in particular, the Claus Papers, Vols. 1-19, were of interest.

MG21 contains the Haldimand Papers, Series B, which were of inestimable value for the chapter concerned with the American Revolution on the frontier. Volumes consulted include:

B38 – Letters from Lord George Germaine and others to Carleton, 1776-79
B39 – Letters from Sir Guy Carleton, 1776-78, Vols. 1 and 2
B42 – Letters from Haldimand to Germaine and the Treasury, 1777-79
B45 – Letters from English ministers, 1782-84
B50 – Letters from English ministers, 1777-84
B54 – Letters to English ministers, 1778-82, Vol. 1
B55 – Letters to the ministry, 1780-82, Vol. 2
B56 – Letters to the ministers, 1782-84, Vol. 3
B57-2 – Register of letters to the ministry, 1780-84
B96-1, B96-2 – Correspondence with officers commanding at Michilimackinac and Niagara, 1777-83 (2 parts)
B99 – Letters and papers relating to the upper posts, 1778-82
B100, B-101-2, B102-3, B103-4 – Letters from officers commanding at Niagara, 1777-84
B104 – Correspondence with officers at Niagara, 1777-84

MG24, A6, Peter Hunter Papers

In addition to the several Manuscript Groups, Record Groups 8 and 10 were of considerable value.

RG8, C series, the military and naval records accumulated by the British forces in Canada, were consulted. Vols. 247-71 relate to the Indians of North America from 1767 to 1859.

RG10 includes Indian Affairs.

Vol. 4-8, 11-12 – Journals of William and Guy Johnson, 1755-72, 1779-80
Vol. 9 – Correspondence of Sir William Johnson, 1756-72
Vols. 8-21 – Records of the Office of the Superintendent General, 1791-1828
Vols. 140-74 – Requisitions for presents required by officers of the Indian Department, 1782-1853
Vols. 587-89 – General orders to Sir John Johnson, 1814-30

The Burton Historical Collection (Detroit Public Library) contains a number of private papers which provided a wealth of information for this study. Of particular interest were:
George Ironside Papers, Letterbook No. 5
William Woodbridge Papers, Fort Malden, 1815
Silas Farmer Papers, Lewis Cass Letter, 1819

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# The B.C. Mills Prefabricated System: The Emergence of Ready-made Buildings in Western Canada

by G. E. Mills and D. W. Holdsworth

Canadian Historic Sites
Lieux historiques canadiens
No. 14

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## Abstract

Between 1904 and 1910 the Vancouver-based British Columbia Mills, Timber and Trading Company marketed a patented system of prefabricated sectional buildings in western Canada. Initially this system was devised as a means of supplying small inexpensive huts to incoming settlers in newly opened agricultural regions. Such structures were prefabricated, prepainted, packaged and shipped by rail to local distributors in towns and villages throughout western Canada. With a set of accompanying instructions, the purchaser could erect his dwelling in a minimum amount of time with little assistance or equipment.

This sectional system was subsequently adapted to a variety of larger permanent homes and ultimately to institutional and commercial structures such as schools, churches and banks. It was with a series of classical banks manufactured for the Canadian Bank of Commerce that the system achieved its greatest success as an enduring western Canadian landmark.

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## Résumé

Les constructions préfabriquées, élément permanent de la conquête de nouvelles régions, atteignirent le sommet de leur popularité au Canada lors de l'ouverture des quatre provinces de l'Ouest au début du siècle. Dans un milieu peu boisé, les colons déjà aux prises avec l'urgent problème d'assurer leur subsistance avaient du mal à se procurer des logements. Le système de constructions préfabriquées mis sur le marché entre 1904 et 1910 par la British Columbia Mills, Timber and Trading Company, de Vancouver, fut l'une des plus fructueuses tentatives visant à répondre à ce besoin de logements bon marché, durables et faciles à construire. Breveté par le directeur de la scierie, Edwin C. Mahony, le système fut d'abord conçu pour fournir des maisonnettes peu coûteuses à ceux qui venaient s'établir dans des nouvelles régions agricoles. Ces petites habitations étaient préfabriquées, peintes d'avance, emballées et expédiées par rail aux revendeurs locaux, aussi loin qu'à Winnipeg. A l'aide des instructions qui accompagnaient l'envoi, l'acheteur pouvait ériger son logement en un minimum de temps et avec peu d'aide et d'outillage. Le succès obtenu par ces constructions préfabriquées aux expositions commerciales de Winnipeg et de New Westminster en 1904 décida la compagnie à produire une gamme élargie de "maisons de ville" pour compléter sa série initiale de "logements de colons." Elle agrandit son usine de Vancouver et, pendant plusieurs années, vendit dans l'Ouest canadien une forme de maison distinctive dont tous les modèles se caractérisaient par des murs à tasseaux (les tasseaux servaient à masquer les joints des panneaux) et par un toit à profil en cloche. La société publia un catalogue grâce auquel le client pouvait choisir le modèle qui lui convenait, depuis la maisonnette à une seule pièce jusqu'à une impressionnante maison de ville à étage et toit en croupe, comprenant quatre chambres à coucher.

En raison de sa souplesse, le système de préfabrication de la B.C. Mills se prêtait à tout un éventail d'applications non résidentielles. Des écoles, des églises, des magasins ainsi que des centraux téléphoniques, des hangars d'entretien ferroviaire et des succursales de banque firent bientôt leur apparition, répondant l'image familière des murs à panneaux du système en question. C'est la Banque canadienne de Commerce qui exploita le plus à fond les possibilités qu'offrait ce système de produire massivement des constructions standardisées, à l'intention des régions pauvres en main-d'œuvre et en bois. Elle commanda une série de banques préfabriquées de style classique, inspirée de modèles créés par Darling et Pearson, important bureau canadien d'architectes de l'époque. Ces constructions étaient expédiées à travers l'Ouest pour répondre aux besoins qu'engendraient les nouvelles villes nées du chemin de fer avant la première Grande Guerre mondiale. Souvent citées par les observateurs contemporains comme étant les plus impressionnantes constructions des collectivités du temps, ces banques devinrent en quelque sorte des monuments familiers et durables des Prairies.

Malgré ses succès, le système de préfabrication de la B.C. Mills connut une période de production relativement brève : le milieu de pionniers qui avait fait naître un marché propice aux constructions préfabriquées évolua dans le sens d'une économie régionale plus indépendante, capable de satisfaire à ses propres besoins d'habitations. Les modifications d'orientation intervenues au sein de la société hâtèrent ce déclin. En 1910, les droits de production du système furent cédés à la Prudential Builders Limited, autre entreprise de Vancouver, dont les efforts pour continuer ce type de préfabrication massive échouèrent face à la concurrence croissante née de l'emballement spéculatif de la construction à Vancouver et du changement de climat économique d'avant-guerre.

En dépit de son assez brève durée, le système de préfabrication conçu par B.C. Mills dota le paysage de l'Ouest canadien d'une caractéristique durable, tant par ses versions en bois, de styles recherchés, des banques urbaines que le système rendit possible, que par les habitations de style si particulier qu'il contribua à définir et à répandre.

## Acknowledgements

The writers wish to acknowledge the assistance of the following people in the preparation of research material for the writing of this report: Miss Edna C. Mahony, Victoria, B.C., who recalled much useful information related to her father's career; Shelagh Draper, Vancouver City Archives; Georgeen Barras, Glenbow-Alberta Institute, Calgary; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Regional Offices, Vancouver, B.C. and Regina, Sask.; British Columbia Telephone Company Photographic Archives, Vancouver, B.C.; British Columbia Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.; Joan Mackie, Heritage Canada, Ottawa; Marsha Snyder, Canadian Inventory of Historic Buildings, Ottawa, and Dr. Edward Gibson, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University.

The authors are grateful for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this report at a conference on "The Architecture of Western Canada" at the Universities Art Association of Canada meeting, Winnipeg, 1 March 1974. They would particularly like to acknowledge the encouragement and helpful criticism offered by Dr. Harold Kalman, Department of Fine Arts, University of British Columbia.

## Introduction

Prefabrication played a significant, albeit subtle, role in the unfolding of Canadian architectural history, just as it did during phases of American and British colonial expansion.[1] It made its first appearance with Frobisher on Baffin Island in 1578 and has reappeared intermittently ever since. Halifax's first church, St. Paul's, a pre-cut structure transported from Boston in 1750, and St. John's Anglican Church in Victoria, a corrugated iron specimen bequeathed by a benevolent English bishop in 1860 are notable examples from the country's colonial period.[2] It was with the opening up of the Canadian West, however, that prefabricated structures became an important domestically based industry, just as they had during the major thrust of frontier expansion several decades earlier in the western United States.[3]

In frontier environments, prefabrication offered a distinct advantage. It met an urgent need for instant housing in labour- and timber-scarce areas – packages quickly shipped along transportation routes from centres with established industrial, labour and raw-material bases. The advantage to settlers was obvious: quickly erectable structures freed them to concentrate on their primary goals of establishing livelihoods in their new environment.

The impetus for the manufacture of ready-made buildings in western Canada was the commencement of the celebrated "Great Boom" of immigration, railroad expansion and land settlement which had begun by 1897. Manitoba, the North-West Territories (after 1905, Saskatchewan and Alberta) and British Columbia all experienced unprecedented population increases between 1900 and 1910. The demands for accommodation quickly exceeded existing lumber and labour supplies, particularly on the prairies: consequently, the procurement of adequate shelter became a difficult and time-consuming problem for many new homesteaders. The memoirs of such pioneers are rife with descriptions of 40- and 50-mile treks to purchase substandard materials, and weeks of arduous labour spent erecting a primitive shanty while the pressing problems of farming were delayed.[4] Out of this critical housing shortage emerged a vast new market for the lumber products of the established milling industries of Ontario, the American Midwest and British Columbia. For those settlers affluent enough to afford them, a variety of ready-made building systems appeared. Perhaps the most extreme example was the series of colonies of "ready-made farms" featuring prebuilt houses and barns offered to carefully selected candidates in Saskatchewan and southern Alberta by the Canadian Pacific Railway's Department of Natural Resources. Purchasers had only to move in, sit back on their ready-made verandahs and watch their pre-planted first crops grow.[5] Another example of note was the standardized and pre-cut churches and manses ("Canterbury Cathedrals" and "Lambeth Palaces") designed by the Anglican Diocese in Saskatchewan to meet the spiritual needs of the rapidly increasing number of settlers.[6]

The most fascinating attempts devised to tap this market were the sectional or "knock-down" building systems manufactured and shipped out by trainloads in packages, the sections ready to be bolted together. Such systems were not new. They too had been extensively employed during British and American expansion periods. But under the more rigorous climatic conditions of western Canada, panelled systems borrowed from previous designs marketed south of the border met with little success. Their numerous seams showed a marked tendency to ventilate the structures faster than their inhabitants could heat them.

There was one notable exception, a sectional "ready-made" system which was outstanding for its success in meeting the need for instant accommodation and for its ability to withstand the Canadian climatic extremes to which preceding prefabs had been vulnerable. This was the panelled system marketed by the British Columbia Mills, Timber and Trading Company of Vancouver between 1904 and 1910. The system offered new settlers a "thoroughly weather-proof, convenient, inexpensive, handsome and permanent dwelling."[7] These "B.C. Mills prefabs" have previously been noted in reviews of Canadian architectural evolution which focused largely on essential characteristics of the houses as described in surviving catalogues.[8] This paper offers the first detailed account of the origin, variety and distribution of the B.C. Mills prefab system, which represents a distinctive contribution to the evolution of the western Canadian architectural landscape.

## Invention, House Designs and Initial Marketing

The shortage of lumber products on the Canadian prairies in the years after 1900 was particularly opportune for Vancouver and British Columbia. Lumber-mills geared to the foreign export trade had been operating in the Vancouver region since the mid-1860s. Timber in the immediate area acquired a reputation in foreign markets for its remarkably large size and high quality. Even after the establishment of Vancouver as west-coast terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1886, the trade of that city's mills remained primarily geared to export markets. This trend was gradually supplemented by a growing local market as the city and its neighbouring communities experienced their initial construction booms. With the growth of trunk lines and settlement both on the prairies and in the British Columbian interior during the 1890s, a complementary market emerged, capable of absorbing the rough cuts, shingles and milled products unmarketable in the export trade, and Vancouver's role as a manufacturing and distribution centre rather than merely a shipping depot commenced.[1] Saw- and planing-mills were quickly consolidated and diversified to exploit this new source of trade.

The leader in this trend was the British Columbia Mills, Timber and Trading Company. It was formed in 1889 by the amalgamation of three large saw-mill companies located on the British Columbia lower mainland: the two Royal City Mills founded and owned by John Hendry at New Westminster and on False Creek in Vancouver, the Hasting

1 Design A, B.C. Mills Settlers' Series. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses.* [Vancouver, 1905].)



Mill on Vancouver's waterfront, and the Moodyville Mill across Burrard Inlet in North Vancouver. Under the aggressive management of Hendry,[2] the company rapidly expanded its assets to include logging railways, a fleet of steamers and vast timber rights in British Columbia. By 1905 the four mills had a daily capacity of 500,000 feet of lumber, 200,000 shingles, 600 doors, and 100,000 feet of mouldings, and employed a staff of over 2,000 people. B.C. Mills termed itself "the largest lumber manufacturing establishment in Western Canada or on the Pacific Coast, and one of the largest in the world."[3]

During the early 1890s a large amount of the firm's production was shifted from export to domestic trade. The Hastings Mill division on the Vancouver waterfront was partially altered for this purpose in 1891, while the False Creek branch of the Royal City Mills was converted to domestic trade in the following years. These changes were consistent with president Hendry's longtime interest in tapping the potential markets of the Canadian Northwest. As early as 1874 he had travelled east to Winnipeg to investigate the potential demand for west-coast lumber. Such a market appeared ripe to him by the mid-1890s, and a Winnipeg office was opened in 1900. The firm's line of building products, ranging from milled lumber to sashes, doors and decorative mouldings, was subsequently distributed throughout western Canada.

The idea of adding a selection of prefabricated buildings may be viewed as a logical step in rounding out the firm's already extensive line

2 Edward Caton Mahony, Royal City Planing Mills manager and inventor of the patented sectional wall system used in the B.C. Mills prefabs. *(R. E. Gosnell, A History of British Columbia. Lewis, Victoria, 1906.)*

of products. In fact, B.C. Mills appears to have been initially motivated more by desires for increased mill efficiency than by grandiose designs for revolutionizing the housing industry. Royal City Mills manager Edwin C. Mahony, a veteran lumberman, began experimenting with a system of panelled wall construction as a means of utilizing excess short ends of lumber which were being discarded as waste. Previous attempts at marketing prefabricated sectional houses as temporary accommodations had, as previously stated, proven unsuccessful in western Canada. In fact preceding structures had acquired a notoriety for being flimsy, draughty and hard to heat which made marketing prospects rather grim. So Mahony was faced not only with the problem of devising a system which would provide weather resistance and durability, but also with overcoming a well-entrenched stigma attached to such structures.[4] After a year's experimentation, he arrived at a solution to the structural problems unique enough to warrant a patent, which was issued to him in January 1904.

Mahony produced a panel incorporating a series of layers of wood and tarpaper separated by an air space. This unit was calculated to offer adequate insulation against the western Canadian climate. Laminated panels were not actually a new concept, although Mahony believed them to be so. Darnall notes the invention of interlocking sandwich panels by a Lorenzo Forrest of Minneapolis in 1884.[5] Mahony's system differed, however, in the greater number of veneers and the use of a moulded weather-tight joint by which successive panels could be linked together, then bolted (Fig. 3). Windows and doors were incorporated in panels which likewise slid together. Panels were further locked in position by morticed sills at both the floor and eaves level as additional protection against heat loss. It was the inclusion of these moulded joints which marked the chief innovation in Mahony's system. The inventor made provisions for additional storeys which could be stacked on top of each other using additional moulded sills, although additional storeys were rarely used. He also provided for prefabricated roofs and floor sections in his patent, although these sections were not incorporated in production models; they offered precut studding, rafters and joists instead.

The exteriors of Mahony's prefabs were characterized by narrow clapboard veneers broken at three- or four-foot intervals by vertical battens that covered the panel joints. In some cases a veneer of cedar shingles was added, thereby completely masking any indication that the building was in fact a "knockdown." The inside veneer of the panels was offered with either tongue-and-groove cedar or lathing for plaster walls.

In his letter of patent, Mahony left no doubt that his system was intended for the traditional prefabricated building market, the recently arrived settlers of remote agricultural regions.

*My invention relates to the construction of knockdown houses especially designed for the use of settlers in a comparatively new or undeveloped country, and is intended*

3 Components of prefab panels and house from 1904 patent. *Upper*, cross-sections showing panel components and sectional joint; *lower*, no indication of the distinctive designs which characterised the B.C. Mills prefabs is evident in Mahony's initial patent illustration of the system's application. *(Canada. Dept. of Agriculture, Patent Office Record, 1904, No. 85, 101, 1 January 1904.)*



> *to meet the requirements of such a class by providing a framed house the erection of which does not require the service of skilled carpenters or tradesmen, but that can be put together by the settler himself in less time than it would take to build one in the usual manner, and that when finished is superior in its weather resisting qualities, appearance and comfort to the best class of house usually built by farmers or miners.*[6]

Having overcome the technical problems related to prefabricated sectional houses, Mahony next confronted the problem of gaining public acceptance for such a system. The first step was the production of a series of small one-storey hip-roofed structures, five of which were shipped to Winnipeg to be displayed at that city's annual exhibition in the summer of 1904 (Fig. 4). The intention of this display was both to demonstrate the system's weather-resisting properties and quality of materials and construction, and to gauge public response. The timing of the display could not have been better. The city of Winnipeg was then on the crest of a phenomenal period of growth.[7] The demand for housing among incoming migrants far outstripped production, resulting in a desperate demand for housing of any kind. A system of ready-made structures which eliminated the need for local lumber and carpenters appeared to members of the local press to offer a ready solution to the existing shortage.

> *There has been nothing on the fair grounds in the last weeks that has attracted more attention than the cottages erected of British Columbia lumber. There is a fascinating sound about a house built to order, for the very reasonable prices quoted. The cottages shown are very pretty and convenient, and in addition you can order your house laid out any way you please, within moderation.*
>
> *The fierce demand for some place to live made visitors to the fair keen to visit these houses and see their possibilities. Even at the present exhorbitant figures charged for putting in foundations, there would seem a possibility of getting an abiding place within the reach of people in very moderate circumstances, while for the settler on new land these cottages certainly solve a knotty problem.*[8]

A similar display at the Royal Agricultural Exhibition at New Westminster, British Columbia, in the fall of 1904 also met with public approval. Encouraged by brisk sales of these initial models, both on the prairies and in British Columbia, and by a demand for larger versions, the B.C. Mills Timber and Trading Company began an expansion of its facilities at the False Creek Royal City Mill. A storage barn was built capable of housing enough panels for 50 houses along with a large fitting and erecting shed where up to six buildings could be preassembled and painted prior to packaging and shipping. In the fall of 1905 a catalogue was published offering a greatly expanded range of house models. There were in fact two distinct series marketed. A selection of small inexpensive huts labelled the "Settlers' Series" was clearly aimed at the traditional prefab market, the newly arrived residents of isolated rural areas requiring tem-

4 Winnipeg Fair (July 1904) marked the first public display of the B.C. Mills prefabs and the beginning of their distribution on the prairies. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].)



5 *a*, "Portion of fitting and erecting sheds showing the walls of a school house and cottage in place, and receiving their primary coat of paint prior to shipment." *(B.C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company, Ready-Made Houses: A New System of House Construction. Vancouver* [1906].*)*
*b*, Storage warehouse for ready-made house sections at Royal City Planing Mills. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

*a*

*b*



porary accommodation, or artisans desiring quickly built quarters in urban centres. For as little as $100 one could purchase a 12 ft. by 12 ft. one-room cabin, prepainted and complete with wooden footings and a galvanized iron chimney. Three additional designs were offered, ranging up to a three-room 16 ft. by 20 ft. cabin featuring sectional interior partitions and priced at $200.

A second group, labelled the "Townhouse Series," was offered to a broader market. This series, presenting a basic selection of 15 designs ranging from a 4-room 21 ft. by 29 ft. one-storey cottage up to 4-bedroom 1½- and 2-storey homes, was in effect offering the prospective buyer a permanent residence at prices competitive to if not cheaper than those of locally built structures.[9] Prices ranged from $400 to $785 in the initial area catalogue, prompting claims of savings of up to 40 per cent over the cost of equivalent structures built on site. Standard designs could be enlarged or altered to suit individual taste by juggling the number and location of panels. Interior layouts were flexible, apart from the location of staircases (Fig. 6).

Considerable attention was given to the external appearance of all models; as they were being marketed in competition with locally produced structures, they had to be visually attractive in order to overcome general suspicions regarding their quality and durability. All models featured standard B. C. Mills sashes, doors, rain gutters and moulding trims. Another standard feature was their bell-cast roofs, deemed "an improvement on the

6 *a-f.* Sample of designs and floor plans from B.C. Mills *Catalogue of Patented Ready-Made Houses* (Vancouver 1905).


a

b

c
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7 The firm's expanded range of townhouses was first displayed at the New Westminster Dominion Exhibition, 27 September to 7 October 1905. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

e

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

8 Two design O prefabs. The Saskatchewan Elbow and Wheat Lands Co., Caron, Saskatchewan. "The sod house in the centre of the group is representative of the settlers' early habitations, and was occupied by the builders during the erection of these buildings." *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

9 E. C. Mahony's prefabricated home on Comox Street, Vancouver (demolished). *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

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

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

hard effect of the usual straight line finish seen in most wooden houses." On cottages in the Townhouse Series, a decorative dormer window was installed on the hipped roof, "adding much to the tastefulness of these natty residences." Additional features were bay windows on the front façade of most models, along with full or partial verandahs, "nicely arranged and related so as to produce a fine impression on the eye."[10] The largest two-storey designs also featured a distinctive gambrel roof with decorative eaves trim. Most of these stylistic features were in fact borrowed from popular styles prevalent in the Vancouver area around the turn of the century; the combination of such features, along with the battened wall system and B. C. Mills standardized products, gave them a distinctive appearance which was, and still is, readily apparent to the alert observer.

One of the major selling points was, of course, ease and speed of construction. Each house was preassembled and painted, then individual pieces were numbered prior to packaging for shipment. Using an enclosed book of instructions, the purchaser could erect his home in several days without the need of skilled assistance.

> *Every section is numbered. The sill of the house is laid, then beginning with, say, number 2 section, each is fitted into the place indicated by a corresponding number. If a door is desired in a certain place or a window in another, the section with these already in may be placed to suit. . . . Individual taste can easily be accommodated in every respect. As every section fits, having been tried before leaving the factory, there is no mistake to make, as the directions are absolute. When the sides and end walls are in place, according to plan, the roof is put on, each part necessary having been cut and ready for position.*[11]

A selection of these new designs was displayed at a second trade fair held in New Westminster, British Columbia, in the fall of 1905. The five-building display was an immediate success. A local clergyman purchased three of them for his congregation, and the local press gave highly favourable reviews on the merits of the system. Subsequent rapid sales in the greater Vancouver area and lower Fraser Valley towns suggest that they were considered as economical and attractive alternatives to conventionally constructed houses even in lumber-rich areas. A dealer in Chilliwack advertised,

> *The very best houses in Chilliwack are the only houses that will compare with Ready-Made Houses in design, quality, and warmth. . . . At the present prices of lumber I believe these houses are cheaper than can be built in the usual way.*[12]

Distribution was channelled through the B. C. Mills head office and Royal City Mills in Vancouver, and the branch office in Winnipeg. Houses were shipped, from one to six per boxcar (depending on size), to local agents. This policy made them attractive to firms or individuals wishing to purchase in quantity. In Caron, Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Elbow and Wheat Lands Company purchased a number of hipped-roof models to sell as replacements for settlers' initial sod houses. In urban centres, particularly Vancouver and Winnipeg, there were frequent instances of clusters of small models being erected on 25-foot lots for rental purposes. A Polis Catholic priest in Winnipeg's north end purchased a group of 17 such models for members of his parish.

The firm took pains to stress that rather than restricting the scope of individual taste, the system offered the purchaser an almost limitless number of possible variations. Edwin Mahony undertook to demonstrate this by building himself an eye-catching home in Vancouver's fashionable West End district in 1905 (Fig. 9), which a local writer touted as "an example of the perfection to which this modern metho of construction has been brought. It is attractive, unique and handsome and shows that individuality of tast has the fullest scope."[13] In fact, although floor plans were modified to suit individual needs, most customers appear to have contented themselves with standard Townhouse designs, varied only by occasional alteration through the use of additional panels.

10 Schoolhouse design from 1905 catalogue. Multiple use of standard window sections provided light for the schoolroom. These structures were offered with or without the bell tower. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

## Commercial Applications and Distribution

The flexibility of the system lent itself to wider non-residential applications. B. C. Mills marketed a schoolhouse series, small one-room structures with optional bell towers which were sold in both Manitoba and British Columbia.[1] Urban applications were made in Vancouver and New Westminster, the former employing them as portable classrooms to accommodate rapidly growing enrolments, and the New Westminster board commissioning one for administrative purposes. Several of the Vancouver buildings are still in use at the present time.

At least two churches were built from B. C. Mills panels in the Vancouver area. One, the Robertson Presbyterian Church in the city's east end, survives although a non-prefabricated front wing was later added to the original 1908 structure.

At Rock Bay, the headquarters of the B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company logging operations on the north end of Vancouver Island, two Townhouse Series houses were built. One served as the camp's hospital, run by the Victorian Order of Nurses (later moved to Union Bay, Vancouver Island). Several bunkhouses were also constructed from the panels at this location. A Settlers' Series hut was employed as the first post office at Ocean Falls, B. C. in 1908, while a similar structure served as part of the initial sanitorium complex at Kamloops, B.C.[2]

Just as Mahony's personal home was constructed to demonstrate the system's flexibility for residential use, the offices and outbuildings at the firm's mill sites in Vancouver

11 Built in 1905 as the B.C. Mills Hasting Mill general office, this structure was possibly the most elegant example of the prefabricated system's potential. A similar building was erected at the firm's Royal City Planing Mills branch in Vancouver. *(H. J. Boam, British Columbia: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources, Sells, London, 1914.)*

12 The British Columbia Telephone Company exchange, Aldergrove, B.C., 30 miles east of Vancouver. The firm erected six prefab exchanges in Fraser Valley towns prior to 1910.

11

12





13 Refreshments room, Canadian Pacific Railway station, Mission City, B.C. (demolished). *(British Columbia Provincial Archives.)*

became models to demonstrate its potential commercial applications. The main office of the B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company at the foot of Dunlevy Street on Vancouver's waterfront and the office at the Royal City Mill at the head of False Creek, both erected in 1905, were impressive hipped-roof structures with porticoed full verandahs. They were calculated to impress the public with "to what variety the sections may be put, and how any particular architecture may be carried out, without adherence to any one or two [standard] designs."[3] A massive two-storey stable on the B.C. Mills site served similarly to demonstrate possible agricultural applications. Both the office and barn on this location long survived the company's demise. The barn remained intact until the summer of 1973 when it was destroyed by fire; the office remains a familiar landmark, having served successively as National Harbours Board office and Seaman's Mission.

The adaptability of the system to commercial buildings was quickly exploited by a variety of firms. Artisans and shopkeepers employed slightly modified standard house designs for shops and offices. The British Columbia Telephone Company erected a half-dozen hipped-oof models in the Fraser Valley owns of Eburne, Ladner, Haney, loverdale, Aldergrove and Agassiz s local exchanges.[4] The Canadian acific Railroad, the chief initial neans of distributing the prefabs, is nown to have purchased several for rew accommodation and mainte-ance facilities.[5]

14 a, The first prefab bank commissioned by the Canadian Bank of Commerce was this gambrel-roofed structure, erected initially at Latchford, Ontario, but subsequently moved to Cobalt, Ontario, in November 1905. The building currently serves as the township office. *(V. Ross, The History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, Oxford Univ. Press, Toronto, 1922.)*

b, The walls of the same bank in place in the Royal City Planing Mills erecting shed, receiving the primary coat of paint. *(B.C. Mills, Catalogue of Patented Ready-made Houses* [Vancouver, 1905].*)*

a

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

Chartered banks were undoubtedly B. C. Mills' best commercial customers for prefabs. Banking in western Canada was a highly competitive and speculative field during the first decade of this century: *competitive* since the first bank to establish a branch in the suddenly emerging local distribution centres was likely to gain a monopoly on trade in the immediate region, and *speculative* due to the difficulty in determining which of the numerous instant towns being created by railroad expansion were likely to survive as viable communities. The dilemma for banks was one of erecting inexpensive structures in a minimum amount of time which nonetheless reflected an air of stability and security to potential investors. A building system such as that marketed by B. C. Mills offered an obvious solution.

Two firms, the Bank of Montreal and the Winnipeg-based Northern Bank, purchased a number of standard Townhouse Series prefabs as branch buildings and managers' accommodations in towns in British Columbia.[6] It was the Canadian Bank of Commerce, however, that most fully exploited the potential of the prefabs and made them enduring features of the western Canadian landscape. The bank initially experimented with a slightly modified gambrel-roofed Townhouse design for a branch in Cobalt, Ontario, erected in August 1905. It evidently satisfied its owners, who recalled the circumstances of its erection 17 years later.

> *Tar-papered shacks and log cabins sprang up all over the town like mushrooms during the night, an*

*byJanuary 1 there were possibly two hundred shacks. In the meantime a few nice buildings were being erected. In our case we imported a ready-made building from Vancouver, which proved to be, and still is, the most attractive in the town.*[7]

The Bank of Commerce, however, had clearly defined policies regarding the image it wished to project to the banking public vis-à-vis its buildings.

*The buildings erected by the bank are not the product of passing fashion. While modern in spirit and diverse in every legitimate respect, they are founded both in general design and in detail on those classical traditions which never fail to command respect.*[8]

In major urban centres this carefully nurtured image had been achieved through impressive neoclassical stone buildings. Branches in suburbs and in smaller communities were scaled-down versions, usually in brick, of these structures. With the B. C. Mills prefabricated system, the bank perceived a means of translating this image yet again into small wooden structures which nevertheless could be cheaply and rapidly erected in small western communities. Darling and Pearson, perhaps the leading architectural firm in Canada and the architects responsible for the design of many of the bank's major stone buildings as well as many other major institutional buildings of the period, were now commissioned to produce classical designs based on the prefab system.[9] The result was a series of three designs ranging from a small hipped-roof model with a multi-columned front verandah to a mas-

15 Front elevation and section, from original building plans, Bank of Commerce, Bay and Douglas streets, Victoria, B.C. Darling and Pearson, leading Toronto architectural firm commissioned by the Canadian Bank of Commerce, designed this series of three bank styles (*see* Figs. 16, 17, 18), adapting the B.C. Mills sectional building system. *(Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.)*


SECTIONAL·BUILDING·FOR·THE·CANADIAN·BANK·OF·COMMERCE
FROM·PLANS·BY·DARLING·AND·PEARSON.
ADAPTED·TO·THE·PATENTED·SECTIONAL·CONSTRUCTION.
MAN'F'D·BY·THE·B·C·M·T&T·Co.,
VANCOUVER·B·C·JUNE·1909.
Stone Cap
FRONT·ELEVATION
SECTION·THROUGH
FRONT·WALL·AT·AA

16 Prefabricated bank in Creston, B.C., featuring pilastered first floor; built 30 July 1907. *(Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.)*



sive looking two-storey structure with neoclassical features including a handsome pedimented entrance and fluted pilasters. Banking facilities, including the vault and manager's office, were located on the first floor. The second storey contained dormitory rooms to house junior clerks. These rooms were occasionally converted into a suite for the manager in areas where the housing shortage was particularly acute. In some cases, a Townhouse design prefab was erected in the vicinity of the branch to serve this purpose. The two larger models featured fireplaces on both floors, located in the manager's office and upper dormitory lounge.

These three models, termed by the bank as their "Prairie Type" branches, proved to be an ideal solution to the various problems confronting the firm during its period of western expansion. The bank's policy was to keep several of these structures in reserve at the B.C. Mills headquarters in Vancouver, from which they could be shipped on short notice to meet sudden demands for branches as expanding railroad lines opened new regions to settlement. Components for a single structure could be packed in two boxcars for shipping.

The most spectacular demonstration of their usefulness occurred in 1906 when two hipped-roof models were shipped to San Francisco to serve as temporary quarters for the firm's offices demolished by the earthquake. One was subsequently employed as a sub-branch in that city.[10]

Although precise figures are not available, it can be safely estimated

17 Prefabricated bank in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, featuring multi-columned verandah; built 14 May 1906. *(Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.)*

18 Prefabricated bank in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, featuring two-storey pilastered and pedimented facade; built 2 March 1906. *(Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.)*

19 A trainload of banks leaving Vancouver, 1906, taken from a full-page advertisement of the B.C. Mills range of products in the *B.C. Review* during the peak phase of the bank's western expansion. *(Vancouver Public Library.)*

17

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

19

that close to 70 prefabricated "Prairie Type" branches were erected in western Canada between 1906 and 1910.[11] During this period a pattern emerged whereby new bank branches appeared in newly established towns within months of railway construction. A notable example is the Canadian Northern Railway line crossing central Saskatchewan in 1905-06. A series of prefab banks was erected in seven distribution centres – Kanask, Canora, Wadena, Watson, Humboldt, Vonda and Radisson – within a few months of the line's construction.[12] Branches similarly appeared along Canadian Pacific feeder lines throughout western Canada. Distribution ranged from Winnipeg (excluding the Cobalt branch) west to Ladysmith and Victoria on Vancouver Island. Because they were frequently the most sophisticated structures in remote communities, they became well-known and frequently cited landmarks.[13] Although the inhabitants of diminutive communities featuring a prefab bank were most likely unaware of or indifferent to the fact, their town or village shared the distinction, along with the major cities of eastern Canada, of having edifices designed by Darling and Pearson gracing their main streets!

Over a decade after the last prefab branches had been erected, the bank remained satisfied with their performance.

*No one can travel to any extent over the prairie provinces without becoming familiar with the typical frame buildings erected by The Canadian Bank of Commerce, such as those at Elbow, Canora, Humboldt and Radville. . . . They have . . . justified themselves, having proved durable beyond all expectation, commodious, popular and creditable in architectural effect. The pilastered and pedimented example illustrated by Canora, and the broad and massive effect illustrated by Radville are particularly satisfying in their effect, and dominate their surroundings to the proper degree, without seeming out of harmony with them.*[14]

20

20 Bank built in Granum (originally Leavings), Alberta, on 21 February 1906. *(Glenbow-Alberta Institute.)*

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

21 Crossfield, Alberta, 1914; typical streetscape featuring prefabricated Bank of Commerce, built 17 April 1906. *(Glenbow-Alberta Institute.)*

### The Demise of the System

Despite the widespread enthusiasm of firms, institutions and individuals for the B. C. Mills ready-made system, its period of production was short-lived. By 1911 the panels were no longer listed among the firm's line of products. Coincidentally, the last of the prefab banks, erected in Ladysmith, Vancouver Island on 21 June 1911, marked the end of the Bank of Commerce's major phase of western branch expansion.

Previous prefabricated building industries had been dependent on fragile and transitory economic conditions. The B. C. Mills system was no exception. It blossomed during a period of rampant population growth which locally based lumber and building industries were not yet geared to meet. By 1908, however, shifts were beginning to occur which were reflected in the records of the firm. Although 1904 to 1907 were boom years for the British Columbia lumber industry, a recession in profits began to set in by 1908 due to increased competition and a corresponding decline in retail prices. This competition included a number of sectional building systems which were marketed by Vancouver firms after 1905; none, however, seriously challenged the B. C. Mills line in design or volume of production.[1] In his report for 1908, general manager John Hendry of B. C. Mills declared that although the volume of business had continued to rise, prices had dropped markedly over the previous year, particularly in the domestic trade. The company's policy in the face of this less favourable climate was "a curtailment of operations and expenses, as far as possible, and refraint from pushing trade that could only be done at a loss."[2] But whereas the prices of standard lumber products were forced down by market competition, the cost of prefabricated buildings crept steadily higher from the initial 1904 prices, thus eroding their competitive edge over locally built housing. Nevertheless, in 1908 the firm deemed it appropriate to spend several thousand dollars on an exhibit at the Calgary Exhibition, indicating that prefabs were not yet considered among the firm's liabilities.[3]

Perhaps a more direct reason for the eventual dropping of the prefabs in 1910 lay in Hendry's personal financial commitments. After 1907 he had become increasingly involved in railroad and land speculation. Possession of the Vancouver, Westminster and Yukon Railroad franchise, which offered the only feasible route into Vancouver apart from the Canadian Pacific, made him the recipient of a succession of overtures and offers from railroad companies. Consequently after 1908, Hendry regarded his milling interests increasingly in terms of their real estate value as strategic waterfront properties rather than as an expanding industry. In correspondence with his secretary, William McNeil, he expressed a recurring desire to liquidate his mill assets and remove himself entirely from the lumber industry.[4] Although the firm did not pass out of his hands until 1913, general policy during the last years of Hendry's management appears to have reflected his declining enthusiasm for the lumbering aspect of his holdings. Increasing competition and declining prices undoubtedly encouraged his outlook.

It is not surprising therefore that when approached in 1910 by a newly formed firm, the Prudential Builders Limited, Hendry agreed to turn over the rights to the prefab system on a royalty basis. Edwin Mahony left the B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company to assume the post of general manager of Prudential Builders. Evidently the board of directors of this company considered the market for prefabricated housing to be far from closed. In a prospectus to shareholders they confidently announced,

*The Company has acquired the rights to manufacture on a royalty basis, the most improved and modern sectional buildings ever invented. We have in operation one of the finest wood-working factories in the Dominion for the manufacture of these sectional buildings, and our special equipment enables us to secure a large share of this very profitable business. . . . These buildings will be shipped throughout the Western Provinces and sold to incoming settlers on easy terms.*[5]

Prudential Builders was in fact representative of a new phenomenon occurring in western Canada. Like the older B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company, the firm owned its own timber rights and saw-mill, in addition to a large house-building factory located at the corner of Manitoba and Dufferin streets on the south side of Vancouver's False Creek. But unlike B. C. Mills, this firm was specifically geared to the mass production of popularly priced housing rather than components and lumber products. Its lineage lay not in the old-style saw-mills of the lower mainland, but in the Prudential Investment Company, one of the numerous investment and loan companies emerging in the highly speculative building climate of Vancouver. Marketing of the firm's houses was conducted through a subsidiary, the National Finance Company.[6]

Although Prudential Builders initially intended to continue tapping the rural frontier market for prefabricated housing, the newly settled rural regions, they soon altered their plans. They attempted instead to apply the sectional system to the continually growing urban market in the form of subdivision housing. At this point a conflict arose between Mahony, the system's inventor, and the executives of the firm over the type and location of such developments. Mahony maintained that his system would be best applied initially to small homes on the outskirts of Vancouver which would be inexpensive and readily marketable to working-class buyers.[7] The firm instead elected to apply the system to the construction of larger California-bungalow style homes on a tract of land adjacent to Shaughnessy Heights, the most fashionable residential section of the city. Inspired by a development in Los Angeles, the project was named Talton Place after the firm's president, Thomas Talton Langlois. It is believed to have been the first attempt at mass-produced subdivision housing in the city.[8] The first houses were prefabricated at the firm's plant at False Creek, then reassembled on site. Mahony's fears were soon borne out, however. It was found that the use of the panels inflated the cost of the



22 Prudential Builders, inheritors of the prefabricated system in 1910, attempted to adapt it to larger California-style bungalows. Note this advertisement's concern with stressing the maturity and reliability of the sectional system ("in use for 7 years"). Many styles were advertised, but this design, "Vancouver", typified the predominant two-storey house built in large areas of Vancouver during this period. *(Province* [Vancouver].*)*

# Do You Intend to Build?

**Then Investigate the Patented Sectional Houses of**

**Prudential Builders Ltd.** Cor. Dufferin and Manitoba Sts.

SECTION THROUGH WALLS OF ONE STORY BUILDINGS.
SECTION THROUGH WALLS OF ONE AND A HALF STORY BUILDINGS.
SECTION THROUGH WALLS OF TWO STORY BUILDINGS.
DESIGN "VANCOUVER" SHOWING SECTIONS, FRAMING, AND METHOD OF APPLYING SHEATHING PAPER AND SHINGLES, OR LONG RUSTIC IF USED IN PLACE OF SHINGLES ON OUR BUILDINGS.
Lath
Plaster
Lath furring
Corner studs
Space
Lath studs
Heavy impervious sheathing paper
Shingles
Window Section
HORIZONTAL SECTION THROUGH EXTERIOR WALLS

This system of house construction is not new—seven years in use.

All the component parts of a house are manufactured and ready to be set up before leaving the factory.

All materials and workmanship are of the best

As all sectional parts are stocked, orders are filled very quickly

All hardware, tinware and furnace are supplied if purchaser so desires. As material of this class is bought in carload lots, the purchaser secures the benefit of the reduced freight rates.

All timber, which is of superior class, is cut at our own mills. We can therefore cut to suit our requirements without delay.

**We Guarantee Satisfaction. For Prices and Full Particulars See**

**National Finance Company Ltd.**

Exclusive Agents

**Corner Pender and Homer Streets** **Phone 4523-4**

houses beyond those of other firms. Prudential Builders decided to abandon use of the system and built the remainder of their houses in the orthodox baloon-frame manner, with the intention of marketing them in both Vancouver and western Canada.

This proved increasingly difficult to do, as the industrial bases in large prairie centres such as Calgary and Winnipeg were now capable of supporting similar firms geared to mass-produced house manufacturing.[9] Although this terminated the demand for ready-made structures, Vancouver's role as a major lumber supplier for the prairies continued, as did its influence on prairie building designs.[10] Edwin Mahony left Prudential Builders within a year of their abandonment of his sectional building system,[11] and an interesting phase in western Canada's architectural development came to an end.

## Conclusion

Whereas earlier prefab building systems, particularly sectional or "knock-down" ones, are studied in the past tense as transitory curiosities, the system described in this paper remains a visible part of western Canada's human landscape. In fact it is through the remarkably diverse examples found throughout Vancouver, southwestern British Columbia and the prairie provinces that much of the documentation for this study has been obtained. The significance of structures such as those illustrated in the report may be viewed in two ways.

Their link to earlier prefabricated building systems, particularly those of the American West, was obvious. Mahony's invention may be seen as a late – perhaps even final – stage of this tradition, a sophisticated and durable application of prefabricated techniques to frontier markets. By the same token, its sudden demise may be explained as a natural death to which all preceding ready-made systems had been subject, as the initial pioneer stage gave way to increasingly self-supporting regional development. Within this context, Mahony's system is of particular interest for its close interrelationship with both the emerging west-coast lumber industry and with the railroad-oriented settlement patterns of the Canadian West.

A case may also be made for suggesting that Mahony's system represented a fascinating link in the evolution of western Canadian vernacular architecture. B. C. Mills factory prefabrication of permanent dwellings constituted a major departure from the preceding era of individual craftsman-built housing, and anticipated the standardized mass-production so common in present-day buildings. This new scale of production along with the versatility inherent in the system made it an ideal medium for the dissemination of building styles throughout western Canada. Vernacular styles evolving in the Vancouver area during the first decade of the century were reflected in standard designs marketed in the firm's catalogue; similarly, classical bank images previously restricted to major urban centres were rendered common sights in many of the smallest prairie settlements within a four-year period.

Although the B. C. Mills prefab system enjoyed a relatively short production life, its impact as an enduring part of western Canada's early architectural heritage is testified by the survival of so many of the structures 70 years after their manufacture.

23 This streetscape of workmen's housing built by the Calgary firm of Robertson and Carlile is a good example of the locally based companies which emerged to take over the market filled earlier by B.C. Mills prefabs.
*(H. J. Boam, The Prairie Provinces of Canada: Their History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources, Sells, London, 1914.)*



24 The Edward B. Walker house, 2163 E. Hastings Street, Vancouver, a Settlers' Series design D.



25 Barber shop, Aberdeen Street, Winnipeg,
a Settlers' Series design D.



26 A pair of one-and-one-half storey prototype houses built in 1904 for Hastings Mills yard foreman S. Brereton at 515 and 521 Hawks Avenue, Vancouver.



27 Former B.C. Mills stable on Pandora Street, Vancouver, destroyed by fire, 1973.



28 Note the distinctive bell-cast roof and dormer of this Townhouse Series design L, 161 East 12th Avenue, Vancouver.



29 Townhouse Series design J. 120 24th Street West, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.



30 A group of Townhouse Series design J models on 1500 block, Yew Street, Vancouver. Smaller models such as these were popular for speculative building. Numerous clusters were erected throughout the city.



31 Former branch of Northern Bank, Steveston, B.C., a slightly modified Townhouse Series Design J-J which now serves as a doctor's office.



32 Although much altered through the years, the bell cast roof and dormer identify this house as a B.C. Mills prefab. In this case, an exposed section of the original facade helps verify its origins, unlike many others which have been completely covered.

33 A well-preserved Townhouse Series model L-L-L, 1556 Adanac Street, Vancouver, showing the distinctive bell-cast gambrel roof.

34 Detail from the house shown in Figure 33 showing a standard porch and eaves treatment. Wooden eaves troughing was included.

35 A Townhouse Series model O-O-O, 1735 E. 1st. Ave., Vancouver.

32



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

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

36 In 1907 B.C. Mills published a supplementary series of two-storey townhouse designs in response to requests for larger homes. This example is located on Brink St., Ashcroft, B.C. *(Warren Sommer.)*

37 The Robertson Presbyterian Church, 1795 Napier Avenue, in Vancouver's East End. The original section, built in 1908 with B.C. Mills panels, was enlarged in 1921 with the protruding south wing (left side), which employed vertical battens for aesthetic purposes.

36



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

38 Three standard B.C. Mills school houses still in use as annexes, City School, 557 West 12th Avenue, Vancouver.

39 A former British Columbia Telephone Company exchange in Ladner, B.C., now used as offices.

40 Former B.C. Mills general office, Dunlevy Street Vancouver. White columns against a bright blue background make this one of the most pleasing of the prefabricated structures erected by the firm.

41 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce branch, corner of Bay and Douglas streets, Victoria, B.C., built 3 March 1910. This is one of the few prefab banks still in servic

42 Bank of Commerce, Watson, Saskatchewan (built 24 November 1906). *(Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.)*

39



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

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

42

43 Former Bank of Commerce Branch, Vermilion, Alberta (built Oct. 30, 1905). Most of these structures have been adapted to other uses, as in the case of this recently demolished example which served as a Legion hall.

44 Former Bank of Commerce branch, Blake Street, Winnipeg, built 22 January 1906, now used as the "Old Bank Grocery Store."

43



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

### Introduction

1 The role of prefabricated buildings in American and British expansion has been extensively documented. *See,* for example, Gilbert Herbert, "The Portable Colonial Cottage," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* (hereafter cited as *JSAH*), Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1972), pp. 261-75; Margaretta Jean Darnall, "Innovations in American Prefabricated Housing, 1860-1890," *JSAH,* Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 51-5; Charles E. Peterson, "Prefabs on the Prairies," *JSAH,* Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 1952), pp. 28-30; Charles E. Peterson, "Prefabs in the California Gold Rush, 1849," *JSAH,* Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1965), pp. 318-24.

2 The first prefabricated house in North America was brought across the Atlantic by Frobisher in 1578 for a gold-mining project on Baffin Island: *see* Charles E. Peterson, "Early American Prefabrication," *Gazette des Beaux Arts,* Vol. 33 (1948), pp. 37-46. For St. Paul's, Halifax, *see* Alan Gowans, *Building Canada: An Architectural History of Canadian Life* (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), Pl. 53 and legend; for St. John's, Victoria, *see* Edgar Fawcett, *Some Reminiscences of Old Victoria* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), pp. 115-8. An interesting example of Canadian-built exported prefabrication includes the one-storey 20 ft. by 27 ft. ready-made houses by Rhodes and Curry of Truro, N.S. for the Jamaican government ("Manufacture of Ready-Made Houses in Canada," *Canadian Architect and Builder,* Vol. 6 [August 1893], pp. 33, 84).

3 An early example of prefabrication on the prairies is the old Royal Hotel in Calgary, built in sections in 1884; *see* article in *Calgary Herald* 1913 by J. W. Costello, quoted in M. B. Venini Byrne, *From the Buffalo to the Cross. A History of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Calgary* (Calgary: Calgary Archives and Historical Publishers, 1973), p. 517. In the American West, the prefabricated building industries reached major proportions. J. B. Jackson, in his book, *American Space: The Centennial Years, 1876-86* (New York: Norton, 1972), notes, "Even before the completion of the Union Pacific, much of its west-bound freight consisted of portable houses." He adds, "To try to understand the distribution of house types throughout the United States without recognizing the role played by the factories in Chicago and other Mid-western cities would be a hopeless undertaking" (pp. 83, 85).

4 *See,* for example, Percy A. Maxwell, *Letters of Percy Augustus Maxwell* (Toronto: Elizabeth A. Maxwell, 1967), pp. 86-7; M. Hennicker, *Canadian Life as I Found It: Four Years of Homesteading in the North West Territories* (London: Elliott Stock, 1908), pp. 14, 20, 26, etc.; and James M. Minifie, *Homesteader: A Prairie Boyhood Recalled* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 59-64.

5 The Canadian Pacific Railway's Department of Natural Resources initiated a program of ready-made farms around 1908. A series of 16 "colonies," 14 in southern Alberta and 2 in Saskatchewan, had been established by 1912. Five ready-made fruit farm colonies were later established in British Columbia; Henry J. Boam, *The Prairie Provinces of Canada: Their History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources* (London: Sells, 1914), pp. 346-8. The company produced a pamphlet illustrating the selection of available buildings in 1912 [*Buildings Erected on Ready-Made Farms,* Calgary, Canadian Pacific Railway, Department of Natural Resources, 1912].

6 The pre-cut churches and parsonages are described in L. N. Tucker, *Western Canada* (Toronto: Musson Book Co., 1907), pp. 124-6.

7 B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company, *Ready-Made Houses, A New System of House Construction* (Vancouver, [1906]), p. 1.

8 Thomas Ritchie, *Canada Builds, 1867-1967* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 126; "One Hundred Years of B. C. Housing," *Western Homes and Living* (January 1958), pp. 16-17.

### Invention, House Designs and Initial Marketing

1 R. H. Alexander, "The British Columbia Lumber Industry, From the Point of View of a Pioneer in the Trade," *The British Columbia Review* (1906), p. 19. Alexander, an executive with B. C. Mills, noted, "The Northwest and Manitoba market is looked upon to take most of the rougher grades and some of the higher, such as siding, flooring and ceiling. The rougher grades come into competition with duty-free lumber from the United States and the railway haul averages about 1200 miles before the product reaches this market."

2 John Hendry, a native of Gloucester County, New Brunswick, had been active in the British Columbia lumber industry since 1872. Spending some time in lumber operations in California and Washington's Puget Sound, he was responsible for the founding of a succession of mills and wood-working factories in New Westminster, Nanaimo and Vancouver. After the formation of B. C. Mills, Hendry's interests rapidly expanded to encompass electrical power companies, railways and land speculation. A full sketch is contained in *British Columbia: Pictorial and Biographical* (Vancouver: J. S. Clarke, 1914), Vol. 2, pp. 38-43.

3 B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company, op. cit., p. 1.

4 Winnipeg *Tribune,* 1 August 1904: "Heretofore the idea of the so-called 'portable houses' has been somewhat sneered at, and but little faith has been fixed on such ready-made buildings."

5 Margaretta Jean Darnall op. cit., p. 54.

6 Canada. Department of Agriculture, *Patent Office Record,* 1904, No. 85, 101 (1 January 1904), pp. 1-2.

7 *See,* for example, W. L. Morton, *Manitoba, A History* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 273-328, passim.

8 Winnipeg *Town Topics,* 6 August 1904, cited in B. C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company, *Catalogue of Patented Ready-Made Houses* (Vancouver, 1905).

9 Ibid. Seven basic series were available, identified by alphabetical letter in ascending order of size from "H" to "P", excluding the letters I and N. Each series contained from one to three models with identical first floors (i.e., same number of panels), but differing in the number of storeys and roof design.

10 E. Odlum, Vancouver *Daily World*, 3 October 1904.

11 Vancouver *Daily News Advertiser*, 2 October 1904.

12 Chilliwack *Progress*, 4 April 1906.

13 R. E. Gosnell, *A History of British Columbia* (Victoria: Lewis, 1906), p. 703.

### Commercial Applications and Distribution

1 Rural school examples were erected at Bradwardine, Manitoba, and Port Essington, B.C.

2 The Ocean Falls post office is illustrated in Bruce Ramsey, *Rain People, the story of Ocean Falls* (Ocean Falls: Ocean Falls Centennial Committee, 1971), p. 52. An illustration of the prefab in use at the Consumption Hospital, Kamloops, B.C., is obtained in "T.B. – Fighting the White Plague," by "Traveller," *British Columbia Magazine*, Vol. 8, No. 6 (June 1912), pp. 457-60 (illustration, p. 459).

3 Vancouver *Daily News Advertiser*, 8 January 1905.

4 British Columbia Telephone Company, Historical Photo File, Main Office, Vancouver, B.C.

5 The number of CPR purchases from B.C. Mills is unknown. Documented examples were erected at Spences Bridge (brakeman's residence), Mission City, Savona and Merritt (maintenance sheds), all in British Columbia.

6 Bank of Montreal prefab branches were located in Nicola and Chilliwack; a Northern Bank branch was erected in Steveston, B.C.

7 Victor Ross, *The History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce* (Toronto, 1922), Vol. 2, pp. 280-81. This building survives, although it is now sheathed with aluminum siding. It has served for many years as the office for the township of Coleman.

8 Ibid., p. 490.

9 Ibid., p. 280; also original building plan, Douglas and Bay Street branch, Victoria, B.C. Darling and Pearson are best known for major works such as Trinity College, Toronto General Hospital in Toronto and the Sun Life Assurance Building, Montreal. Pearsons worked on the reconstruction of the Ottawa Parliament Buildings in 1916, as well as a series of regional head offices for major banks, including the Bank of Commerce branches in Vancouver and Winnipeg.

10 Ibid., pp. 294-5.

11 Ibid., pp. 561-4. Ross provides a chronological list of branches constructed by the bank. The majority built between 1906 and 1910 (79 out of 118) were located in the prairie provinces and British Columbia. Full records for the B.C. Mills, Timber and Trading Company were destroyed at the time of its liquidation in 1932.

12 At least six prefabricated Commerce banks were opened during 1906 in towns along the newly built Canadian Northern railroad line through Saskatchewan. These include Radisson (22 February), Humboldt (2 March), Vonda (5 April), Canora (5 April), Watson (24 November) and Wadena (30 November); Victor Ross, op. cit., Appendix 12, pp. 556-72. The meagre populations of these towns in 1911 – e.g., Canora 435, Watson 211, Vonda 268 (*Atlas of Canada*, 1915) – suggests the wisdom of this wait-and-see investment policy by the bank.

13 Canadian Northern Railway, *Opportunities and Business Openings in Towns in Western Canada* (Winnipeg, 1913), p. 16.

14 Victor Ross, op. cit., pp. 492-3.

### The Demise of the System

1 One such competitor was the Colonial Portable House Company, 746 Beach Avenue, Vancouver, which claimed a distribution in Alaska, the prairies, the fruit districts of British Columbia, South Africa and the tropical islands of the Pacific; *see Greater Vancouver – Illustrated* (Vancouver: Dominion Illustrating Co., 1908), pp. 183-4. According to one advertisement, their intent was to build "Canada Cottages to meet the requirements of Settlers, Ranchers, Townsite Owners, Etc." *British Columbia Review* (1906), p. 34.

2 Vancouver City Archives, William McNeil MSS, Vol. 2, John Hendry, "General Manager's Report, The British Columbia Mills, Timber and Trading Company, Dec. 31, 1908."

3 Ibid., "Statement of Profit and Loss, Royal City Planing Mills Branch, Vancouver, B.C." The Calgary exhibit expenses totalled $2,222. Gross sales for prefabs totalled $86,393 in 1908.

4 Ibid., personal correspondence, John Hendry to William McNeil, 28 June 1910; 12 August 1910; also John Hendry to R. H. Alexander, 15 April 1921.

5 The Prudential Investment Company, *Prospectus* (Vancouver, 1910), "Plan of Preparation," p. 6.

6 This linkage of the house building and home financing operation under one company was modelled on the vastly successful Los Angeles Investment Company, which had realized the advantages of integration for scale economies in the increasingly competitive Los Angeles real estate industry during the previous decade. Other Vancouver building companies were to model themselves overtly on the Los Angeles model. Two such examples included the Bungalow Finance and Construction Company and Vancouver Free Homes Ltd.; these and many other companies emerging just prior to the 1912 real estate boom in Vancouver had a profound effect on the suburban landscape of the city. They enjoyed advantages in design costs, material purchase, landholdings and home financing over smaller scale building contractors.

7 Miss Edna M. Mahony, personal communication, 25 July 1973: "They had taken up acreage on the outskirts of the city, then divided it up into lots. Consequently, these houses, being on less expensive property, could be sold for less and returns would come in sooner. This was my father's thought, but instead of carrying out this idea, the partners preferred buying city lots and, of course . . . the houses, which in some cases were larger than the original sectional houses, were more expensive and did not sell too fast."

8 Vancouver City Archives, Interview, J. C. McPherson, president, Canada Permanent Loan Company, with J. S. Mathews, 17 October 1939.

9 One example of this emerging local ability to provide mass housing needs is the firm of Robertson and Carlile of Calgary; *see* H. J. Boam, *The Prairie Provinces of Canada: Their History,*

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*People, Commerce, Industries and Resources* (London: Sells, 1914), pp. 363-6; also the Tuxedo Park development, Calgary, by Canadian Estates Co. Ltd., whose operation was similar to that of Prudential Builders in Vancouver; ibid., p. 339.

10 *See*, for example, the Tudor-style homes and California bungalow designs suggested by the B.C. Forest Service in bulletins promoting the use of B.C. timber for prairie needs. These bulletins contained a detailed breakdown of the amount of lumber of specific size and length, all necessary screws, nails, etc., as well as plans. *See* British Columbia. Department of Lands. Forest Service. *British Columbia Timber for Prairie Farms, Farm Building Series.* Bulletins 1-10 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1915), particularly No. 10, "Farm Houses."

11 Mahony moved to England where he attempted to remarket his sectional houses during the 1920s. Apparently his base was Bushey Heath, near Watford; research has yet to provide information on this phase of his career. Prefabricated bungalows did enjoy a successful English market in the 1920s and 1930s as the increasing leisure and mobility of the middle class found an outlet in second homes at the seaside or in the countryside; *see* Anthony D. King, "The Bungalow, Part Two," *Architectural Association Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (October-December 1973), pp. 14-17.

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